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Statement of the Supreme Court in 1895:
―Whenever a distinction is made in the burdens a law imposes or in the benefits it
confers on any citizens by reason of their birth, or wealth, or religion, it is class
legislation, and leads inevitably to oppression and abuses, and to general unrest
and disturbance in society. It was hoped and believed that the great amendments
to the Constitution which followed the late civil war had rendered such legislation
impossible for all future time.‖
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.3
Introduction
Ask anyone whether the Constitution permits discrimination on the basis of religion, and
the response will undoubtedly be no. Yet the modern Supreme Court has not recognized that the
anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment protects religion in the same way
that the Amendment protects against discrimination on the basis of race or gender. In fact, the
Supreme Court has permitted the legislature to facially discriminate against religion in funding
programs.4 To make matters worse, thirty-seven state constitutions and the District of
Columbia‘s Code openly discriminate on the basis of religion in so-called Blaine amendments.5
The exclusion of religion from the Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination
command is all the more remarkable because the Supreme Court has used the Amendment‘s antidiscrimination command to protect a wide variety of groups – most of whom are never
mentioned elsewhere in the text of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has relied on the
Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command to strike down classifications based on gender, 6

3

157 U.S. 429, 596, (1895) superseded by constitutional amendment, CONST. AMEND. XVI, as recognized in South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
4
See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (permitting a state to withhold scholarship money from individuals
seeking a religious education, even though it provided scholarships to individuals seeking a secular education).
5
Kyle Duncan, Comment, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72 Fordham L.
Rev. 493 (2003) (counting so-called ―Blaine Amendments‖); D.C. CODE § 44-715 (2012).
6

Craig v. Boren , 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); United States v. Virginia
(The VMI Case), 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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illegitimacy,7 physical disability,8 alienage,9 citizenship,10 and sexual orientation.11 And in
Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court used the Fourteenth Amendment‘s antidiscrimination command to strike down a statute compelling sterilization for larceny but not
embezzlement.12 Although the Supreme Court once restricted its equal protection doctrine to
―discrete and insular minorities,‖13 it has recently extended equal protection rights to whites,
limiting affirmative action programs and other efforts to aid racial minorities.14 Most recently,
the Ninth Circuit used the Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command to strike down
California‘s Proposition 8, banning same-sex marriages.15 Curiously, the Supreme Court has not
granted the same anti-discrimination protection to religion despite explicit suggestions in the text
of the Constitution itself that religion ought to always be treated as a suspect class.
We think this outcome is clearly wrong. The Supreme Court‘s current view is that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment granted equal protection to groups that lacked civil or
political rights in 1787 (racial minorities), as well as to groups that lacked civil and political
rights in 1787 and 1868 but who would gain those rights in the future (e.g., women, immigrants,
gays and lesbians), yet the Fourteenth Amendment denied equal protection to groups that did
7

Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
8

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that denial of zoning permit to
home for mentally retarded individuals failed rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause); but see Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that mentally retarded individuals should
be considered a suspect class due to history of discrimination and strict scrutiny analysis should apply).
9
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that a school district could not charge children of illegal immigrants
tuition to compensate for lost state funding).
10
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (holding that a state could not condition admission to the bar on citizenship).
11
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (O‘Connor, J.
concurring).
12
Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See also Harper v. West Virginia, 383
U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down a poll tax under the equal protection clause).
13
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 155 n.4 (1938).
14

See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
15

See Perry v. Brown, 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010).
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have both civil and political rights in both 1787 and 1868 (religious groups). Such an outcome is
quite frankly wrong. A more likely construction of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it did
guarantee equal protection for groups that already had civil and political rights prior to 1868, as
well as to other groups newly-recognized for protection starting in 1868. Thus, Michael A.
Paulsen has quite rightly argued for an equal protection approach to the Establishment Clause,16
and Bernadette Meyler has argued quite rightly for an equal protection approach to the Free
Exercise Clause.17 Other scholars as well have sought to interpret the two Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment with reference to the Equal Protection Clause.18 But no one to date has made
an argument from the original public meaning of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment that the
anti-discrimination command of that Amendment bans all forms of discrimination on the basis of
religion, including Blaine Amendments and public school monopolies, and that it would do so
even if the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clauses had never been adopted!
In this article, we argue that, as a matter of original meaning, the Fourteenth Amendment,
standing alone, forbids all discrimination on the basis of religion just as it forbids all
discrimination on the basis of race and gender. Our understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment
is based on the research of Professor Melissa Saunders19 and Professor John Harrison,20 who

16

Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311 (1986).
17
Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and their History, 47 Boston
College L. Rev. 274 (2006).
18
Other scholars have also argued that the religion clauses involve a concept of equality. See, e.g., Philip B.
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1961) (stating that the religion clauses
should be ―read together as creating a doctrine more akin to the reading of the equal protection clause than to the due
process clause‖); PHILLIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002); Susan Gellman & Susan
Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment
Clause), 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 665 (2008); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 70 (2007) (explaining that ―the religion clauses express equality norms that ... are
much like the more general norms in the Equal Protection Clause‖).
19
20

Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 245 (1997).
John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L. J. 1385 (1992).
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have both argued that the Amendment outlawed class legislation, and on the research of
Professor Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert, who have argued that the Amendment also banned
systems of caste.21 The historical evidence is overwhelming and persuasive. We argue that a ban
on class legislation and systems of caste is broad in scope and that it includes a ban on all forms
of discrimination on the basis of religion. Religion is a suspect classification such that
discrimination on the basis of religion ought always to be subjected to strict scrutiny which is
strict in theory and fatal in fact. We reach this conclusion without regard to the original meaning
of either the Establishment Clause or of the Free Exercise either in 1791 or in 1868.
The anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment would ban
discrimination on the basis of religion even if the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. Discrimination on the basis of religion is a forbidden
form of class legislation even when it is sanctioned in State constitutions, and it is always
unconstitutional. And just as the constitutional and statutory bans on race discrimination and on
sex discrimination ban State laws and workplaces and educational environment that are hostile to
African Americans or to women, the ban on religion discrimination, which is specifically
mentioned in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ought to be understood to ban community or work or
school environments that are hostile to religion. A learning environment in which student
religious groups face official hostility on account of their religious beliefs is quite simply illegal.
The Supreme Court‘s recent 5 to 4 ruling in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where a
Christian Legal Society chapter was compelled to admit members who engaged in gay sexual
relationships, is thus wrongly decided and should be overruled as a violation of the federal Civil
21

Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2011). See also
Mark C. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1366 (1990) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause banned systems of
class and caste).
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Rights laws and of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 Moreover, Supreme Court decisions that seek
to scrub the public square clean of all references to religion are themselves unconstitutional
attempts to create a public environment that is hostile to religion.23 A Supreme Court rule
banning public displays on government buildings of, for example, the Ten Commandments
creates an environment that is hostile to religion in the same way that a Supreme Court rule
banning displays of pictures of Martin Luther King or of Susan B. Anthony would create an
environment that is hostile to African Americans or to women.
Our anti-discrimination argument with respect to religion is in line with the Supreme
Court‘s most important and most recent decision protecting religious liberty from government
action. In its 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, a
unanimous Supreme Court recognized that the Constitution mandates a ―ministerial exception‖
to generally applicable employment laws.24 In the Hosanna-Tabor decision, a minister of a
church claimed that she had been wrongfully terminated in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.25 The Supreme Court unanimously held that the plaintiff was a minister, and
the Court explicitly rejected the Obama Administration‘s argument that the government can
subject ministers in churches to the employment discrimination requirements of Title VII.26
Hosanna-Tabor thus requires the government to consider the impact of its neutral, generally
applicable employment discrimination laws on religion. Since those employment discrimination
laws make it just as illegal to discriminate on the basis of religion, as it is to discriminate on the
basis of race or sex, it is hard to see how a religious employer could ever be stopped from firing

22

130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
See, e.g., Lee v. Wesiman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down school prayers at graduation ceremonies);
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (outlawing a display of the Ten Commandments).
24
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
25
Id. at 699-701.
26
Id. at 706-707.
23
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any employee for religious reasons whether that employee is or is not a minister. Obviously,
religious employers can hire exclusively members of their own religions just as it is obvious that
Native American tribes can decide whether a person is or is not, for example, a Cherokee, and
just as men can be excluded from all women‘s colleges that have federal tax exempt status. The
Hosanna-Tabor decision decisively rejects the claim that forbidding discrimination on the basis
of race or sex discrimination under the Constitution is somehow more important under the
Constitution and laws than is forbidding discrimination on the basis of religion. All three forms
of discrimination are equally proscribed by the Constitution and by our civil rights laws.
Our analysis begins with the premise that the proper way to interpret the Constitution is
to evaluate the original public meaning of the Constitution‘s text.27 We thus follow the
methodology of Supreme Court justices Antonin Scalia28 and Clarence Thomas throughout this
article. In looking for the objective original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s antidiscrimination command, we have looked at dictionaries, speeches, newspaper articles,
documents, legislative histories, and historical events to determine the original public meaning of
the constitutional text.29 We emphatically do not think that the framers‘ subjective meaning or
intent is a controlling analytical factor, just as a party‘s subjective intent in signing a contract
does not determine the meaning of the contract.30 Instead, we think that what matters is the
objective public meaning of the text as defined during the historical time period in which it was

27

See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
Id.
29
See William Michael Treanor, Taxing Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of
Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 497–98 (2007).
30
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990) (―The
search is not for a subjective intention.... [W]hat counts is what the public understood.‖); John Harrison, State
Sovereign Immunity and Congress's Enforcement Powers, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 353, 388 (2006) (discussing how the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were concerned that the Amendment could have broader implications than
they expected or intended); Steven Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virgina, ____BYU L.
Rev.____ (forthcoming 2012) (on file with authors) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment banned
antimiscegenation laws, even though the framers subjectively intended otherwise).
28
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written and ratified.31 It is therefore necessary to examine the historical record to discern how the
framers understood the Fourteenth Amendment‘s meaning in so far as it bans discrimination.
Adhering to the original public meaning of the text is especially important when
evaluating a Fourteenth Amendment question. If a court takes the view that the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s guarantee of equal civil rights can change and evolve over time, then no one is
safe. Living constitutionalists must concede that not only could groups be added into the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s protection, but also that groups could be removed from the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s protection as well. 32 This consequence was implicitly endorsed by the Warren
Court in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, in which the majority stated, ―the Equal
Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era . . . we have never
been confined to historic notions of equality.‖33 But perhaps some kinds of shackling are in fact
good. If the Supreme Court would always agree to adhere to the original public meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, civil rights could never in the future be conditioned on the basis of race,
and segregation would always be unconstitutional. But if the Supreme Court follows the Warren
Court‘s view in Harper, there are no constitutionally secured protections against segregation.
Under originalism, segregation was unconstitutional in 1868, and Plessy v. Ferguson34 was

31

See Scalia, supra note 27, at 37–38 (1997).
Eliminating groups protected under the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is precisely what the
Supreme Court did in Carolene Products Footnote Four. There, the Court restricted the Amendment‘s protection to
―discrete and insular minorities,‖ 304 U.S. at 153, n.4, even though the Amendment originally protected everyone,
even members of the majority; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088-3120 (2010) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Second Amendment does not give individuals a substantive right to bear arms, even
though the original meaning indicated otherwise).
33
383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
34
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (endorsing the concept of ―separate but equal‖).
32
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wrong on the day it was decided.35 But under Harper, Plessy was correct in 1896, and
segregation was permissible until the 1950s when the Supreme Court said otherwise.36
We believe that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s broad ban on all class legislation and
systems of caste prohibits the government from singling out any groups or individuals for unique
burdens or privileges or immunities. Class legislation, which benefits or injures a limited class of
individuals, can in essence be viewed as the opposite of legislation enacted to promote the
general welfare, which benefits all citizens.
We find it hard to believe that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment created a broad
ban on class legislation, yet excluded religious individuals from protection against all forms of
class legislation enacted on the basis of religion. The religion clauses of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights served as early, though limited, bans on some forms of class legislation directed
against religion. Religion also enjoyed substantial protection in state constitutions in 1868 most
of which had Free Exercise and Establishment Clause analogues.37
Constitutional protection against discrimination on the basis of religion has deep roots in
American history going back to the founding generation. The founders were well aware of the
evils of discrimination on the basis of religion which had been widespread both in Europe and in
Colonial America, and they sought to guard against it. The three religion clauses in the
Constitution of 1787 and in the Bill of Rights served as an initial, though limited, protection
against certain specific forms of discrimination on the basis of religion. State constitutions also
35

Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 30 (setting out the originalist case against Plessy).
Similarly, Harper allows future courts to reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment‘s guarantee that no state shall
―deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law‖ as including fetuses, not just people.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added). See Abortion Case I, Federal Constitutional Court (Germany), 39
BVerfGE 1 (1975) (―‗Everyone‘ within the meaning of [the Constitution] is ‗every living human being,‘ or, put
differently, every human individual possessing life; ‗everyone‘ thus also includes the still unborn human being.‖)
After all, why should it matter that in 1868 a ―person‖ did not include a fetus?
37
See Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When the Fourteenth
Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 Texas
Law Review 1, 31-41 (2009).
36
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protected against certain forms of discrimination on the basis of religion in varying ways. But
unfortunately discrimination on the basis of religion was quite prevalent during the Antebellum
Period. Slaves in particular were subjected to harsh discrimination on the basis of religion, in
addition to the general cruelty of slavery that they experienced. Abolition was partly sought to
give slaves religious liberty. And the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment generally recognized
that discrimination on the basis of religion was entirely unacceptable. When the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment condemned the systematic mistreatment of African Americans during
Reconstruction, those Framers frequently cited the Indian caste system as a comparable
reprehensible social order. The Indian caste system was itself defined by and was in practice a
class system based on religious distinctions. A typical Nineteenth Century dictionary definition
of caste read, ―In Hindostan, a tribe or class of the same profession, as the caste of Bramins; a
distinct rank or order of society.‖38 Bramins were the priestly class at the top of India‘s religious
caste system. So, in 1868, the literal dictionary definition of an undesirable system of ―caste‖
was one that made reference to a religious caste system! The unavoidable conclusion is therefore
that when the Framers banned systems of caste and of class legislation in general, they surely
meant to ban class systems that were maintained by discrimination on the basis of religion.
Banning discrimination on the basis of religion is also consistent with global human
rights law which bans discrimination on the basis of religion just as emphatically as it bans
discrimination on the basis of race or gender.39 At least forty-five countries protect against
discrimination on the basis of religion alongside protections against discrimination on the basis
38

See, e.g., CHAUNCEY A. GOODRICH, A PRONOUNCING AND DEFINING DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 64,
75 (1856); JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, A UNIVERSAL AND CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 107-08,
128 (1849) (―Caste, n. A distinct, hereditary order or class of people among the Hindoos, the members of which are
of the same rank, profession, or occupation; an order or class‖); see also Charles Sumner, lecture, The Question of
Caste, 6-10 (Wright & Porter Printers, 1869), available at
http://ia600306.us.archive.org/5/items/questionofcaste00sumn/questionofcaste00sumn.pdf (discussing the Indian
caste system at length).
39
See discussion infra Part II.E.
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of race and gender.40 Some of those countries include such major world powers as Canada,
Germany, France, India, and South Africa. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms also outlaws discrimination on the basis
of religion. And in the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protected against
discrimination on the basis of religion alongside its protections against discrimination on the
basis of race and gender. Simply put, when people come together to ban discrimination and to
guarantee equality, they include religion along with race and gender on the list of suspect classes.
We recognize that our reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination
command in religion-related cases might appear novel, since courts generally rely on the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to decide religionrelated cases. We think the Supreme Court has probably felt obligated to take this path because
the First Amendment‘s text speaks so directly about religion. In contrast, the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not mention religion explicitly, although it is the Fourteenth
Amendment and not the First that makes the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
applicable at all to the fifty states. Notwithstanding the constitutional text, there is no reason to
think that all religion questions must be answered by the First Amendment, and that no religion
questions can be answered by the Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination command standing
alone. Indeed the Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command does not specifically
use the words ―race‖ or ―gender‖ any more than it uses the word ―religion.‖ In fact, the Supreme
Court as long ago as in 1938 in Carolene Products Footnote Four said that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects religion from discrimination, just as much as it protects against race or
national origin discrimination!41 And the Court made that observation even though it also

40
41

See Appendix.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 155 n.4
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recognized that laws abridging First Amendment rights get strict scrutiny.42 The clear
implication of Footnote Four is that religion gets Fourteenth Amendment protection in addition
to and above and beyond any First Amendment protections that religion gets under the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.43 And that truism has been cemented by subsequent
courts‘ almost ritualistic recitation that ―[t]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits selective
enforcement based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification.‖44 The Supreme Court has also never said that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s antidiscrimination command does not forbid discrimination on the basis of religion. The issue of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment bars discrimination on the basis of religion has never truly
been argued before the Court because the parties and the Court generally have focused
exclusively on the First Amendment religion clauses to date.45 So, the Supreme Court could start
using the Fourteenth Amendment to adjudicate discrimination on the basis of religion cases
without contradicting its existing incorporated First Amendment case law. Even lower courts
could start using the Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination guarantee in religion cases
without getting into trouble for stare decisis reasons because the Supreme Court has never said
that only the incorporated First Amendment can be used in religion cases.

42

Id.
See further discussion infra Part III.C.
44
See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 n.8 (1979) (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687
(1996); Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 938 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture,
553 U.S. 591, 596 (2008); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17) (stating that ―[t]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment most typically reaches state action that treats a person poorly because of the person's race or other
suspect classification, such as sex, national origin, religion, political affiliation, among others, or because the person
has exercised a ‗fundamental right,‘ or because the person is a member of a group that is the target of irrational
government discrimination‖).
43

45

Parties often mention the Equal Protection Clause as an afterthought, but they never treat equal protection as the
principal argument. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, at *44-45.
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In Part I of this paper, we discuss the original public meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its anti-discrimination command. In Part II, we explain how the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to ban discrimination on the basis of religion. In Part III, we discuss how the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment compares to modern case law. In Part IV, we
describe the connection between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses and the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Part V, we explain why Blaine Amendments violate the Amendment and
respond to a critical counterargument against my thesis. In Part VI, we apply the Fourteenth
Amendment to the public school system. We think that public schools in their current form
discriminate on the basis of religion. We then close with some concluding thoughts.
I. The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
For nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court has mangled the words and basic structure of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court‘s misreading of the Fourteenth Amendment began in
1873 in the Slaughter-House Cases, a case in which the Court, somewhat ironically, butchered
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court‘s opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases
rendered the Privileges or Immunities Clause – the most important clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment – essentially meaningless.46 In subsequent years, the Court continued to ignore the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, and eight justices adhered to that stance as recently as 2010, in
McDonald v. City of Chicago,47 although Justice Clarence Thomas did call for reconsidering the
Slaughter-House Cases. Since 1873, the Supreme Court has relied solely on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the textual source of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s antidiscrimination command.48 And in cases involving claims of individual fundamental rights, the

46

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
48
See e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
47
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Supreme Court has also ignored the Privileges or Immunities Clause and has instead analyzed
those cases under its substantive due process doctrine.49
This approach has been largely unsettling to observers, since it leaves unanswered some
fairly obvious questions. First, what happened to the Privileges or Immunities Clause? Second,
how does a constitutional guarantee of due process of law translate into a substantive due
process doctrine under which certain rights are absolutely protected? And third, how does a
clause that guarantees the equal protection of existing laws also guarantee equality in the making
of new laws? Ironically, the Supreme Court has reached mostly the right results in its case law
while proceeding in every case under the wrong clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because
the current approach is so unsatisfying as an original matter, we begin with an originalist account
of the whole text of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A.

The Text and Structure of the Fourteenth Amendment

To understand the original meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, one
must begin with the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.50 That Clause,

49

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Modern scholarship on the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause began with John Harrison‘s
article Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L. J. 1385 (1992), in which Harrison argued
that the Clause was on an anti-discrimination guarantee and not a font of substantive due process individual rights.
Phillip Hamburger reaches the same conclusion in Privileges or Immunities, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 61 (2011). See also
David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years 342-51 (1985). Akhil Reed Amar
and Randy Barnett read the Clause as protecting both against discrimination and as conferring un-enumerated
individual rights. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA‘S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES
WE LIVE BY 157 (forthcoming 2012); RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 62-65 (2004). Kurt Lash argues in a series of three law review articles which he is turning into a book
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects both against discrimination and that it also protects enumerated but
not un-enumerated individual rights. Kurt Lash, The Constitutional Referendum of 1866: Andrew Johnson and the
Original Meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, forthcoming law review article on file with the authors
(2012); Kurt Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: ―Privileges and Immunities‖ as an
Antebellum Term of Art, 98 Geo. L. J. 1241 (2010); Kurt Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 Geo. L. J. 329 (2011). Robert
Natelson argues in The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 Georgia L. Rev. 1117 (2009)
for the John Harrison and Phillip Hamburger interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2. Our own view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it protects: 1)
against laws that discriminate on the basis of class or caste and that are not just laws enacted for the good of the
whole people; and that 2) it protects both enumerated individual rights and un-enumerated individual rights that are
50
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which the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought was the most important Clause in the
Amendment, says that ―No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.‖51 The Privileges or Immunities Clause
thus restricts the kind of laws a state can ―make‖ or ―enforce.‖ The Privileges or Immunities
Clause is the only clause in the Fourteenth Amendment which directly addresses the question of
what laws a state legislature can constitutionally ―make.‖ Noah Webster‘s 1828 Dictionary
defines the verb ―to make‖ as ―to form,‖ ―to fashion,‖ ―to mold,‖ or ―to create.‖52 The Privileges
or Immunities Clause thus applies to the formation of laws. Laws can, of course, be made by the
legislature as statutes, by the executive branch as regulations, or by the judiciary as judge-made
common law. The Clause therefore forbids lawmakers from ―making‖ any laws that ―abridge,‖
i.e. that ―shorten‖ or ―lessen‖ those rights which are the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States. This reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been advanced most
vigorously in the modern era by Professor John Harrison53 and by Professor David Currie.54
In addition to banning the making of discriminatory laws, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause also bans the enforcement of discriminatory state laws. Noah Webster‘s 1828 Dictionary
defines the verb ―to enforce‖ as ―to strengthen,‖ ―to instigate,‖ ―to animate,‖ ―to give force to,‖
or ―to put in execution.‖55 This indicates that the Privileges or Immunities Clause forbids the

deeply rooted in history and tradition subject always to the caveat that the states can override such rights if they pass
a just law that is enacted for the general good of the whole people. Our reading grows out of the foundational case
of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 no. 3230 C.C.E.D. Pa. (1823).
51
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
52
NOAH WEBSTER‘S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828), available at http://www.1828-dictionary.com/ [hereinafter
―WEBSTER‘S 1828‖].
53
Harrison, supra note 20.
54
Currie, supra note 50.
55
Webster‘s 1828, supra note 52.
Enforce:
1. To give strength to; to strengthen; to invigorate.
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executive and judicial branches from executing any laws that ―abridge‖ citizens‘ privileges or
immunities. This no-enforcement language effectively prevents state executive branches from
being able to claim that they had no choice but to execute a state legislature‘s unconstitutional
laws. Taken together, the Privileges or Immunities Clause stops state governments from making
or implementing any laws that unconstitutionally ―abridge‖ citizens‘ privileges or immunities.56
The meaning attached to the Privileges or Immunities Clause was of course squarely
before the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases. Since the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment makes everyone born or naturalized in the United States a citizen both of
the United States and of the state wherein they reside, the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States necessarily include both 1) their privileges or immunities of national
citizenship and 2) their privileges or immunities of state citizenship. But the Slaughter-House
majority denied this understanding. It seems quite obvious that the majority‘s reading ignored the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s plain language. It was also general knowledge in 1866 to 1868 that a
primary goal of the Fourteenth Amendment was to outlaw the Black Codes which abridged the
state common law rights of contract, torts, and property of African Americans. To accomplish
that objective, the Fourteenth Amendment simply has to be read as protecting the privileges or
2. To make or gain by force; to force; as, to enforce a passage.
3. To put in act by violence; to drive.
Stones enforced from the old Assyrian slings.
4. To instigate; to urge on; to animate.
5. To urge with energy; to give force to; to impress on the mind; as, to enforce remarks or arguments.
6. To compel; to constrain; to force.
7. To put in execution; to cause to take effect; as, to enforce the laws.
8. To press with a charge.
Id.
56
See Harrison, supra note 20, at 1420-24, 1447-51.
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immunities of state citizenship as well as the privileges or immunities of national citizenship. But
the Slaughter-House majority literally rendered the Fourteenth Amendment unintelligible. For
that reason, the Supreme Court had to read back into the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses all the content that it had wrongly drained from the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
But the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause grants all persons the equal
―protection‖ of the laws. In contrast to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause says nothing about equality in the making or implementing of equal laws. The noun in the
Equal Protection Clause is ―protection‖ and ―equal‖ appears only as an adjective. The Clause is
thus quite literally all about the ―protection‖ of the laws. Therefore the text of the Equal
Protection Clause declares that ―no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.‖ If the Clause had been meant to ban the making or formation of
discriminatory laws, it should have read, ―no state shall deny to any person equal laws‖ or just
―no state shall deny to any person equality.‖ The word ―protection‖ – which again is the noun in
the Equal Protection Clause -- would have been unnecessary if the Clause was about equality in
the making of laws. Instead, the word ―protection‖ adds meaning to the Equal Protection Clause
because it makes it clear that the Clause is fundamentally about providing equality in the
protection of those state constitutions and state statutes and state common law rules that were
already made and that were in the statute books or that were in the recorded state case law. 57
Noah Webster‘s 1828 Dictionary defines the word ―protection‖ as meaning ―defense;
shelter from evil; preservation from loss, injury or annoyance.‖58 This definition shows that the
Equal Protection Clause required the states to defend and shelter all people equally under their
respective laws. No state could enforce its laws against murder to ―protect‖ some people, such as
57

This explanation contradicts the Supreme Court‘s declaration in Yick Wo v. Hopkins that ―the equal protection of
the laws‖ means ―the protection of equal laws.‖ See 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
58
WEBSTER‘S 1828, supra note 52.
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white southerners, but not others, such as Blacks or northerners residing in the South. Unlike the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause is thus centrally concerned with the
application or operation of laws that are already on the books or that are reported common law
rights and that do not discriminate on their face. The guarantee of the ―equal protection of the
laws‖ means that a state must enforce its facially neutral laws and common law rules equally
with regards to all persons. A state cannot, for instance, use its police power to protect whites but
not blacks or enforce its contract law for the benefit of whites but not blacks. The Equal
Protection Clause applies to both executive and judicial enforcement of otherwise valid laws.
As a historical matter, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to ensure that
southern states would protect blacks from violence and from being denied the equal ‖protection‖
of those facially neutral laws that were already on the books.59 Philosophically, the Equal
Protection Clause recognized the Lockean principle that individuals sacrifice the individual
freedoms with which they are born and retain in the state of nature in exchange for the equal
protection of the laws.60
It is well-established that the American people understood that by enacting the Fourteenth
Amendment they were writing into federal constitutional law the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which
had abolished the Black Codes. The Black Codes were a series of racially discriminatory laws

59

See Harrison, supra note 20, at 1437 (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause enabled Congress to pass the
Ku Klux Act of 1871).
60
See BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, Editor's App. 47-48 (S. Tucker ed. 1803) [hereinafter ―BLACKSTONE‘S
COMMENTARIES‖] (―that the whole should protect all of it's [sic] parts, and that every part should pay obedience to
the will of the whole; or, in other words, that the community should guard the rights of each individual member, and
that (in return for this protection) each individual should submit to the laws of the community; without which
submission of all it was impossible that protection could be certainly extended to any.‖)
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adopted by southern states in 1865 and 1866 to reduce freedmen to second class social status.61
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 read as follows:
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.62
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 thus guaranteed two forms of legal equality. First, it barred states
from ―making‖ or ―enforcing‖ any law that failed to give citizens ―of every race and color‖ the
―same‖ common law rights as were ―enjoyed by white citizens.‖ And second, it prevented the
states from unequally enforcing otherwise valid laws that were facially non-discriminatory so as
to protect some classes of citizens and not others. This provision addressed such obvious
problems as how blacks could possibly buy and own property if they could not rely on the police
for ―protection‖ when violent whites came to throw them off their land.
The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed and ratified to, at a minimum,
constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866. President Andrew Johnson had vetoed the Act

61

See Harrison, supra note 20, at 1402-1405. Senator Lyman Trumbull maintained that abolition under the
Thirteenth Amendment permitted Congress to pass laws protecting blacks from badges of slavery, such as the Black
Codes, and to protect blacks‘ legal rights. He accordingly said,
Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled in the insurrectionary States
have passed laws relating to the freedmen, and in nearly all the States they have discriminated
against them. They deny them certain rights, subject them to severe penalties, and still impose
upon them the very restrictions which were imposed upon them in consequence of the existence of
slavery, and before it was abolished. The purpose of the bill under consideration is to destroy all
these discriminations, and to carry into effect the constitutional amendment. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH
CONG., 1ST SESS. 474 (1866).
62

Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
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because he felt that it exceeded Congress‘s power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment‘s ban on
slavery. Congress responded by overriding his veto and ultimately ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment. The substantive rights or privileges or immunities protected by the Act are all
obviously state common law rights, such as the right to make contracts, own property, inherit,
and testify. It was these common law rights of state citizenship that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause were meant to safeguard. All originalist scholars,
including Raoul Berger, agree that at a minimum the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized
the list of rights in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.63 The Slaughter-House Cases eviscerated that
purpose and was therefore clearly wrong.
The two primary forms of legal equality guaranteed in the Civil Rights Act were thus
infused into the Fourteenth Amendment. As Professor Harrison has argued, the guarantee of
equal enforcement of facially non-discriminatory laws was encapsulated in the Equal Protection
Clause, while the guarantee of equality in the ―making‖ of laws was enshrined in the Privileges
or Immunities Clause.64 Modern readers may wonder how the Privilege or Immunities Clause
might be understood as ban on discriminatory law-making.
The answer is that the Clause forbids the making of laws that give one class of citizens an
―abridged‖ or shortened or lessened set of rights as compared with another class of citizens. The
verb ―abridge‖ is used in precisely this anti-discriminatory way in the Fifteenth Amendment
63

See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE CONSTITUTION 185 (1987) ( ―[T]he uncontroverted
evidence, confirmed in these pages, is that the framers [of the Fourteenth Amendment] repeatedly stated that the
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were ‗identical‘....‖); see also ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND
CONSTITUTION 75 (1992) (―It was the demonstrable consensus of the Thirty-ninth Congress that section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment ‗constitutionalized‘ the Civil Rights Act of 1866.‖); MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE:
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 72 (1999) (―Recall that, whatever else it did, the second
sentence of section one constitutionalized the 1866 Civil Rights Act.‖); 2 RALPH A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS 53 (8th ed. 2010) (―The
Fourteenth Amendment was obviously designed to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866.‖).
64

See Harrison, supra note 20, at 1414-33.
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which says that ―The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.‖ Of course, the verb ―abridge‖ can also apply to individual abridgements of rights as
when an individual‘s right to the freedom of speech or of the press is ―abridged‖ in violation of
the First Amendment. Rights can be shortened or lessened by one person at a time or by one
class of people at a time. The original plain public meaning of the verb ―abridge‖ in the
Privileges or Immunities Clause thus obviously forbids both discriminatory ―abridgements‖ and
―abridgements‖ that occur as denials of individual rights that are deeply rooted in history and
tradition. Because the Slaughter-House Cases strangled the Privileges or Immunities Clause in
its crib, discriminatory abridgements of rights are today analyzed under the Equal Protection
Clause, while abridgements of individual rights are analyzed using substantive due process.
In the Nineteenth Century, the words ―privileges‖ and ―immunities‖ were synonymous
with the phrase ―positive law rights,‖ and these terms were often used side by side.65 The word
―privilege‖ in particular comes from the Latin words ―privi‖ which means private and ―legis‖
which means law.66 A ―privilege‖ is therefore not a right enjoyed under natural law but is instead
only a right that is enjoyed under positive law. Noah Webster‘s 1865 Dictionary defined the
word ―privilege‖ as being ―a right or immunity not enjoyed by others or by all,‖ and Webster‘s
cited the words ―immunity,‖ ―franchise,‖ ―right,‖ and ―liberty‖ as being synonyms.67 Webster‘s
defined the word ―immunity‖ as meaning ―[f]reedom from an obligation‖ or a ―particular

65

See generally McDonald, Ill., 130 S. Ct. at 3063-3078 (Thomas, J., Concurring) (discussing the meaning of
―privileges‖ and ―immunities‖).
66
ROBERT K. BARNHART (ed.), THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 841 (1988).
67
NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1039 (C. Goodrich & N. Porter rev.
1865) [hereinafter ―WEBSTER‘S 1865‖]; See also 2 C. RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1512 (1839) (defining ―privilege‖ as ―an appropriate or peculiar law or rule or right; a peculiar
immunity, liberty, or franchise‖).
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privilege.‖68 The word ―immunity‖ has the same positive law connotation as does the word
―privilege‖.69 And Webster‘s defined the word ―right‖ as meaning a ―[p]rivilege or immunity
granted by authority.‖70 Similarly, William Blackstone described the ―rights and liberties‖ of
Englishmen as being ―private immunities‖ and ―civil privileges.‖71 And a federal court in Magill
v. Brown said that ―‗privileges and immunities' relate to the rights of persons, place or property;
a privilege is a peculiar right, a private law, conceded to particular persons or places.‖72
The substance of these rights or ―privileges or immunities‖ encompassed all of the
common law rights of contract, property, torts, and inheritance guaranteed in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. The Act thus guaranteed that all citizens of every race and color should enjoy the
same state law rights as to property, contract, family law, and tort. As all commentators on the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment have argued, the drafters and ratifiers of the
Amendment understood the words ―privileges or immunities‖ to mean much the same thing as
was meant by those exact same words in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.
This Clause was understood in 1868 as having the expansive meaning that Supreme Court
Justice Bushrod Washington had given the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause while
riding circuit in 1823.73 In Corfield v. Coryell, Justice Washington defined the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV in quite expansive terms. He said that:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to
the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed
by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time
of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental
68

WEBSTER‘S 1865, supra note 67, 166; see also Richardson, supra note 62, at 1056 (defining ―immunity‖ as
―[f]reedom or exemption, (from duties,) liberty, privilege‖).
69
BARNHART, supra note 66,at 510.
70
WEBSTER‘S 1865, supra note 67, at 1140.
71
BLACKSTONE‘S COMMENTARIES, supra note 60, at 129.
72
Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 428 (No. 8,952) (CC ED Pa. 1833).
73
See Harrison, supra note 20, at 1410.
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principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They
may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection
by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety;
subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state
to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to
take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from
higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be
mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which
are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be
fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and
established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.
These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking,
privileges and immunities . . . 74
This sprawling list of constitutionally protected privileges and immunities encompasses a huge
number of federal, state, and common law rights so long as they are deeply rooted in American
history and tradition as the first bold faced passage above indicates. New-fangled rights, like the
so-called right to privacy, are simply not privileges or immunities because the right to privacy is
not deeply rooted in American history and tradition.
Justice Washington also sets up a second rights limiting principle in the second boldfaced passage in the excerpt quoted above. Justice Washington says that all privileges or
immunities are ―subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe
for the general good of the whole.‖75 And this is where the Privileges or Immunities Clause‘s ban
on class legislation comes into play. The government can only pass a law that diminishes
traditional common law privileges or immunities if the law serves the ―general good of the whole
[people]‖ but not if it is mere class legislation.76 Professor Harrison thus argues that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects Corfield‘s expansive list
74

6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
Id. at 552.
76
See Id.
75
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of rights but subject to the caveat that states can legislate to abridge rights when doing so
protects the general good of the whole people.77 Professor Harrison therefore reads the word
―abridge‖ in the Privileges or Immunities Clause as forbidding only class-based legislation.78
The Clause allows states to make laws that further the good of the whole people, but states may
not discriminate against classes of people either on the basis of race or some other criterion that
does not benefit the public generally. In other words, Professor Harrison reads the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as if it said, ―No state shall make or enforce any law which abridges the rights
of citizens of the United States in a way that improperly discriminates or that does not promote
the general good of the whole people.‖ Professor Harrison goes to great lengths to show that the
framers viewed the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as being
solely an anti-discrimination provision.79 Harrison thus claims erroneously that incorporation of
the Bill of Rights was a mistake at least as a matter of law. He overlooks that a state can quite
literally abridge rights one citizen at a time as well as by one class of citizens at a time.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause describes the general rights of citizens as being
privileges or immunities, instead of rights, because the Framers of the Fourteenth meant by that
Clause to protect only the rights of citizens and not the rights of non-citizens or of all people.80
The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, in contrast, apply
to all persons and not merely to citizens. The rights detailed in Corfield were thus special rights
possessed only by citizens and not necessarily rights that were available to all inhabitants of the
77

See Harrison, supra note 20, at 1452.
See Id. at 1422.
79
See Id. at 1410-1433. For instance, Representative Samuel Shellabarger said that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause ―[r]equires that the laws on their face shall not ‗abridge‘ the privileges or immunities of citizens. It secures
equality toward all citizens on the face of the law. It provides that those rights shall not be ‗abridged;‘ in other
words, that one man shall not have more rights upon the face of the laws than another man. By that provision
equality of legislation, so far as it affects the rights of citizenship, is secured.‖ CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 1ST SESS.
71 app. (1871).
78

80

See Harrison, supra note 20, at 1442-1447 (discussing differences in rights available to citizens and aliens).
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United States. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment left open the possibility that future
legislatures might not want to give aliens all of the rights of citizens. Republican Representative
Horatio Burchard of Illinois said, ―The privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United
States are those particular advantages or exemptions secured or granted to them, but not
extended to all persons, and from which aliens may lawfully be debarred.‖81
The Privileges or Immunities Clause does not bar the states from altering the rights of its
citizens that are deeply rooted in history and tradition so long as the alteration is made in a just,
general law enacted for the good of the whole people. What is clearly banned, however, is
legislation that favors one class or caste of people over another. Put another way, the Privileges
or Immunities Clause bars discrimination by forbidding the states from giving greater privileges
or immunities to one class of citizens as compared to another class of citizens.
What was the original public meaning of class legislation or of improper discrimination
in 1868? Raoul Berger and former Chief Justice William Rehnquist claimed in the 1970‘s that
the Fourteenth Amendment only banned discrimination based on race and national origin and
nothing more.82 Justice Felix Frankfurter, and a majority of the New Deal Supreme Court held
specifically that sex discrimination was not a suspect classification under the Fourteenth
Amendment in Goesaert v. Cleary a decision that was in tension with language in Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital83 and that was correctly overruled in Craig v. Boren.84 Supporters of this
New Deal rational basis test argument claim that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
simply sought to end discrimination against the freed slaves and nothing more. The Slaughter81

CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 1ST SESS. 313-14 app. (1871).
See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 191
(1977); see also Trimble, 430 U.S. at 777 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that ―[e]xcept in the area of the law in
which the Framers obviously meant [Section One] to apply-- classifications based on race or on national origin, the
first cousin of race,‖ the Court's decisions may be described as ―an endless tinkering with legislative judgments, a
series of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding principle‖).
83
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
84
335 U.S. 464 (1948) overruled by 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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House majority seemed to take a similar view saying: ―We doubt very much whether any action
of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of
their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision.‖85
But this narrow conception of the Fourteenth Amendment as barring only race
discrimination and not other forms of discrimination is at war with both the text and the original
public meaning of the Amendment. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment is written
broadly, guaranteeing ―any person‖ equal protection of the laws and barring the states from
making any law that abridges the privileges or immunities of ―citizens of the United States.‖86
The text of Section One gives absolutely no indication that the Amendment applies to only race
discrimination and not to other forms of discrimination more generally. Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment thus stands in stark contrast with Section Two of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which protects only the right of ―males‖ to vote.87 The text of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment also differs from the text of Section One of the Fifteenth Amendment
which only forbids abridging the right to vote ―on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.‖88 And Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment contrasts with the No Religious
Test Clause which bars Congress from conditioning the right to hold public office on the basis of
religion but leaves open the possibility that eligibility to hold public office could be restricted on
some other basis.89 Simply put, when the Framers of both the original Constitution and of the
Reconstruction Amendments wanted a constitutional provision to apply to only race, color, or
previous condition of servitude, they made their intent explicit in the text. Thus, when the
85

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81.
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2 (ensuring that states shall not abridge the right to vote of ―male inhabitants‖).
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by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.)
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Framers of the Nineteenth Amendment wanted to give women the right to vote, they wrote an
Amendment that explicitly said ―The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.‖90 If the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment wanted to merely end class-based legislation that was racially
discriminatory, they would have said so explicitly. The fact that they chose broader language
shows that they meant to ban all forms of class legislation and not merely the Black Codes.
The language of the Fourteenth Amendment tracks other constitutional provisions which
have a broad application despite the narrow historical contexts in which those provisions were
ratified. For example, the Thirteenth Amendment‘s sweeping, unqualified language bans the
enslavement of any individual,91 even though the Thirteenth Amendment was, as a historical
matter, a direct response to the slavery of African Americans. Surely no one would claim that
some new form of non-race based slavery is permissible under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Obviously such a new system of slavery would be blatantly unconstitutional.
Similarly, no one would claim that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause,
which bars the states from depriving ―any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law,‖ 92 only guarantees racial groups due process rights because in 1868 the framers were
primarily concerned with protecting the due process rights of African Americans. The language
―any person‖ should have the same meaning in the Equal Protection Clause as it does in the Due
Process Clause. Because both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses apply to ―any
person,‖ it is quite incoherent to claim that that the Equal Protection Clause pertains only to race,
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U.S. CONST. amend XIX (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (―Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.); See also U.S. CONST. amend. V (―nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb‖) (emphasis added).
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See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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national origin, or some other subset of society. To make this claim, one would have to explain
how the term ―any person‖ can have two different meanings within the same sentence. It is
instead much more plausible to conclude that the unqualified language of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies broadly to protect all classes of citizens from abridgements of their
privileges or immunities and all classes of persons from denials of due process or of the equal
protection of the laws. As we will now explain, Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment did in
fact protect all citizens from class legislation and from the legal imposition of systems of caste.
Before making this argument, we should note that some scholars like Professor Melissa
Saunders, with whom we agree with regards to the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class
legislation, disagree with Professor Harrison‘s and Professor Currie‘s view of the Privileges or
Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses that we have just articulated. Saunders is bothered by a
handful of remarks made by a few legislators during Reconstruction indicating that they thought
that the Equal Protection Clause in fact guaranteed equality in law making as well as in law
execution.93 For instance, Representative James Garfield said that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibited the states from ―mak[ing] or enforc[ing] laws which are not on their face and in their
provisions of equal application to all the citizens of the State . . . like the air of heaven, covering
all and resting upon all with equal weight.‖94 The problem with Professor Saunders‘ argument is
that the isolated snippets of legislative history upon which she relies are not plausibly related to
the original objective public meaning of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, as we have
already discussed. Professor Saunder‘s snippets reflect nothing more than the subjective
understanding of a few lawmakers who misread the Amendment‘s text. Legislative history may
sometimes be helpful in explaining the objective public meaning of legal texts, but legislative
93

See Saunders, supra note 19, at 288-293.
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CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 1ST SESS. H. APP. 153 (1871).
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history is manifestly not helpful when it openly defies the text‘s objective dictionary meaning. It
simply does not matter that Congressman Garfield did not understand that the noun in the Equal
Protection Clause is ―protection‖ and not ―equal,‖ while it is the Privileges or Immunities Clause
that is about the ―making‖ of laws. Rebutting Professor Harrison‘s textual analysis requires much
more than just a few snippets of legislative history in conflict with the constitutional text.
Nevertheless, it is not necessary that one agree with Professor Harrison, as we do, to
accept the notion that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole banned all class
legislation. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equality via two clauses or one is not
critical. For that reason, both Professor Harrison and Professor Saunders recognize that the
Amendment bans all class legislation even if they disagree as to how it does.95
B.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Ban on Caste and Class Legislation

The terms ―caste‖ and ―class‖ had related and at times overlapping meanings and both
referred to social hierarchies which privileged some individuals and groups while disadvantaging
and degrading others. Yet Nineteenth Century contemporaries generally assigned distinct
meanings to each term. We discuss both terms below.
1.

Definition of “caste” and “class legislation”

The word ―class‖ was used in the context of ―class legislation‖ which was any form of
legislation that singled out groups or individuals for special privileges or burdens apart from
those born by the rest of the members of society. During the Antebellum Period, class laws were
often called ―special‖ or ―partial‖ laws96 because they did not apply to the people as a whole and
because they often granted monopolies or other special privileges to a favored group or imposed
95

See Harrison, supra note 20; Saunders, supra note 19.
Professor Saunders reports, ―In the mid-nineteenth century, lawyers and judges began to use the term ―class
legislation‖ as a synonym for partial or special laws. See, e.g., Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 666, 673 (1867)
(argument of counsel); Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573, 606-07 (1863) (using class legislation to describe
legislation in which ―operation is limited to ... certain classes of persons‖).‖ Saunders, supra note 19, at 252 n. 29.
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unique burdens on a particular disfavored group.97 Generally, special laws created unique
privileges for a particular class, and partial laws created unique disadvantages for a particular
class, although the value of distinguishing between special and partial laws is debatable.98
The word ―class‖ had a generic definition in the Nineteenth Century. It was generally
defined as a ―rank; order of persons or things; scientific division or arrangement.‖99 The
designation therefore of a particular group of people as a protected class did not depend on
whether that group was a minority, nor did it depend on whether that group had been previously
subjected to persecution, or nor did the class need to be distinguished by hereditary or immutable
features. As Thomas Cooley put it in his treatise, ―every one has a right to demand that he be
governed by general rules.‖100 Cooley repeated John Locke's famous tenet that legislators ―‗are
to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one
rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough.‘‖101
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Saunders cites several examples. See, e.g., Reed, 2 Greene at 28 (defining a special law as one ―confined to a
particular class of individuals‖); Lewis, 3 Me. at 336 (defining a special law as one ―granting a privilege and
indulgence to one man, by way of exemption from the operation and effect of [a] general law, leaving all other
persons under its operation‖); Jones' Heirs, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) at 78 (defining a partial or special law as one that is
―restricted in its operation‖ to certain persons); Wally's Heirs, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 556 (defining a partial law as one
that is ―limited in its operation ... to a very few individuals‖); Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 269 (1829)
(Peck, J.) (describing a partial law as one ―which is partial in its operation, intended to affect particular individuals
alone, or to deprive them of the benefit of the general laws‖); Id. (Catron, J., concurring) (describing a partial law as
one that ―tend[s] directly or indirectly to deprive a corporation or an individual of rights ... to the equal benefits of
the general and public laws of the land‖). See Saunders, supra note 19, at 252 n.29.
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See Correspondence between the House of Representatives of the State of Maine and the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine, 58 Me. 590, 593 (1871) (opinion of Appleton, C.J., Walton, & Danforth, JJ.) (observing that ―a
discrimination in favor of one ... is a discrimination adverse to all other [s]‖); Note, Developments in the Law Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1086 n.47 (1969) (―[W]hen a benefit is extended to one group but refused
to another, the excluded group may be seen as suffering a relative burden‖); Saunders, supra note 19, at 269 n.102.
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Goodrich, supra note 38, at 75; Worcester, supra note 38, at 128 (―A rank or order of persons or things; a
division; a set of pupils or students of the same form, rank, or degree; a general or primary division‖); WEBSTER‘S
1828, supra note 52 (―An order or rank of persons; a number of persons in society, supposed to have some
resemblance or equality, in rank, education, property, talents, and the like; as in the phrase, all classes of men in
society‖).
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T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF
THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 459 (3d ed. 1874) [hereinafter ―CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS‖].
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In contrast, the word ―caste‖ generally referred to rigid and immutable social divisions
based on hereditary traits with which a person was born. A definition of the word ―Caste‖ did not
appear in American dictionaries until the mid-Nineteenth Century.102 When dictionaries began
defining the word and when people began using it in common parlance, the Indian caste system
was almost always used as the word‘s defining benchmark. This makes sense because the
Portuguese first used the word ―caste‖ to describe the Indian system of social hierarchy. 103 A
typical definition of caste was ―In Hindostan, a tribe or class of the same profession, as the caste
of Bramins; a distinct rank or order of society.‖104 Senator Charles Sumner explained that a
―[caste] system had two distinct elements: first, separation, with rank and privilege, or, their
opposite, with degradation and disability[;] secondly, descent from father to son[;] so that it was
perpetual separation from generation to generation.‖105 Sumner observed that in the Indian caste
system one person ―claimed hereditary rank and privilege‖ and another is ―doomed to hereditary
degradation and disability.‖106 In India, people were born into a particular caste and were unable
to change their caste. In describing the caste system of Europe, Sumner said,
people were distributed into classes and the son succeeded to the condition of his
father whether of privilege or disability the son of a noble being a noble with
great privileges the son of a mechanic being a mechanic with great disabilities and
this inherited condition was applicable even to the special labor of the father nor
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Neither Samuel Johnson‘s 1786 Dictionary nor Noah Webster‘s 1828 Dictionary contained a definition for the
word ―caste.‖ Charles Sumner said that ―the word is too modern, however, for our classic English literature‖ and
noted how dictionaries excluded the word. Sumner, supra note 38, at 7.
103
NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 152 (1857) [hereinafter ―WEBSTER‘S
1857‖] (―In Hindostan, a name (from casta, race) first given by the Portuguese to the several classes into which
society is divided, having fixed occupations, which have come down from the earliest ages. There are four great and
many smaller castes. 2. A distinct order in society.‖)
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See, e.g., Goodrich, supra note 38, at 64, 75; Worcester, at supra note 38, at 107-08, 128 (―Caste, n. A distinct,
hereditary order or class of people among the Hindoos, the members of which are of the same rank, profession, or
occupation; an order or class‖); Sumner, supra note 38, at 6-10 (discussing the Indian caste system at length).
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Sumner, supra note 38, at 7.
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Id. at 10 (referencing the Indian caste system).
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was there any business beyond its tyrannical control. According to Macaulay the
tinkers formed an hereditary caste.107
Accordingly, Nineteenth century dictionaries defining ―caste‖ referred to it as a ―hereditary
order,‖108 ―fixed occupations,‖ and a ―distinct order in society‖109 – all of which express the
principles of immutability and heredity which were the key features of caste.
Notably, the Nineteenth Century definition of caste was not limited to only racial or even
physical features. Instead a ―caste‖ could mean ―a tribe or class of the same profession,‖110
people with ―fixed occupations,‖111 people with ―the same rank, profession, or occupation,‖ or
simply ―an order or class.‖112 These definitions clearly encompassed classifications based on
status or conduct which had nothing to do with racial or physical features. And the Nineteenth
Century definition of caste also included classifications based on religion.113
A caste was therefore considered one kind of a class, and laws supporting a caste system
were simply one form of class legislation. Accordingly, one of the definitions of ―caste‖ was that
it constituted a ―class.‖114 As Senator H. Wilson put it in arguing for black suffrage, class
legislation was the means by which a system of caste could be structured and maintained.115
One important qualification was that class legislation was permissible during the
Antebellum period if it served an important public purpose, benefiting society as a whole.116 As
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Id. at 7. Sumner also referenced caste systems in Persia, Egypt, Peru, Assyria, and Attica.
Worcester, supra note 38, at 107-08, 128.
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WEBSTER‘S 1857, supra note 103, at 152 (emphasis added).
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Goodrich, supra note 38, at 64, 75.
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WEBSTER‘S 1857, supra note 103, at 152.
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Worcester, supra note 38, at 107-08, 128.
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See infra Part II.A.
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Worcester, supra note 38, at 107-08, 128.
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See 40TH CONGRESS 3RD SESSION CONG. GLOBE 153 (1869) (appendix) (statement by Senator H. Wilson (―to
maintain by class legislation the abhorrent doctrine of caste‖).
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Justice Bushrod Washington said in Corfield that citizens‘ privileges and immunities were ―subject nevertheless
to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.‖ 6 F. Cas. at 552.
Melissa Saunder cites several example cases for this public purpose principle. See Saunders, supra note 19, at 261
n.68 (citing Blackington, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) at 358-59 (rejecting a partial law challenge to a law forbidding the sale
of intoxicating liquors without a license on the ground that the law's ―real object‖ was ―to promote the public good,‖
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Justice Field explained, ―[s]pecial burdens are often necessary for general benefits,‖ such as
―supplying water, preventing fires, lighting district, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many
other objects.‖117 Justice Field added that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits ―[c]lass
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others,‖ but not ―legislation which, in
carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application‖ to certain individuals or groups.118
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment permits laws that discriminate if they ―are designed, not to
impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual
inconvenience as possible, the general good.‖119 Class legislation therefore differs from laws
regulating conduct which are generally applicable to all persons. For instance, criminal laws
prohibiting stealing or civil laws delineating a standard of care in tort actions regulate the
conduct of all persons. Thus the legislature could safely pass a law prohibiting embezzlement,
but it could not pass such a law if it only applied only to the employees of a specific bank.120 We
will elaborate on class legislation doctrine more in Part III.
2.

Historical evidence of opposition to class legislation

rather than to confer a special advantage on the licenseholders); Hewitt, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) at 356 (rejecting a
partial law challenge to a law conferring a special benefit on licensed medical practitioners on the ground that the
law's ―leading and sole purpose‖ was ―to guard the public,‖ rather than ―to promote the[ ] private interests‖ of the
licenseholders); Blackington, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) at 358-59 (holding that laws which have the ―effect‖ of conferring
special benefits upon certain persons are not invalid, so long as that effect is ―collateral and incidental‖ to a ―purpose
... to promote the public good,‖ rather than ―one of the objects and purposes of the law‖); Hewitt, 33 Mass. (16
Pick.) at 355-56 (stating that laws which have the ―effect‖ of conferring special benefits on certain persons are not
invalid, so long as that effect is ―incidental, and not one of the purposes‖ of the law.))
117
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
118
Id. at 32.
119
Id. at 31-32.
120
See Budd v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 483 (1842) (special criminal law applicable only to employees of a certain
bank); see also Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121 (Vt. 1825) (a creditor challenged a law granting a debtor a special right
to release from debtor‘s jail without paying back his debt); Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15, 27-28 (Iowa 1849) (a halfbreed Indian challenged a law singling out halfbreed Indians for special disadvantage as land owners and attempting
to recover property); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326 (1825) (adversely affected party challenging a law granting certain
person a special right to appeal financial obligations between adverse parties); Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (10
Yer.) 59 (1836) (heirs of an estate challenged a law granting guardian of certain minors a special right to sell their
property); Officer v. Young, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 320 (1833) (law granting a certain person a special right to prosecute
an appeal in the name of a deceased person); Saunders, supra note 19, at 252, n.28.

33

Calabresi and Salander

Opposition to class legislation had deep roots in the common law and was a fundamental
principle of the Founders of this country.121 Aversion to such laws was grounded in the Lockean
philosophy that government existed for the purpose of protecting private citizens‘ natural
rights.122 And there was widespread belief that laws should have equal application to all
members of society and should not be used as a means of favoring or disfavoring specific groups
or individuals. As Locke put it, there should be ―one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the Favourite at
Court, and the Country Man at Plough.‖123
a. Evidence from the common law and the founding
Even before the Founding in 1789, some states banned class legislation in their state
declarations of rights or bills of rights.124 For instance, Virginia‘s Declaration of Rights of 1776
prohibited the granting of ―exclusive or separate Emoluments or Privileges from the Community,
but in Consideration of public Services.‖125 James Madison articulated the pervasive belief of the
Founders that government should be ―neutral between different parts of the Society,‖ that
―equality . . . ought to be the basis of every law,‖ and that laws should not place ―peculiar
burdens‖ on some individuals or ―peculiar exemptions‖ on others.126
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See Saunders, supra note 19, at 255-256; see also Yudof, supra note 21, at 1374-1377
See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 123-24 (describing how ―[t]he great and chief end ... of
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See Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate about Equal Protection and
Equal Civil Rights, 8 Sup. Ct. Rev. 295, 346 (1992).
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Later generations recognized that one of the Founders‘ primary goals was to abolish class
legislation and to form a government dedicated to providing for all of its citizens. As
Representative Stephen L. Mayham said in 1870:
. . . when this Constitution was adopted there was no sentiment that was more
universal in this nation than that of condemnation of all monopolies
and privileged classes. It was to rid themselves of enormous and oppressive
monopolies in the way of taxation and stamp duties that the colonists had severed
their connection with Great Britain; and it was in the interest of equality and
freedom of commerce, as well as freedom of person, that this Government was
founded. It would be a slander upon the intelligence and patriotism of our fathers
to say that this provision of the Constitution, which is the only one under which
this doctrine of protection is claimed, intended it to foster monopolies and create
invidious distinctions of caste based upon business or wealth.127
Senator James W. Nye similarly said in 1866:
Our forefathers were made to chafe under monarchical insult and imposition.
They learned to know by experience that common protection would never be
awarded by privileged class. They entered into the contest in defense of their
natural and inalienable rights, and made the cause of popular justice in the
strength and ennobling feature of the conflict.128
And Representative Owen Lovejoy said in 1860:
The object of government, according to the theory of the revered sages who
organized this Republic, is a very simple one, namely, to protect the people in the
peaceful enjoyment of their natural rights. In other words, it is a mutual pledge,
each to all and all to each, to secure this result; designating the modes in which
this end shall be achieved. Consequently, pensions, bounties, peculiar privileges,
class legislation, and monopolies, sought from Government, is for one portion of
the people to become beggars or vampires of the rest. For classes thus to
beleaguer Government is as disgraceful to communities as it is to individuals ...129
In his constitutional treatises, Thomas Cooley wrote extensively that the Constitution of
1787 contained a broad ban on class legislation that applied to both the federal government and
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CONG. GLOBE, 41ST CONG., 2ND SESSION APP. 180 (1870) (Speech by Representative Stephen L. Mayham)
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CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1071 (1866) (Statement of Sen. James W. Nye). Nye also condemned the
conduct of southern states: ―In the recent attempt at revolution the intended perpetuity of human bondage, added to
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CONG. GLOBE, 36TH CONG., SPECIAL SESS. 174-175 (1860) (Speech by Representative Owen Lovejoy).
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the states.130 For one, Cooley saw ―implied restrictions‖ on Congress‘ taxing power in Article I
Section 8,131 which states, ―The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.‖132 As he said, ―a tax can have no other basis than the raising of a revenue for public
purposes, and whatever governmental exaction has not this basis is tyrannical and unlawful....
Where, however, a tax is avowedly laid for a private purpose it is illegal and void.‖133 But
Cooley also said that these ―implied restrictions‖ applied to all the Article I, Section 8 powers,
and not just to the taxing power:134 ―Every legislative body is to make laws for the public good,
and not for the benefit of individuals; and it is to make them aided by the light of those general
principles which lie at the foundation of representative institutions.135 Cooley also said that the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment embodied this public purpose doctrine.
Inherent in the ―underlying principle of the law of eminent domain,‖ is the government‘s power
―to control and regulate those rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common,
and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety,
necessity, convenience, or welfare may demand.‖136 Tying together congressional power to tax
and take property, Cooley explained that ―[t]axation takes property from the citizen for the
public use, but it does so under general rules of apportionment and uniformity, so that each
citizen is supposed to contribute only his fair share to the expenses of government, and to be
130

See THOMAS COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1880) [hereinafter ―GENERAL
PRINCIPLES‖].
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Id. at 58-60, 98.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 130, at 57-58.
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States.‖ U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
135
See Id. at 97-98.
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compensated for doing so in the benefits which the government brings him.‖137 In contrast,
eminent domain takes a specific piece of property from an individual and utilizes just
compensation as a means of ―equalization.‖138 In his section on contract and property rights,
Cooley also said that the Contracts Clause banned class legislation passed by the states,
describing how the Clause only allows regulation of contracts for a public purpose.139 Cooley
also described how the Constitution banned monopolies: ―exclusive privileges are to some extent
invidious and very justly obnoxious, and it is not reasonable to suppose that the State would
grant them, except when some important public purpose or some necessary public convenience
cannot be accomplished or provided without making the grant exclusive.‖140 A state could only
grant an exclusive privilege that served a public purpose, such as for building a bridge.141
Several other constitutional provisions further support Cooley‘s view that the 1787
Constitution banned class legislation. For instance, the Preamble declares that the purpose of the
Constitution is to ―provide for the common defence‖ and ―promote the general Welfare.‖142 And
the Full Faith and Credit Clause only allows Congress to pass ―general laws.‖143 Bans on bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws in Article I Sections 9 and 10 perhaps were also designed to
protect against class legislation. As discussed below, the religion clauses also banned class
legislation at least with respect to religion.144 The Establishment Clause prevented the
government from granting a special monopoly to one religion; and the Free Exercise and No
137
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Id. at 334.
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See Id. at 310-311.
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U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (―Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
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Religious Test Clauses barred the government from subjecting those who were religious to
unique burdens. So Cooley‘s position that the Constitution banned class legislation starting in
1787 is well grounded in constitutional text.
b. Evidence from state constitutions around the time of the Founding
Around the time of the Founding, several states had incorporated various bans on caste
and class legislation into their state constitutions.145 These provisions show that opposition to
caste and class legislation has been strong since the Founding. These state constitutional
provisions banning class legislation lend support to Cooley‘s view that the federal Constitution
may also have originally banned all federal class legislation. Alternatively, these clauses could
indicate that the states thought that they had to include these protections in their state
constitutions because the federal Constitution did not ban class legislation in contradiction to
Cooley. Either way, these provisions demonstrate the deep-rooted opposition to class legislation
in American history in the 1770‘s and 1780‘s.
In 1787, three states, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia, explicitly banned
feudalism, which is a quintessential form of class and caste in their state constitutions.146 These
states comprised twenty-three percent of the total number of states and forty-three percent of the
national population in 1787.147 The provisions banning feudalism specifically evoked the
language of class legislation and systems of caste, and these provisions declared hereditary
privileges impermissible and they foreshadowed the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on caste and
class legislation. For instance, Massachusetts‘s constitution said that:

145
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―No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain
advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, district from those of the
community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the
public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to
children, or descendants, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a
magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural.‖148
By 1790, eight states, including Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia, had provisions in
their state constitutions banning the granting of titles of nobility.149 These states
comprised forty-six percent of the number of states and fifty-seven percent of the total
population.150 Once again, these provisions used the language of caste and class
legislation in targeting hereditary rights as being especially repugnant. For instance,
Maryland‘s constitution read, "That no title of nobility, or hereditary honours, ought to be
granted in this State."151 And New Hampshire‘s constitution similarly declared, ―No
office or place whatsoever in government, shall be hereditary—the abilities and integrity
requisite in all, not being transmissible to posterity or relations.‖152
By 1791, three states, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, had broad
equality guarantees in their state constitutions.153 These states constituted twenty-one
percent of the states and comprised twenty-four percent of the population.154 These
equality provisions guaranteed that laws could only be enacted if they would benefit the
148
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population as a whole and if they did not single out specific groups for special burdens or
privileges. For instance Vermont‘s constitution stated that: ―...it is our indispensable duty
to establish such original principles of government as will best promote the general
happiness of the people of this State, and their posterity, and provide for future
improvements, without partiality for, or prejudice against, any particular class, sect, or
denomination of men whatever.‖155 Invoking the language of class legislation, these
provisions further show the deeply rooted opposition to class legislation in this country.
c. Evidence from the Antebellum Period
During the Antebellum Period, widespread opposition to class legislation was also found
in state-level bans on special and partial laws.156 As the Maine Supreme Court said, ―it can never
be within the bounds of legitimate legislation to enact a special law ... granting a privilege and
indulgence to one man‖ that is not granted to ―all other persons.‖ 157 Instead, laws should be
―prescribed for the benefit and regulation of the whole community‖ because all individuals have
―an equal right‖ to their ―protection.‖158 Chancellor Kent similarly wrote in 1816 that laws
should ―have a general and equal application‖ and should be ―impartial in the imposition[s]
which [they] create.‖159 States pragmatically recognized that permitting explicit favoritism or
discrimination would undermine the democratic process and encourage corruption in
government.160 Such an un-democratic system would favor the powerful and politically-

155

See, e.g, VT. CONST. of 1786, Pmbl; PA. CONST. 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 8 (―That every member of
society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to contribute
his proposition towards the expence of that protection, and yield his personal service when necessary, or an
equivalent thereto.")
156
See generally Saunders, supra note 19, at 251-268.
157
Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 336 (1825).
158
Id. at 335.
159
WILLIAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT, LL.D 163 (1898) (quoting from an opinion Kent wrote
in 1816 in his capacity as a member of the Governor's Council of Revision); Saunders, supra note 19, at 259.
160
See, e.g., Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 123 (Vt. 1825) (argument of counsel) (―If the legislature have power to
select any individual, as the object of particular legislation, and exempt him from obligations to which all others are

40

Calabresi and Salander

connected and disadvantage unpopular minorities.161 As the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
said, ―[i]t is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice . . . [that]
any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like
circumstances.‖162 Courts also questioned whether it was constitutional to bar individuals from
holding public office based on their political views.163 Instead, most agreed that the best way to
protect minorities and society as a whole was through generally applicable laws that did not
confer special privileges or burdens on certain groups. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
explained that when ―general laws are enacted, which bear ... on the whole community, if they
are unjust and against the spirit of the constitution, the whole community will be interested to
procure their repeal.‖164 This obviously would not be the case where special or partial laws
burdened only a few. Political groups, such as the Maine Whigs, also argued for ―[e]qual rights,
equal laws, and equal privileges for all classes of the community.‖165
Andrew Jackson and his followers spoke out especially strongly in opposition to class
legislation politically at the national level in the 1830s. As Jackson put it, government should
subject, it may be the instrument of the grossest favoritism; or, in times of political excitement, of the most cruel
persecution‖); Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 470 (1871) (discussing how class legislation would ―open[
] the door to the greatest corruption, partiality, and favoritism‖).
161
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―confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the
high and the low, the rich and the poor.‖166 Although ―[d]istinctions in society will always exist
under every just government,‖ for ―[e]quality of talents, of education, or of wealth can not be
produced by human institutions,‖ government should not pass laws that ―add . . . artificial
distinctions‖ to the ―natural . . . advantages‖ that some individuals have over others.167 Perhaps
most famously, Jackson vetoed the re-charter of the Second National Bank of the United States,
which he viewed as being a quintessential special law.168 Jackson thought the bank was a
monopoly because of its significant role in the economy and because no other banks were
permitted to operate under a federal government charter of incorporation. Jackson argued that the
Constitution only permitted Congress to grant monopolies in very limited situations, such as for
patents and copyrights. And he believed that without an explicit textual provision like the Patents
and Copyrights Clause, Congress lacked the power to grant monopolies even for patents and
copyrights. In his message vetoing the renewal of the Bank‘s charter, Jackson wrote that:
Every act of Congress, therefore, which attempts by grants of monopolies or sale
of exclusive privileges for a limited time, or a time without limit, to restrict or
extinguish its own discretion in the choice of means to execute its delegated
powers is equivalent to a legislative amendment of the Constitution, and [is]
palpably unconstitutional.169
Jackson thought government created monopolies, such as the Bank of the United States,
were violations of Locke‘s principles of equality:
Many of our rich men have not been content with equal protection and equal
benefits, but [they] have besought us to make them richer by act of Congress. By
attempting to gratify their desires we have in the results of our legislation arrayed
166
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. . . interest against interest, and man against man, in a fearful commotion which
threatens to shake the foundations of our Union. . . . If we can not at once, in
justice to interests vested under improvident legislation, make our Government
what it ought to be, we can at least take a stand against all new grants of
monopolies and exclusive privileges, against any prostitution of our Government
to the advancement of the few at the expense of the many . . . .170
Jackson therefore encouraged people to ―take a stand against all new grants of monopolies and
special privileges, against the prostitution of our Government to the advancement of the few at
the expense of the many.‖171 It is notable that Jacksonian equal protection was confined to
economic or social class legislation, such as state-granted monopolies, and did not encompass
class legislation that discriminated on the basis of race.172
Many Nineteenth Century state constitutions explicitly prohibited class legislation. By
1868, thirteen out of thirty seven states had provisions in their state constitutions that effectively
barred special or partial laws.173 A typical provision read, ―No law shall be passed granting to
any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not
equally belong to all citizens.‖174 In states where state constitutions lacked such explicit
language, courts used other broadly worded provisions to strike down special and partial laws.175
Thomas Cooley documented numerous state court decisions invalidating special and partial laws
based on their respective state constitutions.176 Cooley said that the widely-held, fundamental
precept of state constitutional law was that ―[t]hose who make the laws ‗are to govern by
promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich
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and poor.‖177 Cooled explained, ―Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably
should be the aim of the law,‘ because ‗[s]pecial privileges are always obnoxious, and
discriminations against persons or classes are still more so.‖178
There is also significant evidence that opposition to class legislation played a crucial role
in the political fight against slavery. Although slavery certainly should have been recognized as
violating bans on special or partial laws, many state courts rejected challenges to slavery,179 and
many politicians as well were unsympathetic to the disfavored status of African-Americans.180
Instead, many abolitionists successfully argued that slave holders represented a powerful special
interest group that had seized control of the government, potentially undermining the republic‘s
stability.181 These abolitionists specifically avoided arguing that slavery was immoral or that
whites should empathize with the plight of the slaves.182 The argument was based on political
power, and it appealed to a wide variety of political groups who worried about the economic,
social, and political consequences of special and partial laws and who recognized that
government should simply not be in the business of picking favorites.183 This approach to
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abolition became a unifying force for the Republican Party and attracted defectors from other
political affiliations, such as Jacksonians, who objected to class legislation.184
Debates over slavery often invoked the language of class legislation and caste. For
instance, Representative Norton Townshend said in 1852:
I protest against all these interpolations into the Democratic creed, and against
any such interpretation of Democracy as makes it the ally of slavery and
oppression. Democracy and slavery are directly antagonistic. Democracy is
opposed to caste, slavery creates it; Democracy is opposed to special privileges;
slavery is but the privilege specially enjoyed by one class-to use another as brute
beasts and take their labor without wages; Democracy is for elevating the laboring
masses to the dignity of perfect manhood; slavery grinds the laborer into the very
dust . . . slavery is but the extreme of class legislation . . . slavery is nothing more
than the privilege some have of living out of others . . .185
Representative John F. Farnsworth also said, ―As a moral being, as a man, I hate slavery in the
States of this Union as I hate serfdom in Russia--which, by the way, is about to be abolished in
that Empire, while we are quarrelling over the extension of slavery in this—just as I hate caste in
India- just as I hate oppression everywhere.‖186 President Andrew Johnson later described
slavery as a ―monopoly.‖187 Even supporters of slavery recognized that slavery constituted a
caste system. Senator Lewis Cass said:
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―Between three and four millions of people, differing in race and color from the
pre-dominant caste, are held in bondage. I have seen a good deal of slavery, and I
believe its evils are much magnified, and that the slaves generally in our southern
States are treated with as much kindness and consideration as are compatible with
their relative condition of bond and free.‖188
After slavery was abolished, many recognized that the mistreatment of blacks was not
merely a problem of racial animus but was part of a much larger problem of class legislation.
Senator Sumner summarized the widespread mood in 1866 in discussing the mistreatment of
blacks in the South:
"The pretension thus organized is hateful on another ground. It is nothing less
than a Caste, which is at once irreligious and un-republican. A Caste cannot exist
except in defiance of the first principles of Christianity and the first principles of a
Republic. It is Heathenism in religion and tyranny in government. The Brahmins
and the Sudras in India, from generation to generation, have been separated, as the
two races are now separated in these States. If a Sudra presumed to sit on a
Brahmin's carpet he was punished with banishment. But our recent rebels
undertake to play the part of Bramhins, and exclude citizens, with better title than
themselves, from essential rights, simply on the ground of Caste, which,
according to its Portuguese origin, caste, is only another term for race. But this
pretension is in yet other respects hostile to good government. It is essentially a
Monopoly in a country which sets its face against all monopolies as unequal and
immoral. If any monopoly deserves unhesitating judgment it must be that which
absorbs the rights of others and engrosses political power. How vain it is to
condemn the petty monopolies' of commerce and then' allow this vast, allembracing monopoly of Human Rights. Clearly, most clearly, and beyond all
question, such a government cannot he considered a republican in form." Call it
an Oligarchy, call it an Aristocracy, call it a Caste, call it a Monopoly; but do not
call it a Republic."189
Senator Sumner clearly equated the caste-style mistreatment of African-Americans to the
burdens of government-granted monopoly power to favored groups or businesses. Granting a
government monopoly license, or enacting any other type of economic class legislation, was
therefore no different from the Indian caste system or the mistreatment of African-Americans in
this country. Sumner‘s rhetoric was likely intended to persuade dissenters that African
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Americans deserved the same equal right to be free of class legislation that white Americans
enjoyed. So Sumner compared the mistreatment of African Americans to the mistreatment of
oppressed groups in other legal systems that everyone understood as unjust – namely, the Indian
caste system and government grants of monopoly. Although comparing a government-granted
monopoly to a caste system might sound odd to modern ears, in the Nineteenth Century
government grants of monopoly were widely viewed as being antithetical to democracy and as
being a throwback to Bad King George. For this reason, Sumner could credibly say:
The Rebellion began in two assumptions, both proceeding from South Carolina:
first, the sovereignty of the States, with the pretended right of secession; and
secondly, the superiority of the white race, with the pretended right of Caste,
Oligarchy, and Monopoly, on account of color.190
Similarly, President Andrew Johnson decried the Black Codes because ―‗there is no room for
favored classes or monopolies,‘ for ‗the principle of our Government is that of equal laws,‘
which ‗accord equal justice to all men, special privileges to none.‘‖191
In the years leading up to 1868, there was widespread support for abolishing class
legislation, not simply constitutionalizing the ban on racial discrimination from the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. An editorial in the Chicago Tribune in January 1866 explained that the Black Codes
were a repugnant, aristocratic form of class legislation contrary to American values:
We have seen, through bitter experience, the evils of class legislation as
practi[c]ed by the States, in the form of slave and black codes. We cannot but
perceive the evils of the system in England, and all monarchical governments,
where the laws are allowed to recognize distinctions between persons and classes
. . . And if the several States can practi[c]e class legislation, as between whites
and blacks . . . they can also create class distinctions in the future between native
and adopted citizens, between rich and poor, or between any other divisions of
society. The most effectual way to reach the root of this matter, is to amend the
Constitution so as to forbid class legislation entirely by prohibiting the enactment
of laws creating or recognizing any political distinctions because of class, race or
190

Id. at 684.
2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 158, at 361–62 (emphasis added); Saunders, supra note
19, at 272.
191

47

Calabresi and Salander

color between the inhabitants of any State or Territory, and providing that all
classes shall possess the same civil rights and immunities, and be liable to the
same penalties, and giving Congress the power to carry the clause into effect. . . .
[W]e believe that we might as well level the evil of caste at one blow, as to fight it
by driblets and sections, through another long course of years.192
The editorial‘s rhetoric clearly goes well beyond a call merely for the ending racial
discrimination. Similarly, in February 1866 the North American Gazette described how Congress
was discussing a constitutional amendment that would ―secure for the citizens of any one State
the same rights as are enjoyed by the citizens of other States, thus terminating the discriminations
made against sections and classes and races.‖ 193 The view was, as James Wilson, Chair of the
House Judiciary Committee and sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, put it, that in
democratic government there is ―no class legislation, no class privileges,‖ and no laws that can
be directed ―against [one class] for the purpose of advantaging the interests of [another].‖194
Senator Sumner explained how banning class legislation effectively enforced the Thirteenth
Amendment‘s abolition of slavery:
You have, sir, decreed that colored persons shall enjoy the same civil rights as
white persons; in other words, that, with regard to civil rights, there shall be no
Oligarchy, Aristocracy, Caste, or Monopoly,' but that all shall be equal before the
law without distinction of color. And this great decree you have made as
"appropriate legislation" under the Constitutional Amendment "to enforce" the
abolition of slavery." 195
So strong was opposition to class legislation in the mid-Nineteenth Century, that some attempted
to read a ban on class legislation into the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, even though
the text of the Act did not support such an understanding.196
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d. Evidence from the history of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
The legislative history shows that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically
intended to abolish all forms class legislation, which certainly included slavery and
discrimination on the basis of race.197 The Thirty-ninth Congress that drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment was comprised largely of Republicans and of Jacksonian Democrats who fervently
opposed all forms of class legislation.198 These Republicans and Jacksonian Democrats
supported abolition and the guarantee of civil rights for African Americans, not necessarily out
of a sense of morality or empathy for African Americans – though some framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment certainly felt that way – but out of a hatred for class legislation in all its
hideous forms.199 And the Reconstruction Congresses sought to constitutionalize in the federal
Constitution as it applied to the states the Antebellum doctrine banning special or partial laws,
which state courts had failed to use to protect African Americans.
The legislative history reveals considerable opposition to the Black Codes, not because
they discriminated on the basis of race,200 but because they singled out a certain class of
individuals for unique disadvantage. Senator Lyman Trumbull, the cosponsor of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, criticized the Black Codes for ―depriv[ing] [some] citizen[s] of civil rights which
are secured to other citizens‖ and violating Blackstone‘s maxim that ―‗the restraints introduced
by the law should be equal to all.‘‖201 Senator William Pitt Fessenden described the Black Codes
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as being unacceptable ―class legislation.‖202 Senator Henderson objected to the ―unequal
burdens‖ placed on freedmen.203 Many others objected that the Black Codes effectively reduced
freemen to second class citizens.204 And President Andrew Johnson opposed the Black Codes
because ―there is no room for favored classes or monopolies,‖ for ―the principle of our
Government is that of equal laws,‖ which ―accord ‗equal and exact justice to all men,‘ special
privileges to none.‖205
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment carefully drafted a final version of the
Amendment that made no specific mention of race precisely so as to ensure that the Fourteenth
Amendment would be understood as banning all systems of class and caste, and not just
discrimination on the basis of race. The Thirty-ninth Congress explicitly considered and rejected
a draft of the Amendment that merely banned racial discrimination, and not systems of caste or
class. That rejected version of the Fourteenth Amendment read,
Section 1. No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States,
as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
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Section 2. From and after the fourth day of July, in the year one thousand eight
hundred and seventy-six, no discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the
United States, as to the enjoyment by classes of persons of the right of suffrage,
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Sec. 3. Until the fourth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six,
no class of persons, as to the right of any of whom to suffrage discrimination shall
be made by any state, because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
shall be included in the basis of representation.206
Notably, this version used the language of class legislation (―classes of persons‖ in Section Two
and ―class of persons‖ in Section Three), but the scope of the ban on class legislation was limited
to a ban on discrimination on the basis of race, color, and previous condition of servitude. The
new and final version rejected this narrow ban and instead forbade all caste and class legislation.
And members of the Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Congresses understood that the objective
public meaning of the final version of the Fourteenth Amendment was that the Amendment
broadly banned all forms of caste and class legislation, and not just laws that discriminate on the
basis of race. Senator Jacob Howard said that the Amendment ―abolishes all class legislation in
the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not
applicable to another.‖207 Representative Thomas Eliot said the Amendment would ―prohibit
State legislation discriminating against classes of citizens.‖208 Representative Hotchkiss
described the Amendment as having been constructed to ban ―discriminat[ion] between its
citizens and [all laws that] give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon
another.‖209 Senator Timothy Howe said that the Fourteenth Amendment would give the federal
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government ―the power to protect classes against class legislation.‖210 Republicans generally
understood the Amendment as striking down feudalistic systems and aristocracy:
―But,‖ say some, ―this section is designed to coerce the South into according
Suffrage to her Blacks.‖ Not so, we reply; but only to notify her ruling caste that
we will no longer bribe them to keep their blacks in serfdom. An aristocracy
rarely surrenders its privileges, no matter how oppressive, from abstract devotion
to justice and right. It must have cogent, palpable reasons for so doing.211
Senator Sumner also described the Amendment in broad, powerful terms:
Rights, that Slavery, with all its brood of wrong, was upheld; and it is now in the
name of State rights, that Caste, fruitful also in wrong, is upheld. The old
champions reappear, under other names, and from other States, each crying out,
that, under the national Constitution, notwithstanding even its supplementary
amendments. A State may, if it pleases, deny political rights on account of race or
color and thus establish that vilest institution, a Caste and an Oligarchy of the
skin. . . On these simple texts, conferring plain and intelligible powers, the
champions insist that ―color‖ may be made a ―qualification;‖ and that, under the
guise of ―regulations,‖ citizens, whose only offense is skin not colored like our
own, may be shut out from political rights; and that in this was a monopoly of
rights, being at once a Caste and an Oligarchy of the skin, is placed under the
safeguard of the National Constitution.212
And Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania made it clear that the Amendment
banned even non-racial class legislation: "the same laws must and shall apply to every mortal,
American, Irishman, African, German or Turk"213 because "the same law which punishes one
man shall punish any other for the same offense ... the law which gives a verdict to one man shall
render the same verdict to another, whether he is Dutch, Irish, or Negro."214
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Popular newspapers also recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment broadly banned all
class legislation and systems of caste.215 The San Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin said that the
amendment served as an ―opportunity . . . for the masses to break down the domination of caste
and aristocracy.‖216 The Boston Daily Advertiser described the Amendment‘s purpose as
―compel[ling] the States to . . . throw the same shield over the black man as over the white, over
the humble as over the powerful.‖217 The Boston Daily Advertiser also said, ―The National
Union Committee put the case very well when they stated the object of the amendment of the
Constitution to be, ‗to notify the ruling caste of‘ the South that we will no longer bribe them to
keep ‗their blacks in serfdom‘‖218 And the Cincinnati Commercial said that the Amendment
constitutionalized "the great Democratic principle of equality before the law" and invalidated all
"legislation hostile to any class."219 The Commercial added:
With this section engrafted upon the Constitution it will be impossible for any
Legislature to enact special codes for one class of its citizens, as several of the
reconstructed States have done, subjecting them to penalties from which citizens
of another class are excepted if convicted of the same grade of offense, or confer
privileges upon one class that it denies to another.220
These sources indicate that the public meaning of the Amendment was a broad ban on all
class legislation and systems of caste. As Calabresi and Rickert say:
―[b]y connecting the old-world problems of aristocracy and feudalism with race
discrimination and caste in America, these commentators provide more evidence
that the American public conceived of the word caste at a higher level of
generality than the word race. The Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment would have understood it to ban European feudalism or the Indian
caste system, as well as the special-interest monopolies that so outraged
Jacksonian Americans.‖221
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Significantly, the Thirty-ninth Congress did not believe that laws prohibiting interracial
marriage would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, even though such laws seem to clearly
discriminate on the basis of race. The majority view was that antimiscegenation laws would
remain valid because they did not ―discriminate against‖ a particular race or class but applied
equally to everyone.222 The reasoning relied on a technicality, allowing antimiscegenation laws
to escape the ban on class. Since under these laws whites could only marry whites and AfricanAmericans could only marry African-Americans, it was argued that antimiscegenation laws
applied to the two races equally. In retrospect, this argument overlooks that antimiscegenation
laws were in fact forms of class legislation singling out interracial couples for a special burden
without a legitimate public purpose and in reality served as nothing more than a smokescreen for
degrading African Americans and people who choose to marry African Americans.223 But the
legislative history on this topic makes it clear that the principal issue was whether the laws
constituted class legislation, not whether they discriminated on the basis of race.
Following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, members of the Congress that had
produced the Amendment clearly understood that the objective public meaning of the
Amendment was that it banned all forms of class legislation and all caste systems. Although
some statements in the legislative history contradict Professor Harrison‘s understanding that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause guaranteed equality in law making, and the Equal Protection
Clause guaranteed that the government apply the laws equally, at the very least all the legislative
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history supports the notion that the Amendment as a whole banned class legislation.224 James
Garfield stated that the Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment barred states from ―making or
enforcing laws which are not on their face and in their provisions of equal application to all the
citizens of the State . . . like the air of heaven, covering all and resting upon all with equal
weight.‖225 And Senator Oliver Morton declared that the Equal Protection Clause means ―that no
person shall be deprived by a State of the equal benefit of the laws.‖226 Morton added that the
Clause ―was intended to strike at all class legislation, to provide that the laws must be general in
their effects . . . it was intended to promote equality in the States, and to take from the States the
power to make class legislation and to create inequality among their people.‖227 Morton
explained that ―the word ‗protection,‖‘ as used in the clause, ―means not simply the protection of
the person from violence, the protection of his property from destruction, but . . . the equal
benefit of the law.‖228 Senator Thayer of Nebraska declared, ―For the first time in our history [the
Fourteenth Amendment] struck down that prop of despotism, the doctrine of caste.‖229 Senator
George Edmunds of Vermont also commented that the Constitution ―protected a right of her
citizens against class prejudice, against caste prejudice, against sectarian prejudice.‖230
d. Evidence from after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
In the years following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court also
understood that the Fourteenth Amendment had constitutionalized the Antebellum doctrine
against special or partial laws. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the court dealt with a classic piece
224
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of antebellum class legislation: a monopoly. Justice Bradley‘s dissent dutifully identified the
state-granted slaughter house monopoly as class legislation and declared it unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment‘s equality guarantee.231 Justice Bradley wrote that ―a law
which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment deprives those
citizens of the equal protection of the laws.‖232 In a follow-up case eleven years later, Justice
Bradley wrote that it is a ―denial of the equal protection of the laws to grant to one man, or set of
men, the privilege of following an ordinary calling in a large community, and to deny it to all
others.‖233 But the Slaugther-House majority was unable to accept that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended to infringe on state rights so heavily.234 The only way for the
majority to justify the state-granted monopoly was to declare that the clause barring governmentmandated class legislation (the Privileges or Immunities Clause) did not apply to the states. The
Court‘s reading of the Fourteenth Amendment has been resoundingly condemned as
indefensible, and we agree that the Court‘s reading is incorrect.235 The fact that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was excised from the Fourteenth Amendment in a case involving
231

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
Id.
233
Butchers' Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and
Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. at 766 (Bradley, J., concurring).
234
See Slaughter-house Cases 83 U.S. at 77-78 ("Was it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, by the simple
declaration that no State should make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned,
from the States to the Federal government? And where it is declared that Congress Shall have the power to enforce
that article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore
belonging exclusively to the States? All this and more must follow if the proposition of the plaintiffs in error be
sound.... [T]he effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress in
the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental
character....We are convinced that no such results were intended by the Congress which proposed these
amendments, nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified them.")
232

235

See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe , 526 U. S. 489 n.1, 527 (1999) (Thomas , J., dissenting) (scholars of the Fourteenth
Amendment agree ―that the Clause does not mean what the Court said it meant in 1873‖); Akhil Amar, Substance
and Method in the Year 2000, 28 Pepperdine L. Rev. 601, 631, n. 178 (2001) (―Virtually no serious modern
scholar—left, right, and center—thinks that this [interpretation] is a plausible reading of the Amendment‖); Brief for
Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, at *33 (2010)
(arguing that the scholarly consensus is that the majority opinion is ―egregiously wrong‖).

56

Calabresi and Salander

quintessential class legislation supports Professor Harrison‘s thesis that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was the section of the Fourteenth Amendment dealing with law-making and
was designed to outlaw class legislation, such as monopolies.
Despite the holding in the Slaughter-House Cases, future cases indicated that the
Supreme Court still understood that the Fourteenth Amendment banned class legislation. For
instance, in Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, the Supreme Court struck down under the Fourteenth
Amendment a state law that awarded attorneys‘ fees to plaintiffs injured by trains because the
law subjected railroad companies to a peculiar burden not placed on other corporations or
individuals.236 The Court explained that allowing states to subject ―certain individuals or
corporations to hostile and discriminating legislation is to make the protecting clauses of the
fourteenth amendment a mere rope of sand, in no manner restraining state action.‖237 The Court
took it for granted that the Fourteenth Amendment banned all forms of class legislation and
actually cited antebellum state cases to explain its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.238 The
Court never contemplated that the Amendment only applied to racial classifications, and the
dissenting and concurring justices did not dispute the majority‘s contention that the Amendment
banned all class legislation. On that point, the court was unanimous.
Other Supreme Court opinions similarly understood that the Fourteenth Amendment
banned all class legislation. In an oft-cited opinion, Justice Field explained that under the
Fourteenth Amendment, government could ―not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions
upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general
236
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good.‖239 The laws must ―operate alike upon all persons and property under the same
circumstances and conditions‖ because ―[c]lass legislation, discriminating against some and
favoring others, is prohibited‖ by the Fourteenth Amendment.240 In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., the Supreme Court said that ―the great amendments to the Constitution which
followed the late civil war had rendered [class] legislation impossible for all future time.‖241 In
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, the majority opinion explicitly said that the Fourteenth
Amendment ―prohibit[s] discriminating and partial legislation by any State in favor of particular
persons as against others in like condition.‖242 And even in Pace v Alabama, which upheld antimiscegenation rules, the majority similarly stated that the Fourteenth Amendment ―prevent[ed]
hostile and discriminating State legislation against any person or class of persons.‖243 Even
though the court at times initially indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment would not protect
African Americans,244 the court soon changed course.245
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court was unanimous in saying that the
Fourteenth Amendment banned class legislation. Justice Bradley, writing for the majority,
described ―class legislation‖ as ―obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.‖246
Justice Bradley explained that an example of class legislation would be a law ―denying to any
person, or class of persons, the right to pursue any peaceful avocations allowed to others.‖247 In
dissent, Justin Harlan wrote, ―If the constitutional amendments be enforced, according to the
239
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intent with which, as I conceive, they were adopted, there cannot be, in this republic, any class of
human beings in practical subjection to another class, with power in the latter to dole out to the
former just such privileges as they may choose to grant.‖248
Riding circuit in 1882, Justice Field‘s opinions also discussed the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s ban on class legislation. He wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment ―stands in the
constitution as a perpetual shield against all unequal and partial legislation by the states,‖ 249 and
―‗that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all.‘‖250
The weight of the historical evidence thus suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment
banned all forms of class legislation and all systems of caste. The Amendment‘s framers
recognized the problems associated with not having such a ban, as evidenced primarily by the
treatment of African-Americans up to that time. Consequently, they adopted a ban on all class
legislation that had existed at the state-level since before the Founding. Under Cooley‘s view, the
Amendment mirrored the Bill of Rights, simply articulating principles already embodied in the
Constitution. As Cooley wrote,
It was not within the power of the States before the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the laws; but there were
servile classes not thus shielded, and when these were made freemen, there were
some who disputed their claim to citizenship, and some State laws were in force
which established discriminations against them. To settle doubts and preclude
such laws, the fourteenth amendment was adopted; and the same securities which
one citizen may demand, all others are entitled to.‖251
Either way, there can be no doubt that all class legislation violated the Constitution after 1868.
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II. Religion and The Fourteenth Amendment
Religion as a Caste
The nineteenth century definition of caste surely included discrimination on the basis of
religion. As already discussed, the definition of caste was not limited to discrimination on the
basis or race, national origin, or physical appearance.252 The key features of a caste system were
heredity and immutability which could accompany many kinds of systems of caste ranging from
European feudalism to the Indian caste system which was the paradigmatic caste system for the
Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. India‘s caste system in turn was
based explicitly on religious distinctions and was not openly based on racial distinctions.
Nineteenth century dictionaries cited examples of a caste as including a ―class of people among
the Hindoos‖253 and ―the caste of [the] Bramins.‖254 Hinduism played an important role in
structuring and enforcing the Indian caste system, although the system was not entirely grounded
in Hinduism. The Brahmins were the priestly class at the pinnacle of the hierarchy and served an
important religious function, providing spiritual guidance and leading religious services.
And other non-racial and religious hierarchies, such as European feudalism, the treatment
of Jews in Europe prior to the French Revolution, as well as the many social distinctions that
were made in Persia, Egypt, Peru, Assyria, and Attica were all recognized as being caste systems
in the mid-Nineteenth Century.255 In 1872, Senator Charles Sumner, one of the leaders of
Reconstruction, remarked that:
Religion and reason condemn Caste as impious and unchristian, making
republican institutions and equal laws impossible; but here is Caste not unlike that
which separates the Sudra from the Brahmin. Pray, sir, who constitutes the white
man a Brahmin? Whence his lordly title? Down to a recent period in Europe the
252
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Jews were driven to herd by themselves separate from Christians; but this
discarded barbarism is revived among us in the ban of color. There are millions of
fellow citizens guilty of no offense except the dusky livery of the sun appointed
by the heavenly Father, whom you treat as others have treated the Jews, as the
Brahmin treats the Sudra. But pray, sir, do not pretend that this is the great
Equality promised by our fathers.‖256
Senator Sumner‘s explicit references to the mistreatment of Brahmins and Jews show that he
understood that systems of caste can be based on religious distinctions. Representative Charles
Van Wyck made the same point saying that: ―The meanness of caste in this country on account
of color is no more wicked than the caste of nation, religion, or blood in Great Britain.‖257
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in a case involving the controversial theologian
Francis Abbot, discussed how classifications based on religion lead to caste:
A division of society into two ranks, a theological aristocracy on one side, a
lower caste on the other,--the former wielding all the instruments of the law and
all the power of the government to degrade men of the faith of Jefferson, Franklin,
Ethan Allen, or Governor Plumer; commanding what doctrines shall not be
preached; suppressing the freedom of the pulpit; abolishing the rights of property
given to independent religious uses; and confiscating such property for the use of
a state religion,--all this is as repugnant to the plain and vital principles of the
constitution, as to the sense and spirit of the people who made the constitution.
The governmental work of that generation has been sufficiently extolled for
eighty-five years past as a triumphant vindication of human rights, affording a
sure protection against ecclesiastical oppression in particular, and perpetuating
throughout the state such refuge as wheelwright found for a season at Exeter in
exile for conscience' sake. That work must be undone, and a degenerate age must
be ready to welcome the return of the worse despotisms, before a system of
religious caste can be introduced. When an infidel does not stand as well in law
before the tribunals of justice as a Christian, in any sense of the word, our free
institutions are a failure. To sneer at free-thinkers of free thought is to make a
thoughtless use of free speech, and to scoff at a privilege which we are bound to
protect. The Constitution does not assume to create religious rights or to distribute
them. It reverently recognizes and maintains them as original and universal, as
rights which human government can neither grant nor withhold, which are not of
human tenure, and which no man can give up. A single unresisted infringement,
established as a precedent, subjugates the weak, and leaves them at the mercy of
the strong. Every man and every parish is liable to hold unpopular theological
opinions. And when the right to hold and inculcate such opinions is not sacred,
256
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and the violation of it is not sacrilege; when the constitutional defences of that
right are dismantled, and it is left with no better security than the generosity and
tolerance of an ecclesiastical court, or the caprice of a ruling class; when freemen
are reduced to the consolation of remembering that the writ for burning heretics is
obsolete, and of hoping that civilization will not suffer it to be revived,--the
theory of our government is exploded and its original authority at an end.258
On a superficial level, it could be argued that there is no discrimination on the basis of
religion today such that it could be said that we have a religious system of ―caste.‖ People can
freely change religions – or choose not to practice any religion – without direct coercion by the
government or private individuals. A person born into one religion is not stuck there for life.
Even so, there are clearly some religions and religious sub-groups which have some caste like
aspects to them.
For example, Judaism likely qualifies as a caste, although it is not a caste that faces a lot
of open discrimination in the United States at the moment. According to Jewish law, a Jewish
person is defined as someone who either was born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism.259
Once a person is considered Jewish according to Jewish law, he or she cannot become a nonJew.260 So, even if a Jew renounces his or her belief in Judaism or converts to another religion,
he or she is still considered Jewish. Even such a person‘s children and grandchildren would be
considered Jewish, as long as the matrimonial descent is maintained. Being Jewish is thus
hereditary and immutable and has inherent elements of caste. Prejudice and discrimination
against Jews as an inferior caste is far less common today in the United States than it was prior to
the 1960‘s, but it persists in some places even today.
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The definition of a Jew is also well known in the non-Jewish world and has historically
been used as a basis for persecuting Jews and treating them as an inferior caste.261 For instance,
the Nazis did not define a person as Jewish based on his or her religious beliefs, but based on the
person‘s inherited status as a Jew.262 Whether an individual defined himself or herself as a Jew or
was a member of the Jewish community was irrelevant to the Nazi definition.263 Consequently,
―[m]any Germans who had not practiced Judaism for years found themselves caught in the grip
of the Nazi terror. Even people with Jewish grandparents who had converted to Christianity were
defined as Jews.‖264 The Nazis clearly viewed a person‘s Jewish status as hereditary and
immutable. Such entrenched persecution mirrors the immutability of the Indian caste system. It
is also reminiscent of the disgraceful state laws in this country that defined individuals as
―African-American‖ based on the ―proportion of colored blood‖ in the individual‘s genealogy.265
Another religion where children effectively inherit their parents‘ religious status and
beliefs is Islam. Children born to Islamic parents will usually be raised as Moslems and will be
Moslems when they reach adulthood. Conversion from Islam to another religion is considered
apostasy and is punishable by death, according to many Islamic scholars and regimes. 266 Status
as a Moslem is thus in essence inheritable and almost immutable just as is status as a Jew.
Moslems inevitably are a kind of caste as are Jews.
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Children born to other religious parents may have caste-like attributes as well. Take, for
instance, a child born into an Amish home. The child is born into a religious way of life without
any choice in the matter. The child attends Amish schools and is taught Amish values and
directed in Amish religious practices. Because of parental and social influences, the child likely
has no opportunity or even ability to abandon the Amish religion until he or she is an adult. The
child‘s religious status as an Amish practitioner is thus to some degree hereditary and immutable.
Even a child born into a less rigid religious home will likely not change religions by virtue of the
dominating influence of his or her parents.
Religious groups that fall within the definition of caste, such as Jews and Moslems,
should certainly be protected from discrimination by the Fourteenth Amendment‘s no-caste
principle. For this reason, we will argue below that a government program offering unequal
educational opportunities for religious children relative to secular children violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.267 Whether all religious individuals should receive the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s protection from discrimination on the basis of caste simply because some religious
individuals constitute a caste, is a more difficult question. But answering it is unnecessary
because the Amendment‘s ban on all class legislation clearly protects all religious individuals
including mainline Protestants, Catholics, members of the Eastern Orthodox Church, Mormons,
and practitioners of Hinduism, Buddhism, and all other faiths.
Religion as a Class
As already discussed, a system of forbidden class legislation is one that singles out
particular groups or individuals for special privileges or burdens quite apart from those borne by
the rest of the members of society. Class legislation is by definition legislation which does not
apply broadly to the general populace and which granted monopolies or other special privileges
267
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to a favored group or imposed unique burdens on a particular disfavored group. The original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment held that government could only make distinctions
among classes of people if doing so was rational and necessary to serve a public purpose. Thus,
in its 1897 ruling in Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of a law that awarded attorneys‘ fees to plaintiffs suing railroad companies but
not to plaintiffs suing other corporations or individuals.268 The Supreme Court found that giving
this benefit to plaintiffs suing railways but not to plaintiffs suing other corporations served no
public purpose. So the Court struck down the law as unconstitutional class legislation. Under the
principles enunciated in the Ellis case, classifications based on religion also serve no public
purpose. They therefore violate the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class legislation.
In fact, the Constitution‘s religion clauses served as among the first bans on some forms
of class legislation discriminating against religion starting in 1787 and 1791.269 The Free
Exercise Clause and the No Religious Test Clause both essentially barred Congress from passing
special or partial laws that place unique burdens on religion. And the Establishment Clause
prevents Congress from passing a special or partial law that grants one religion a unique
privilege or immunity that effectively disfavors all other religions. The Establishment Clause
essentially blocks Congress from granting a monopoly on religion to one specific religion. As
Professor McConnell has said:
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was designed to ‗avoid undue
concentrations of power‘ – specifically, to prevent the federal government (and,
after the Fourteenth Amendment, all governments) from assuming the power to
control the religious life of the American people . . . Just as we want no
governmental control of news media, telecommunications, or the arts, the First
268
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Amendment stands for the premise that religious decisions should be made by
individuals, families, and voluntary associations, and not by the state.‖270
The Religion Clauses of the original Constitution and of the federal Bill of Rights were thus
consistent with the Lockean principle of allowing only general rules applicable to all religions
only on similar terms. To be sure, the three Religion Clauses did not by themselves provide as
sweeping protection against discrimination on the basis of religion as is mandate by the antidiscrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment.271 But they were a good first start.
The Fourteenth Amendment dramatically expanded the limited ban on class legislation
initially outlined in the 1787 and 1791 federal constitutional Religion Clauses. The Fourteenth
Amendment broadly banned all class legislation across the board, whether based on religion or
on any other improper classifications that gave some classes of citizens greater rights than were
enjoyed by other classes of citizens. With regards to religion, the Amendment banned all forms
of discrimination on the basis of religion, not just the few narrow forms specified in the Religion
Clauses. There is no evidence in the legislative history that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment sought to carve religion out of the broad ban on class legislation that they meant to
enact. And it is therefore unlikely that the ban on religious class legislation after 1868 should
have simply regurgitated the minimal ban on class legislation set forth in the original Religion
Clauses. The Framers knew how to narrow the scope of constitutional language when they
wanted to do so,272 and there is not even a hint from the legislative history that the framers
thought that religion should receive less protection than other groups. In contrast, the Framers
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debated quite vigorously whether women should be protected from class legislation and what
kind of protection from class legislation African Americans should receive.273
And if class legislation protects against discrimination on the basis of race, it surely bans
discrimination on the basis of religion because multiple protections for religion in the text of the
Constitution predate the Fourteenth Amendment indicating that from 1791 on religion was
already a suspect class. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses protect religious liberty.
And the No Religious Test Clause guarantees that individuals will not be barred from holding
public office based on their religion. In contrast, in 1787 and in 1791 there were no such clauses
indicating that race was a suspect class. Indeed African Americans were subjected to
extraordinary oppression and were barred from holding public office and even from the rights of
citizenship prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is extremely improbable that the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have created a new, far-reaching protection from
class legislation that applied only to racial classes which had been totally unprotected from
discrimination prior to 1868, yet deny protection to religious classes of people that actually had
been recognized prior to 1868 as having suspect class status! The more rational approach would
have been for the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to grant the new protection from class
legislation to those groups which had been recognized as being suspect classes prior to 1868 and
then decide which other groups like racial minorities or women should or should not also receive
that same level of protection.
And in fact the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment followed this logic precisely when
considering whether women should receive protection from class legislation under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Framers chose to ban class legislation that discriminated on the
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basis of race but not class legislation that discriminated on the basis of gender, even though
women should have been protected under the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on caste systems and
on class-based laws.274 The Framers refused to begin considering gender a suspect class by
following a two-step process. First, they carefully considered and extensively debated whether
women should be included in the Fourteenth Amendment‘s protection against hostile class
legislation.275 This step was necessary because prior to 1868 women had few constitutional rights
and had been subjected to extensive discrimination. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
needed therefore to consider whether to include women in the Amendment‘s broad language or
to create a carve-out excluding them from the Amendment‘s protection. They chose the latter
route. Next, they explicitly excluded women from the protection of the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Section Two which protects the voting rights of only ―male citizens‖.276 Professor
Calabresi and Ms. Rickert note that feminists did not object to the broad, unqualified language of
Section One banning systems of class legislation, which they understood as including protection
for women.277 It was only the discriminatory language of Section Two which used the word
―male‖ that they objected to.278 In contrast to the extensive discussion about excluding women
from the Amendment‘s protection against class legislation, there was absolutely no discussion of
excluding religion from the Amendment‘s protection, and there was obviously no textual
exclusion either. The Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class-based laws that discriminate against
religion matches the ban the Amendment would have imposed against class-based laws that
discriminate on the basis of sex had the word ―male‖ not been deliberately inserted into Section
274
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Two. It is thus difficult to see how the Amendment‘s Framers could possibly have meant to
exclude religion from the Amendment‘s ban on systems of class and caste.
And if the Fourteenth Amendment protects women from hostile class legislation, it surely
protects religion from hostile class legislation as well. Professor Calabresi and Ms. Rickert have
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment did not begin protecting women until 1919 when the
Nineteenth Amendment was ratified.279 They point out that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment clearly excluded women from the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth
Amendment by using the words ―male inhabitants‖ in Section 2. But Calabresi and Rickert argue
that when the Nineteenth Amendment granted women political rights including the right to vote,
women automatically gained civil rights protection from hostile class legislation under the
Fourteenth Amendment as well. Their reasoning is that granting a group of people political rights
without granting that group civil rights is incoherent. They claim that the Fourteenth Amendment
has an amoeba-like quality, automatically sucking up new groups with caste or class features to
receive equal civil rights as those groups obtain equal political rights in future generations. It is
hard to imagine that the Fourteenth Amendment would be able to automatically grant equal
rights to groups, such as women, that never before enjoyed equality, even in 1868, yet exclude
religious groups whose status as a suspect class dated all the way back to 1787.
Finally, it should be highlighted that by 1868, all state constitutions protected religion,
usually in multiple ways, even though state constitutions at that time contained little protection
against racial discrimination. Twenty-seven out of the thirty-seven states (73%) had clauses in
their state constitutions in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified that banned the
establishment of religion.280 All thirty seven state constitutions in 1868 had Free Exercise Clause

279
280

See Id. at 70-85; supra, at 70-72 (discussing further).
Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 37, 31-32.

69

Calabresi and Salander

analogues.281 Twenty-four states (65%) in 1868 had clauses prohibiting religious qualifications
for holding public office.282 In contrast, only five states (14%) in 1868 had clauses barring some
form of discrimination on the basis of race.283 It is hard to imagine that these same states, with
resounding protections of religion as a suspect class prior to 1868 and only minimal protection of
race as a suspect class, would come together and ratify a Fourteenth Amendment that banned
only class legislation on the basis of race but not class legislation on the basis of religion.
The Fourteenth Amendment Automatically Protects Groups with Political Rights
In America, a logical and fundamental theory of rights is that groups that have political
rights, such as the right to vote and run for public office, are also guaranteed equal civil rights. 284
This truism exists because political rights – the right to be counted in society and the ability to
participate in the shaping of society – are uniquely valued in society.285 Some people, such as
children or convicted felons, have civil rights but lack political rights. Other people, such as
resident aliens, have some civil rights but not others and have no political rights. But groups of
people that have political rights certainly have civil rights as well.286 To say otherwise would
281
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mean that the legislature could, for example, strip a group of people of the right to contract or the
right to work outside the home, but that it could not eliminate that group‘s right to vote or hold
public office. Such a construction is implausible. The history of women‘s rights is instructive.
In 1868, women did not have constitutionally protected political and civil rights.
Although women should have qualified as a caste because of their immutable and hereditary
physical features, women were not guaranteed equal civil rights or protected by the Fourteenth
amendment from class based legislation because Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment
restricted voting rights protection to men only.287 It therefore became implausible to construe the
anti-discrimination command of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment as including women
when Section Two of the Amendment explicitly excluded them from its protections.288 And
indeed feminists were outraged when they learned that the word ―male‖ would be included in
Section Two because they understood the dire implications.289
But in 1919 when the Nineteenth Amendment granted women the right to vote, the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s equality guarantee automatically expanded to protect women from
class based laws.290 The reason for this is that granting a group of people the right to vote while
simultaneously denying that group of people equal civil rights is simply irrational.291 The reason
the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified to give African American men the right to vote just two
original meaning of the Constitution and instead relied on its perception of the evolving meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 669 (stating that ―the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a
particular era . . . we have never been confined to historic notions of equality‖). In so doing, the majority failed to
cite any original sources for the fundamental right to vote. And it failed to explain why it was necessary to ratify the
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments if the evolving meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause otherwise engulfed the purpose of those provisions. Rather, Justice Black‘s dissent was likely
more in line with the Constitution‘s original meaning. See Id. at 672-675 (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
Equal Protection Clause merely mandates rational basis review of voting restrictions, not strict scrutiny).
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years after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment is precisely because the Fourteenth
Amendment only granted African-Americans equal civil rights, not equal political rights.292 And
it is clear from the legislative history that the Framers understood that the Fourteenth
Amendment was insufficient to guarantee African Americans the right to vote.293 It took the
Reconstruction Framers only two years to realize that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s guarantee of
equal civil rights for African Americans needed to be supplemented by the Fifteenth
Amendment‘s guarantee of equal political rights to the same group. Thus, when fifty-two years
after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment women got the right to vote, women suddenly
had the same political rights as did white and African-American men. From 1920 on, it became
implausible to argue that women had a constitutional right to vote for president, senator, and
governor, but they could not be trusted to make a contract or own property without their
husband‘s consent.
It should be underscored that granting political rights under the Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments does not render the Fourteenth Amendment superfluous. First, the Fourteenth
Amendment banned all systems of caste and of class-based laws, thus creating a new level of
civil rights protection previously not guaranteed by the Constitution. This broad-based civil
rights protection extends to many groups beyond just classes defined by race, gender, and
religion. For instance, Antebellum bans on class legislation mainly involved groups who were
politically connected (or politically disfavored) or economic distinctions that were deemed
unjustified or lacking in having a sufficient public purpose.294 And other groups, such as
children, immigrants, or the disabled would also likely qualify for some protection from class
based laws. Second, without the Fourteenth Amendment, legislatures could pass class legislation
292
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or establish caste systems, such as European feudalism or the Indian caste system, even though
they could not take away the right to vote based on gender or race. Prior to 1868, the
Constitution protected a variety of other civil rights, such as those enumerated in the Bill of
Rights, but it did not outlaw systems of caste or class-base legislation explicitly as the Fourteenth
Amendment did. Thus the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that critical civil rights not otherwise
articulated in the Constitution or its Amendments get protected.
The political rights of religious individuals are explicitly protected in the Constitution.
The No Religious Test Clause guarantees that individuals will not be barred from holding office
based on their religion.295 The Clause makes no distinction as to whether the test discriminates
against a particular religion or against all religions generally. The Clause thus rejects the
argument commonly used by proponents of religious discrimination that discrimination on the
basis of religion furthers an antiestablishment purpose.296 And in fact, religious individuals were
the only group of people – the only suspect class in modern language -- to receive explicit
protection of their political rights in the original Constitution of 1787.
The No Religious Test Clause not only bans laws imposing a religious test for holding
office, but we think that it also implies that legislatures cannot restrict the ability to vote based on
religion. It would be irrational to read the Constitution as prohibiting legislatures from barring
individuals from holding public office based on their religion but as allowing legislatures to
restrict voting rights based on religion. How could the Constitution possibly be read to trust
someone to hold public office, including the office of President, but not trust that person with the
right to vote? Under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment we allow citizens to vote starting from the
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age of eighteen,297 but we do not allow them to hold the greater trust of becoming a member of
Congress until the age of twenty-five,298 a Senator until the age of thirty,299 or the President until
the age of thirty-five.300 Suppose a law were passed that prevented people of all religions from
voting, instead of just preventing members of a particular religion from voting? Such a law
would still be invalid under the implication of the No Religious Test Clause because the Clause
makes no distinction as to whether the discrimination it forbids targets a specific religious group
or all religious individuals generally. So it seems that once the original Constitution in 1787
guaranteed religious individuals the right to hold federal public office, it also guaranteed them
other political rights like the right to vote in federal elections. Since the Constitution specifies in
Article I, Section 2 that voting eligibility must be the same for voting in U.S. House of
Representatives elections as it is in voting for members of the most numerous branch of the state
legislature, the states as well as the federal government are constitutionally barred from denying
any citizen the right to vote on the basis of religion.
Because religious individuals thus have fully protected political rights against the federal
and state governments – the right to hold public office, the right to vote, and the right to serve on
juries – they automatically, like women since 1920, have fully protected equal civil rights that
protect them from federal and state class-based legislation. Neither Congress nor the state
legislatures can restrict the political rights of a single religion or of all religions as a whole. And
Congress and the state legislatures therefore also cannot restrict the civil rights of a single
religion or of all religions as a whole. To say otherwise would lead to the illogical result that
religious individuals had a constitutionally protected right to vote and be elected president,
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senator, or governor, but not to make contracts, buy property, or share a lunch counter with
secular individuals. It would thus be utterly irrational to conclude that the anti-discrimination
command of the Fourteenth Amendment does not ban discrimination on the basis of religion.
One possible counterargument is that because the individual political and civil rights of
religious citizens are already protected by the very specific language of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, one ought not to read the Fourteenth Amendment‘s general ban on
discriminatory class-based legislation as superseding the very specific and on point language of
the Religion Clauses. This argument is perhaps best illustrated by the Supreme Court‘s opinions
affirming political rights for religious individuals under the Free Exercise Clause.301 In Torasco
v. Watkins, for example, the Supreme Court held that a Maryland law requiring that a notary
commissioner declare his or her belief in God violated the First Amendment (it was unclear
whether the court was using the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause).302 The
Supreme Court explained that the No Religious Test Clause was necessary prior to the adoption
of the Bill of Rights for such claims of political rights, but that the First Amendment ―broke new
constitutional ground in the protection it sought to afford to freedom of religion.‖303 Indeed the
Supreme Court does not appear to have ever used the No Religious Test Clause as the basis for a
decision it has rendered.304 And under current Supreme Court case law, laws that restrict the
right to vote or that restrict many but not all civil rights based on religion likely violate both the
Establishment Clause305 and the Free Exercise Clause.306
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But the Supreme Court‘s case law on the Free Exercise, Establishment, and No Religious
Test Clauses is largely inconsistent with the original meaning of these clauses, and there is state
conduct, such as the adoption of Blaine amendments, that under current case law does not violate
the Religion Clauses but which should be read as violating the Fourteenth Amendment‘s antidiscrimination principle. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses combat only certain
specific types of governmental actions that hurt religious citizens but that do not implicate
political rights.307 These two clauses create protections uniquely required for religion. In
contrast, the No Religious Test Clause guarantees religious individuals‘ political rights. The
Torasco court‘s declaration that the No Religious Test Clause is superfluous following
ratification of the First Amendment is indefensible as an original matter or under any plausible
theory of textual interpretation.
To see why the Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command adds and should
add concrete protections for religion above and beyond those afforded by the Religion Clauses, it
is necessary to briefly canvass the protection of religion from hostile class legislation since 1787.
History of Religious Equality in America
The protection of religious liberty from hostile class legislation has a very long history in
this country predating the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by centuries.308 Several of
the original thirteen North American colonies were purposely established to be safe havens for
―pervasively sectarian‖ schools violated the original meaning of the Establishment Clause because the Establishment
Clause demanded ―equal treatment of all religious faiths without discrimination or preference‖); see also Douglas
Laycock, ―Nonpreferential‖ Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 Wm & Mary L.Rev. 875,
922–23 (1986) (explaining that the Establishment Clause prohibited both discrimination against specific religious
groups and discrimination against all religious groups in general).
306
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religious minorities and some of those colonies through their laws ensured religious toleration,
albeit imperfect in our modern eyes.309 And it is generally recognized that the core purpose of the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment was the protection of religion
from certain kinds of hostile class legislation and the furtherance of religious liberty.310 The
equal protection of religion can be seen in state constitutions, in pre-1868 court cases, in the
political history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This diverse and widespread historical evidence shows an overwhelming sensitivity
to the need to protect religion from hostile class legislation. As Thomas Cooley wrote, ―the
general voice has been, that persons of every religious persuasion should be made equal before
the law, and that questions of religious belief and religious worship should be questions between
each individual man and his Maker.‖311 It is therefore inconceivable that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment meant to incorporate a ban on class-based laws that discriminated on the
basis of race but not against class-based laws that discriminated on the basis of religion. Religion
had by 1868 been a suspect class since colonial times. Surely, if racial classifications are to
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receive strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment and to be upheld only in the face of a
compelling public purpose, the same must be true of laws that classify on the basis of religion.
1.

Historical persecution of religion and the founders’ response

The Framers of the Constitution and Bill of rights were well aware of the ugly history of
religious persecution in England when they wrote those documents.312 For instance, church
elections were famously manipulated by the King. King Henry II thus allowed the church to hold
―free‖ elections but ordered it to elect his clerk;313 and King Henry VIII assumed full personal
control of the church and claimed the power to appoint church officials.314 Prior to the rise of
King Charles I, the Church of England dominated the landscape in Elizabethan and Stuart
England, and the supporters of the Church of England thoroughly suppressed religious dissenters
such as Protestants and Roman Catholics.315 By the 1630‘s, high Church Anglicans allied with
Charles I and his Catholic Queen causing Protestant dissenters to flee England for the safety of
living in the Massachusetts Bay and Connecticut colonies. This exodus for the new world
continued in the 1640‘s during the waging of the English Civil War between Oliver Cromwell
and the dissenting Protestants and Charles I and his high church Anglicans. Following the
English Civil War, Protestants executed King Charles I and his Archbishop of Canterbury and
similarly persecuted dissenters from Puritanism. Cromwell and his allies confiscated property,
denied free religious exercise, and imprisoned non-Protestants.316 Following the return of the
monarchy in 1660, the persecution of Protestant dissenters resumed and the persecution of
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Catholics continued.317 The Test Act of 1672 denied public and military office to non-Anglicans
and required that everyone follow the religious practices of the Church of England.318
Eager to escape the religious persecution of England, many dissenters fled to America,
but unfortunately they brought some bad English habits with them. The Puritans in the
Massachusetts Bay colony, for example, persecuted dissenters, even executing some Quakers.319
In Virginia, Puritans and Catholics were expelled because the Church of England was the
established church there, and Baptists were horsewhipped.320 The Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 eventually guaranteed equal treatment of religions but only for Christians,321 and
Massachusetts proved to be unfriendly to Presbyterians, Baptists, and Quakers.322 Many other
states also had religious test oaths requiring public officials to declare their adherence to a
particular religion.323 By 1787, eleven states prohibited non-Christians from holding public
office, and four prohibited non-Protestants from holding office.324
Jews also suffered tremendous persecution in England historically,325 as they did
throughout Europe.326 In the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Jews were subjected to mob
violence in England perpetrated by both the royal crown and private individuals.327 Blood libels
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persisted, and there were many incidents of mobs murdering Jews and stealing Jewish
property.328 During this time, Jews were singled out for many special legal disadvantages,
including higher taxes, prohibitions on owning land, bans on inheritance from parent to child,
and substantial restrictions on trade and occupation.329 Finally, in 1290, King Edward I formally
expelled all the Jews from England a full 202 years before the Spanish Inquisition expelled the
Jews from Spain. It was not until the 1650‘s, under Oliver Cromwell, that the Jews were again
allowed back into the England, and Jews in England continued to have limited legal rights and
religious freedom from the 1650‘s until the mid-Nineteenth Century.330
It was against this backdrop of bloody religious warfare and intolerance that the Framers
of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights sought to guarantee religious liberty. By enacting the
Establishment Clause, in the very first clause in the Bill of Rights, the Framers ensured that there
would never be a national church. As James Madison said, the Establishment Clause responded
to the concern that ―one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and
establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform.‖331 By enacting the Free
Exercise Clause in the Bill of Rights, the Framers barred the government from discriminatorily
targeting religious worship. And regarding the No Religious Test Clause, Oliver Ellsworth of
Connecticut, later Chief Justice of the United States, wrote:
[T]he sole purpose and effect of [the ban on religious tests for office] is to exclude
persecution, and to secure to you the important right of religious liberty . . . . In
our country every man has a right to worship God in that way which is most
agreeable to his own conscience. If he be a good and peaceable citizen, he is
liable to no penalties or incapacities on account of his religious sentiments; or in
other words, he is not subject to persecution.332
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The Religion Clauses thus worked in concert to guarantee religious liberty and guard against the
religious persecution which had pervaded England and the colonies.333 For this reason, Thomas
Jefferson described both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause as ―building a
wall of separation between Church & State.‖334
Prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, several states proposed amendments to the
original Constitution of 1787 which give us a sense of the passion the Framers had for protecting
religious freedom. For instance, New York proposed, ―That the people have an equal, natural,
and unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise their religion, according to the dictates of
conscience . . . .‖335 New Hampshire proposed, ―Congress shall make no laws touching religion,
or to infringe the rights of conscience.‖ 336 And James Madison proposed, ―The civil rights of
none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion
be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed.‖337 These proposed amendments demonstrate how extraordinarily significant
religious liberty was to the founders. Though the final version of the Free Exercise Clause that
was ultimately ratified did not guarantee the level of equality mandated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the notion that religious individuals should not be equal before the law would have
been considered odious to the Framers of the original Constitution.
2.
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Many early state constitutions guaranteed equality of religion in ways that mirrored the
bans we discussed earlier on special and partial laws.338 For instance, Vermont‘s 1786 territorial
constitution, which was one of the first constitutions to contain a broad equality guarantee in
American history,339 stated,
...it is our indispensable duty to establish such original principles of government
as will best promote the general happiness of the people of this State, and their
posterity, and provide for future improvements, without partiality for, or prejudice
against, any particular class, sect, or denomination of men whatever.340
The language ―sect, or denomination‖ referred to religion and reflected the view that religion
was a suspect classification and discrimination on the basis of religion was the quintessential
form of improper discrimination with which the Framers were concerned at that time. Some state
constitutions guaranteed that an individual‘s civil rights would not be burdened or privileged on
account of his religion. A typical provision read, ―The civil rights, privileges, or capacities of any
citizen, shall in no way be diminished, or enlarged, on account of his religious principles.‖ 341
338
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Some state constitutions even created a positive legislative duty to protect religion and possibly
foster free exercise. For instance, the Texas Constitution said, ―It shall be the duty of the
legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect every religious denomination in the
peaceable enjoyment of their own mode of public worship.‖342 Some guaranteed an individual‘s
right to exercise his religion without the influence of governmental burdens or privileges. For
instance, the Maryland Constitution provided,
―That, as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks
most acceptable to him; all persons, professing the Christian religion, are equally
entitled to protection in their religious liberty; wherefore no person ought by any
law to be molested in his person or estate on account of his religious persuasion or
profession, or for his religious practice.‖ 343
These provisions provided religious practitioners with significantly enhanced protection from
class legislation than did the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause of the federal
Constitution. And they reflect a commitment to religious equality.
A few states even explicitly endorsed religious equality. The Massachusetts Constitution,
though establishing Christianity as the state religion, explicitly endorsed equality for the different
branches of Christianity: ―every denomination of Christians, demeaning themselves peaceably,
and as good subjects of the commonwealth, shall be equally under the protection of the law: and
no subordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law.‖344
Similarly, Maryland‘s clause read, ―all persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious

342

TEX. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 4. See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 37, at 40 (noting that Nebraska and Ohio had
similar provisions)
343
MD. CONST. OF 1776, DECL. of RIGHTS, art. XXXIII (emphasis added); see also ALA. CONST. of 1819, Decl. of
Rights, § 7 (―[N]o preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect, society, denomination, or mode of
worship ....‖); CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 4 (―The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this State ....‖).
344
MASS., part 1, art. 3 (1780) (emphasis added).

83

Calabresi and Salander

liberty; wherefore, no person ought, by any law to be molested in his person or estate, on account
of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious practice.‖345
By 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, many states had outright bans
against class legislation imbedded in their religion clauses. Professor Calabresi and Sarah Agudo
have pointed out that twenty-seven out of the thirty-seven states (73%) had clauses in their state
constitutions that banned the establishment of religion.346 But most of these clauses did much
more than merely prevent the legislature from passing a law ―respecting an establishment of
religion,‖ as the federal Constitution mandates.347 Instead they actually banned religious class
legislation. A typical clause read, "No preference shall be given by law to any Christian sect or
mode of worship."348 Giving a preference to a religious group is a special law, comparable to the
giving of an economic preference to a class of merchants. A related but distinct formulation of
state establishment clauses read, "No person shall by law be compelled to join or support, nor be
classed with, or associated to, any congregation, church, or religious association.‖ 349 Compelling
individuals to join or support a certain religion effectively grants a monopoly to that religion
because it eliminates the ability of ―consumers of religion‖ to select their preferred religion. The
supply of religion is restricted to a single religion, demand for religion is affixed by the
government, and the competitive market for religion is terminated. In sum, twenty-two states
(59%) in 1868, a majority, had this stronger language in their establishment clauses when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. These clauses clearly indicate that a majority of the states
345
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in 1868 recognized the problem of religious class legislation and sought to eradicate it more fully
than would be accomplished simply by approving a replica of the federal establishment clause.
Some early court cases also emphasized the equal protection of religion in their
opinions.350 In the 1799 case of Runkel v. Winemiller, Judge Chase granted a writ of mandamus
to a minister in a dispute with his congregation, relying on the principle that ―the pastors,
teachers and ministers, of every denomination of [C]hristians, are equally entitled to the
protection of the law, and to the enjoyment of their religious and temporal rights.‖351 In this
context, equal protection meant that contractual obligations and rights applied equally to all
members and leaders of a church without any special privilege or burden. 352 In the 1876 decision
in Ferriter v. Tyler, the Vermont Supreme Court declared that the Vermont Constitution was
. . . designed ... to secure to every subject equal civil rights, irrespective of his
religious faith; so that his being a Catholic or a Protestant—his being a Calvinist
or an Arminian—his being an orthodox evangelical or a free-thinker— his being a
Baptist or a Universalist—an Episcopalian or a Quaker, should not make him the
object of discriminating legislation or judicial judgment to his disadvantage, as
compared with those of different faith and practice,—so that no law should be
aimed or executed against him because he professed and practiced one form of
religious belief or disbelief rather than another, within the limits of personal
immunity consistent with good order and the peace of society under the
government.353
3.

Religion and Abolition
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Religion played an important role in the abolition of slavery.354 The first American and
British abolitionists were deeply religious individuals who recognized the moral depravity of
slavery.355 Quakers, Methodists, and Presbyterians were some of the early abolitionists.356
Religious abolitionists viewed slavery as ―irreconcilable with the manifested will of our Great
Creator, and with the imperative declaration of our blessed Savior ‗all things whatsoever ye
would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets.‘‖357
As Joseph Story put it, slavery was illegal because it was ―repugnant to the great principles of
Christian duty, the dictates of natural religion, the obligations of good faith and morality, and the
eternal maxims of social justice.‖358 Religious abolitionists believed that it was their religious
duty to end slavery, and they embarked on a large-scale political campaign in New England and
in Congress itself where groups of clergymen and other religious individuals sought to end
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slavery under the law.359 Other abolitionists took a more radical view: ―By what rule is [assisting
runaway slaves] justifiable? By the commands of the bible, and the whole spirit of the gospel.‖360
White slave owners often restricted African American slaves‘ religious practices to
prevent religiously-inspired rebellions. Southern slave owners and governments became
concerned that religion was leading to abolition and to slave rebellion. Notably, Charles Finney,
a preacher in New York, led a popular religious revival in 1824-1825 based on a liberal theology
that emphasized social work.361 Many of Finney‘s followers significantly furthered the
abolitionist cause and became prominent abolitionists in the mid-Nineteenth century.362 Nat
Turner and Denmark Vesey were also preachers who led significant rebellions against white
slave owners.363 Nat Turner‘s bloody rebellion led to the death of seventy whites and caused
many whites to fear that religion was a potential threat to their system of slavery.364 Denmark
Vesey invoked the Bible to inspire rebellion. As one slave testified, ―At this meeting Vesey said
... that we ought to rise up and fight against the whites for our liberties .... [H]e read to us from
the Bible, how the Children of Israel were delivered out of Egypt from bondage.‖365
As a result, southerners established harsh laws restricting slaves‘ ability to exercise their
religion, including draconian regulations on black religious assemblies.366 For instance, in the
District of Columbia, ―all meetings for religious worship, beyond the hour of ten o'clock at night,
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of free negroes, mulattoes or slaves, shall be and they are hereby declared to be unlawful.‖367
And in South Carolina, it was illegal for ―assemblies of slaves, free negroes, mulattoes and
mestizoes‖ to meet ―in a confined or secret place.‖368 Law enforcement personnel could
administer ―corporal punishment, not exceeding twenty lashes, upon such slaves, free negroes,
&c., as they may judge necessary for deterring them from the like unlawful assemblage in the
future.‖369 Many laws prohibited slaves from preaching or religious practice unless in the
presence of whites.370 Under this tight regulation, religious gatherings invariably espoused
proslavery ideology and encouraged slaves to obey their masters.371 There were also laws
prohibiting blacks from reading the Bible,372 becoming ministers,373 preaching,374 and leaving
their plantations on ―Sundays, fast days, and holy days.‖375
This religious oppression repulsed many observers and drove many to support
abolition.376 As Charles Sumner wrote,
―Is it not strange that the Church, or any body of men, upon whom the faintest ray
of Christianity has fallen, should endeavor to exclude the African, ‗guilty of a
skin not coloured as their own,‘ from the freest participation in the privileges of
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worshipping the common God?-It would seem as if prejudice, irrational, as it is
uncharitable, could no further go.‖377
Former slave and prominent abolitionist Henry Highland Garnet declared in a speech, ―Nearly
three millions of your fellow citizens, are prohibited by law ... from reading the Book of Life.‖378
Charles Gardner also observed, ―access to that heavenly chart, which is laid down by Jehovah as
the only safe rule of faith and practice, the liberty of reading and understanding how he may
serve G-d acceptably.‖379 He further said, ―See then, the wickedness of those laws which go
contrary to the law of God, and say to the slave, ‗You shall not read these Scriptures, nor
understand them, nor teach them to your children, nor obey them.‘ Is it not morally right, and
politically safe, to abolish such a system?‖380
4.

Recognizing the need to protect religion

The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment shows that the Framers of that
Amendment recognized the oppression of slaves‘ religious practices and existing discrimination
on the basis of religion and sought to rectify it.381 James Wilson, Chair of the House Judiciary
Committee and sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, noted slavery's ―incessant, unrelenting,
aggressive warfare upon ... the purity of religion.‖382 Lyman Trumbull, the cosponsor of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, also highlighted the religious oppression of blacks, specifically noting laws
preventing them from ―exercising the function of a minister‖ and making it ―a highly penal
offense for any person ... to teach slaves.‖383 Congressman James Ashley said that ―slavery has
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silenced every free pulpit within its control.‖384 And Senator Henry Wilson said, ―religion . . .
never has been and never will be allowed free exercise in any community where slavery dwarfs
the consciences of men.‖385 Wilson also remarked, ―[t]he bitter cruel relentless persecutions of
the Methodists in the South, almost as void of pity as those which were visited upon the
Huguenots in France, tell how utterly slavery disregards the right to free exercise of religion.‖386
Senator George Edmunds of Vermont later commented that the Constitution bans discrimination
based on classifications that are ―sectarian,‖ 387 which was a code word for Catholic in the
Nineteenth Century and reflected bigotry towards non-Protestant denominations.388
In 1866, President Andrew Johnson recognized the history of religious persecution and
pointed out how the American Constitution protects religious liberty: ―The ancient republics
absorbed the individual in the State, prescribed his religion, and controlled his activity. The
American system rests on the assertion of the equal right of every man to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness; to freedom of conscience, to the culture and exercise of all his faculties.‖389
Representative Banks similarly condemned the way in which establishments of religion had
historically been used as a means of oppression:
. . . in a State which has an established religion, any citizen might be compelled to
conform to its doctrines, and to leave his descendants to the same mental and
moral servitude, deprived of the freedom of belief, and without that freedom of
worship to which, according to the laws of nature and of God, every man is
entitled. Society is necessary to the existence of man, and government
384
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indispensable to his civilization, prosperity, and power. But the perpetual
subjection of every person born within its jurisdiction, without consent and in
disregard of protest or removal, is not necessary in any form of political society. It
does not rest upon any theory of justice, and the whole course of civilization
disproves its justice or wisdom.390
Banks went on to praise American democracy for furthering religious liberty.
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment also recognized the free exercise of religion
as one of the Privileges or Immunities protected by that Amendment and as being a fundamental
right.391 In 1871, John Bingham, the author of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, stated that
the free exercise of religion was within the ―scope and meaning‖ of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment.392 Henry L. Dawes similarly remarked that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause had ―secured the free exercise of ... religious belief.‖393 In listing the rights secured by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, Senator Jacob Howard mentioned ―the personal rights
guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments to the Constitution.‖394 John Sherman said
that the ―right to worship God according to the dictates of one's own conscience is not only a
right, but a privilege which in a Christian country a man ought to enjoy.‖395 Congressman
Maynard commented that ―privileges and immunities‖ includes the ―personal right‖ of ―freedom
... in religion.‖396 Representative John Stockton mentioned the First Amendment Religion
Clauses as an example of how the Fourteenth Amendment ―prohibits the states from doing what
the Congress was always prohibited from doing.‖397 These statements are unsurprising since it
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was recognized that one of the privileges and immunities violated by slavery was the free
exercise of religion.398
And the legislative history also reflects that the framers recognized the religious
oppression in other countries and connected it to caste and class-based systems of law and the
problems of discrimination in this country. Senator Charles Sumner condemned the religious
caste system in India and the persecution of the Jews in Europe prior to the French Revolution,
implying that there was a need to protect against contemporary religious discrimination.399
Representative Charles Van Wyck said, ―The meanness of caste in this country on account of
color is no more wicked than the caste of nation, religion, or blood in Great Britain.‖400 Senator
Garrett Davis also compared the oppression of blacks to the oppression of Jews and Gypsies in
other countries: ―the negro slaves, as separate and distinct and insoluble almost as Jew and
Gypsy.‖401 Following ratification, Representative William Purman recognized that the
Fourteenth Amendment banned class legislation directed at religion, asking rhetorically, ―Shall
hostile legislation in States be permitted to oppress any class of citizens on account of religion,
nativity, politics, or complexion, or deny to any such class their inalienable rights, among which
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and thus defeat the very spirit and provision of the
Constitution itself?‖402 In discussing the ramifications of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Representative Samuel McKee said, ―if any gentleman, chooses to associate with a colored man,
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with a black man or any other man or race of men, even the Hindoo or the Hottentot, he can do
it. I believe in every man having the same show in this world for life, and when he develops all
the capacities that fit men for the highest rights, of citizenship, then let him have them.‖403
Court opinions also explicitly recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment banned
religious class legislation. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., the Supreme Court said,
Whenever a distinction is made in the burdens a law imposes or in the
benefits it confers on any citizens by reason of their birth, or wealth, or
religion, it is class legislation, and leads inevitably to oppression and abuses,
and to general unrest and disturbance in society. It was hoped and believed
that the great amendments to the Constitution which followed the late civil war
had rendered such legislation impossible for all future time. But the objectionable
legislation reappears in the act under consideration. It is the same in essential
character as that of the English income statute of 1691, which taxed Protestants at
a certain rate, Catholics, as a class, at double the rate of Protestants, and Jews at
another and separate rate.404
Riding circuit in 1879, Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, Justice Field struck down a law permitting prison
guards to shave the queues of prisoners because the law was directed at the religious practices of
Chinese immigrants and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class legislation
on the basis of religion.405 Justice Field wrote that ―hostile and discriminating legislation by a
state against persons of any class, sect, creed or nation, in whatever form it may be expressed, is
forbidden by the fourteenth amendment of the constitution.‖406 Similarly, in Am. Sugar-Ref. Co.
v. State of Louisiana, Justice Brown stated,
Of course, if such discrimination were purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious,
and made to depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions,
political affiliations, or other considerations having no possible connection with
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the duties of citizens as taxpayers, such exemption would be pure favoritism, and
a denial of the equal protection of the laws to the less favored classes.407
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also recognized that religious groups ―certainly have the same
right to equal protection of the laws as secular organizations.‖408
This history shows that protecting religion was very much on the minds of the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It is hard to imagine that the Framers would have limited the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment to rectifying the existing problem of discrimination on the basis of
race without rectifying the existing problem of discrimination on the basis of religion. Arguably,
the framers felt that by granting African-Americans rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, African-Americans would automatically receive all other constitutional protection,
including free exercise.409 But if that were true, then it would have been sufficient to simply
guarantee African Americans the same constitutional rights as all other citizens. Instead the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed to all citizens equality in their privileges or immunities of
federal and of state citizenship. Thus was born a whole new constitutional right – the right not to
be discriminated against in class legislation. It is extremely unlikely that the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment would observe and condemn religious oppression directed at AfricanAmericans and yet take no action to guarantee religious freedom for everyone in the future –
especially at a time when the Framers were taking action to prevent racial discrimination in the
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future. It is considerably more plausible that the Framers observed the problems of both religious
and racial oppression and ratified a two-in-one solution to wipe them both out.410
Foreign Constitutions and Laws Guaranteeing Equality
At least forty-five foreign constitutions ban discrimination on the basis of religion, just as
they ban discrimination based on other impermissible classifications, such as race and gender.411
Although foreign constitutions are generally not helpful for establishing the original meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment,412 they do indicate that, as a general rule, when constitutional
framers get together to guarantee equality, they protect religion from discrimination too. These
foreign constitutional provisions show that banning discrimination on the basis of religion is a
core principle of western constitutional democracy. Judges that are concerned with keeping
American constitutional law in line with generally accepted western democratic principles surely
would recognize that discrimination on the basis of religion, like discrimination on the basis of
race and gender, is intolerable.
The evidence here is overwhelming and is cited in an appendix to this article because it is
too lengthy to include here in text or footnotes.413 The list shows that the vast majority of western
constitutional democracies countries have constitutionally guaranteed equality for religion, and
even some non-democratic countries ban discrimination on the basis of religion too. Almost

410

A significant counterargument is that evidence of the framers‘ intent to exclude religion from the Fourteenth
Amendment is demonstrated by the history of Blaine Amendments, which openly discriminate against religion in
the funding private organizations. We address this issue in the section on Blaine Amendments, infra Part V.
411
This list is by no means exhaustive but gives us a fairly accurate snapshot of modern worldview on religious
discrimination. See Appendix for text of these provisions. In the Appendix, we also include provisions from Israel‘s
Declaration of Independence, the Soviet Union‘s constitution, and the Hawaiian constitution, although we did not
count any of these provisions towards the list of forty-five. Also, Belgium‘s constitution probably guarantees
religious equality. Its equality provision states, ―There are no class distinctions in the State.‖ art. 10. And the
Beligium Constitution guarantees equal funding for religious schools. art. 24. But because it does not specifically
ban religious discrimination, we excluded it from the list.
412
See generally The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between
Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 Int‘l J. Const. L. 519 (2005) (Justice Scalia‘s explanations of
why foreign law is not relevant for determining the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution).
413
See Appendix.

95

Calabresi and Salander

every European constitution guarantees equality for religion, and every continent has at least one
country with an equality guarantee prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion. Large
diverse countries, such as India,414 Germany,415 and Russia,416 have these provisions; and
smaller, more homogenous countries, such as Iceland,417 Ireland,418 and Estonia419 have them
too. Older constitutions, such as the Dutch420 and Canadian421 ones, have these guarantees; and
newer constitutions such as the ones from Chechnya422 and Bosnia and Herzegovina,423 also have
them. The general trend amongst countries worldwide is to include equality guarantees for
religion in constitutions. A typical provision – the Canadian Equal Protection Guarantee -- reads,
―Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and
benefit of the law, without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.‖424
International conventions have similarly protected religion. The European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states, ―The enjoyment of the rights
and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.‖425 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights reads, ―Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth
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in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.‖426
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also provides extensive protection against discrimination on
the basis of religion for individuals in the workplace, as it does for discrimination on the basis of
race and gender. For instance, the Act states,
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . . . 427
We should add that under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 not only is discrimination on the basis of
race and gender barred, but also the existence of a racially hostile or sexually hostile work
environment is barred as well. Companies thus cannot hire in a non-discriminatory way but
allow for the existence of a hostile work environment. The same thing must of course be true as
to the ban on religion discrimination under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Just as no private
employer can legally refuse to hire or promote someone on the basis of religion, no employer can
maintain a workplace that is hostile to religion or that discriminates on account of religion either.
If a religious group seeks to use office space for religious reasons or if employees want to wear
religious symbols, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be read as giving them that right.
Taken together, these foreign and international human rights clauses barring
discrimination on the basis of religion indicate that when people get together to ban
discrimination and guarantee equality, they include religion alongside race and gender. The same
thing happened in the United States with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For some reason,
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however, the U.S. Supreme Court has never caught on to this global and American trend for
banning discrimination on account of religion.
III.

Class Legislation and Modern Case Law
A.

Class Legislation Doctrine

In assessing whether a particular statute constituted class legislation, Nineteenth Century
courts applied a two-step test. First, courts asked whether a law created a unique burden or
privilege either against or in favor of a defined class of people. If the answer to this first question
was ―yes‖ then the court would ask whether the law furthered a public purpose and is a just law
enacted for the good of the whole people in which case it would be constitutionally permissible.
In other words, under the Nineteenth Century test for disallowing class legislation laws can
discriminate as long as they ―are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions
upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general
good.‖428 The Nineteenth Century two-step test could probably be described as a rational basis
test with a legitimate public purpose requirement.
Under the current rational basis test, a law simply needs to have a rationale, no matter
how dubious the goal or whether the stated rationale is actually the one that the legislature relied
on in passing the law. In Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a law forbidding ―any person not a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist to
fit lenses to a face or to duplicate or replace into frames lenses or other optical appliances.‖429
Practically, this meant that ―no optician can fit old glasses into new frames or supply a lens,
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whether it be a new lens or one to duplicate a lost or broken lens, without a prescription.‖ 430 The
Court held that the law had a rational basis and was therefore constitutional.431
But under a class legislation analysis of the kind we defend here, the law in Williamson v.
Lee Optical should have been struck down. The law created a special privilege for optometrists
and ophthalmologists, artificially boosting demand for their services when unlicensed individuals
could have performed the same work perfectly well and safely. There was absolutely no public
purpose being served by the law since it did not have a public welfare objective, such as the
promotion of the public health or safety. And the law probably even hurt consumers by
artificially driving up costs and nonsensically adding red tape. Instead, the law was merely
special interest legislation designed to generate business for optometrists and ophthalmologists.
To be sure, the threshold for overcoming the public purpose requirement is not and should not be
very high absent the making of a suspect classification – the government need only show that the
law in question serves a rational public purpose. But a naked desire to help or hurt one group of
people or industry over another is not by itself proof of a public purpose. The Lee Optical court‘s
error was its failure to take seriously its responsibility to assess the validity of the purpose, which
the law in question pursued.
The Nineteenth Century two-step test for invalidating class legislation does not apply in
the same way to all Fourteenth Amendment cases. In cases involving fundamental rights, such as
those enumerated and protected in the Bill of Rights, or with respect to suspect classifications
which are presumptively irrational, such as classifications on the basis of race, sex, or religion,
the Nineteenth Century two-step test leads to a strict scrutiny analysis. No law discriminating on
the basis of race, sex, or religion should be upheld unless it survives strict scrutiny and serves a
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compelling and general governmental interest. This approach is sensible as a practical matter
because most laws discriminate, and are nonetheless constitutional in part because the mere
requirement that laws serve a ―public purpose‖ or provide ―general welfare benefit‖ is in practice
a pretty flabby level of protection. The government could probably justify many if not most
kinds of discriminatory laws under a public purpose rationale. And leaving core constitutional
rights and protections or the making of suspect classifications without a thicker guardrail would
leave vital constitutional guarantees open to significant trampling. So, layering a strict scrutiny
requirement on top of the Nineteenth Century two-step test is perfectly sensible and consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment‘s equality guarantee and with the post United States v. Carolene
Products and incorporation case law.432
The Supreme Court‘s 1942 opinion in Skinner v. Oklahoma is instructive. There, the
court received a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to an Oklahoma law requiring sterilization of
prisoners convicted of two or more ―felonies involving moral turpitude.‖433 By its own terms, the
Oklahoma law included convictions for larceny as being felonies that involved moral turpitude
but it exempted convictions for high class felonies involving ―revenue acts, embezzlement, or
political offenses.‖434 The old common law distinctions between larceny and embezzlement were
highly technical and overall not very meaningful. For instance, if a person entered a chicken
coop and stole chickens, he would commit an act of larceny and could be sterilized; but if he
were instead the bailee of the chickens and misappropriated them, then that action would
constitute embezzlement, and he could escape sterilization.435 The law was based on the now-
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debunked ―science‖ that society could eliminate crime by sterilizing repeat-offenders thereby
preventing those criminals from disseminating their criminally-inclined genes.436
Among the enthusiastic defenders of the ―science‖ of eugenics were Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes and the new leader of Nazi Germany, Adolph Hitler. Holmes had famously
opened the door to eugenic sterilization in Buck v. Bell, a case which upheld as constitutional -in spite of a class legislation Equal Protection claim -- a compulsory state sterilization law of the
unfit, including the mentally retarded.437 Justice Holmes concluded his opinion with the words:
―Three generations of imbeciles are enough.‖ Justice Pierce Butler, later a foe of the New Deal,
was the lone dissenter, and he filed no opinion.
Professor Victoria Nourse has detailed how, when Skinner v. Oklahoma was decided in
1942, everyone still understood the Fourteenth Amendment as a ban on class legislation, and
some scholars and lawyers viewed sterilization laws as a classic example of the evils of class
legislation at work.438 Previous sterilization cases, such as Buck v. Bell, were decided in part on
class legislation grounds,439 and the lawyers in Skinner made their arguments in that case
explicitly in class legislation terms.440 Skinner was ultimately decided as a class legislation case
and is relevant for seeing how strict scrutiny and class legislation analyses intersect.
The Oklahoma law that was challenged in Skinner raised several class legislation
problems. First, larceny and embezzlement were basically the same kind of offense. They were
both forms of thievery distinguished only by a technicality which bore no relevance to the
severity of the criminal action. Arbitrary, coin-flip quality distinctions constitute class legislation
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and this law made such an arbitrary coin-flip distinction. It was as irrational and class-based as a
law allowing titles of nobility or any other form of hereditary favoritism. Second, a deeper look
at the distinction between larceny and embezzlement reveals that larceny included ―low class‖
crimes, such as stealing chickens, while embezzlement included ―high class‖ crimes, such as
misappropriation of funds. Thus, under the Oklahoma law in Skinner, a lowly chicken thief got
sterilized while a white collar financier, convicted of bank fraud, was exempt from sterilization.
The law thus created an aristocracy of crime, violating Locke‘s maxim that there should be ―one
law for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough.‖441 Third, some of
the prisoners held in the prison out of which the Skinner case arose wondered why they were the
only ones being sterilized when many other people, such as the mentally impaired, were not
subject to compulsory sterilization even though they probably carried defective or degenerate
genes as well.442 And fourth, some critics of the eugenics movement worried in 1942 that
eugenics laws would open the door to sterilizing other disfavored groups.443 Presumably, the
prevailing majority in the legislature could use sterilization to eradicate dissenters or to target
racial minorities. In fact, Adolph Hitler‘s Germany was engaged in precisely such an effort, in
1942, at the very time that Skinner was decided.
The Skinner court initially subjected the Oklahoma law to the Nineteenth Century class
legislation two-step test under the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the Court recognized that the
law discriminated against people convicted of larceny relative to people convicted of
embezzlement.444 And second, the Court deferred to the legislature‘s public policy goals showing
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typical New Deal Supreme Court deference to the legislature, however arbitrary the law in
question might seem.445 Just as predicted, the public purpose qualification proved quite flabby.
But the Court did not end its Fourteenth Amendment analysis there. It went on to make
three crucial observations, which served as the basis for subjecting the law to strict scrutiny.
First, the Court commented that the law ―involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.‖446 Second, the
Court remarked, ―The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, farreaching [sic] and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the
dominant group to wither and disappear.‖ 447 And third, the Court noted, ―There is no redemption
for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment[,] which the State conducts is to his
irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.‖ 448 Based on these observations, the
Court applied strict scrutiny and found the law‘s arbitrary line-drawing untenable when balanced
against the fundamental right exercised and the substantial damage caused.449
Skinner v. Oklahoma thus stands as a Nineteenth Century class legislation case where a
fundamental liberty – the right to procreate – was being denied to low class thieves but not to
high class thieves. This was something that not even the deferential New Deal Supreme Court
could ignore. The law in question discriminated among different classes of thieves, but it did not
do so to promote the general interest but did so instead to promote the interests of high class
thieves. Thankfully, the justices put a stop to this law and with their decision they helped to stop
the eugenics movement that Justice Holmes had done so much to promote in Buck v. Bell.
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Justice Field spelled out another important qualification to the Nineteenth Century public
purpose requirement in Barbier v. Connolly. There, the Supreme Court upheld a San Francisco
city ordinance subjecting laundries in certain parts of San Francisco to allegedly special and
―burdensome‖ restrictions because the public concerns could ―be remedied only by the state.‖450
The ordinance was defended on the ground that it promoted the public health and safety. Such
arguments of public health and safety are usually a trump card for the government in the post
Lochner v. New York era.451 Courts will usually uphold laws challenged on class legislation
grounds at least in situations where a law is addressing a public health and safety problem that is
of such an extraordinary magnitude that it can only be remedied by the state.
Skinner and Barbier therefore bring out important qualifications to the Nineteenth
Century two-step test for unconstitutional class legislation. Skinner shows that even if a
discriminatory law has a public purpose, it can still be subjected to strict scrutiny if it 1) infringes
in a discriminatory way as to a fundamental right like the right to procreate, 2) if the law in
question has far-reaching consequences and is subject to political abuse, or 3) if the means used
by the law are unreasonably damaging and disproportionate. Barbier, in contrast, shows that the
Supreme Court will usually defer to the political branches as to the significance of the public
health and safety problem that the government claims it is addressing.
The original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class legislation is therefore
fairly easily harmonized with the modern Supreme Court‘s use of strict scrutiny when
classifications are made on such suspect grounds as race, sex, or religion. In strict scrutiny cases,
modern courts under present-day Supreme Court doctrine ask whether a law that makes a suspect
classification serves a compelling government interest pursued under the least restrictive
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means.452 Under a Nineteenth Century class legislation approach of the kind originally imposed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, a court would ask the slightly different question whether the law
served a public and not some private purpose, and not just whether the law was justified by a
compelling government interest. The distinction between the Nineteenth Century test and the
modern test could prove critical in affirmative action cases where the legislature seeks to help a
disadvantaged group. Otherwise, the modern strict scrutiny analysis is consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class legislation as long as one recognizes that religion is every
bit as much of a suspect classification as are race and sex.
B.

Modern Case Law and Class Legislation

The Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class legislation includes a ban on facial
discrimination targeting a specific class. This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court‘s
case law that, for instance, a racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is
presumptively invalid.453 Thus segregation and Jim Crow laws easily fall into the category of
forbidden class legislation. Anti-miscegenation laws are also invalid because they define legal
rights based on race.454 A white person is allowed to marry another white person but a black
person does not have that same right.455 In the context of religion, the court has also recognized
that ―the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face.‖456 Thus,
in McDaniel v. Paty, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a law barring ministers
from holding public office.457
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The constitutional ban on class legislation includes some forms of legal discrimination
amongst religious groups. Courts have appropriately considered these cases on equal protection
grounds. For instance, in Native Am. Council of Tribes v. Solem, the Eight Circuit held that
restrictions on Native American inmates‘ religious practices violated the Equal Protection Clause
because similar restrictions did not exist for other religious groups.458 And in Colorado Christian
Univ. v. Weaver, then-Judge Michael W. McConnell‘s opinion struck down a state educational
funding scheme that permitted public money to go to religious schools but barred it from going
to ―pervasively sectarian‖ schools.459 Although the Tenth Circuit held that the law in question
violated the Establishment Clause, it also declared that discrimination on the basis of religion is
subject to ―heightened scrutiny‖ and could violate the Equal Protection Clause.460 The Tenth
Circuit also said that ―neutral treatment of religions‖ is a requirement of the Equal Protection
Clause, just as it is of the Establishment Clause.461
The ban on class legislation is also consistent with the Supreme Court‘s approach to
facially neutral laws, which serve as a pretext for improper discrimination when the laws are
administered. For instance, in 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that an
ordinance prohibiting the operation of laundry businesses in wooden buildings was
unconstitutional because it was only enforced in practice against Chinese immigrants.462 The
Court dutifully noted that the Fourteenth Amendment banned class legislation and held that the
ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was enforced improperly by drawing
an ―arbitrary line‖ between ―two classes,‖ even though the underlying law did not facially

458

691 F.2d 382, 384 (8th Cir. 1982).
534 F.3d 1245.
460
Id. at 1266.
461
Id. at 1257.
462
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
459

106

Calabresi and Salander

discriminate on the basis of race or national origin.463 In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme
Court held that evidence of discriminatory intent was necessary to prove that a facially neutral
law violated the Equal Protection Clause even when the law in question had a racially disparate
impact and was not justified by a compelling governmental interest.464 The Supreme Court later
made it clear that a plaintiff need not prove that a law is motivated ―solely [by] racially
discriminatory purposes‖ but simply that improper discrimination was a motivating factor.465 In
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Supreme Court
laid out a variety of factors that may be evidence of discriminatory intent.466 ―Once racial
discrimination is shown to have been a substantial or motivating factor behind enactments of
law, the burden shifts [from the plaintiff] to the law's defenders to demonstrate that the law
would have been enacted without this factor.‖467 Those holdings are consistent with Yick Wo and
the original meaning of the Amendment‘s ban on class legislation.468
In the context of racial discrimination and private sector employment contracts, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 has always barred discrimination on the basis of religion as well as on the
basis of race and sex. The Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. that if an
employer‘s hiring criteria disparately impacts a particular racial group, the employer bears the
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burden of showing that the hiring criteria has a ―manifest relationship to the employment in
question‖ and is justified by business necessity.469
When inspecting facially neutral laws for signs of discrimination on the basis of religion,
the Court has transplanted its analysis from its race and sex discrimination cases. As Justice
Harlan noted in the context of the Establishment Clause, "neutrality in its application requires an
equal protection mode of analysis."470 In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, the
Supreme Court said, ―The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond
facial discrimination. The Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality . . . [and] protects
against governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt.‖471 The Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Court went on to use the Arlington Heights factors to show that a facially neutral City of
Hialeah ordinance banning animal sacrifice was enacted for the purpose of discriminating
unconstitutionally on the basis of religion and thus abridging Free Exercise Clause rights. 472
Much of the Supreme Court‘s use of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down various
impermissible classifications in the 1970‘s, 1980‘s, and 1990‘s is also quite consistent with our
view that the Fourteenth Amendment enacts a general ban on class legislation and systems of
caste. Discrimination based on national origin, gender, 473 illegitimacy,474 and many kinds of
physical disability,475 constitutes a caste system because these groups are defined in part by
heredity or by immutable characteristics. The Court has also struck down some state laws
469
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discriminating on the basis of citizenship. We think that, while some such state laws may be
preempted by federal law, state laws that discriminate on the basis of citizenship should not for
that reason be held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command. As
already discussed, the Privileges or Immunities Clause was quite deliberately written to protect
only citizens from the making of discriminatory laws, and it implicitly permits the making of
discriminatory laws that facially discriminate against non-citizens.476 Non-citizens are protected
by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, which apply to all persons and not merely to
all citizens. We therefore think that In re Griffiths, in which the Supreme Court held that a state
could not condition admission to the bar on citizenship,477 was inconsistent with the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. But we think that Plyler v. Doe, a case in which the
Supreme Court held that a school district could not charge children of illegal immigrants tuition,
presents a closer call because those children were persons who were entitled to the equal
protection of the state laws setting up free public schools.478
In the 1960s and 1970s, there was something of a movement to constitutionalize a right to
receive welfare payments. Professor Frank Michelman has been a major advocate of
constitutional rights to welfare, arguing that the equality principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment require the government to pay money to the poor.479 Professor Michelman‘s
argument is essentially a liberal form of Lochner. Just as Lochner tried to constitutionalize
laissez-faire economic theory, Professor Michelman attempts to constitutionalize the post-New
Deal and Great Society welfare state, perhaps even to give a major impetus to further efforts to
476
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achieve socialism. Professor Michelman‘s argument that the government has a constitutional
obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to pay money to a group of people based on
circumstances not caused by the government seems to us to be wrong and is not to be found
anywhere in the Constitution‘s text or history. Even the recovery by private citizens of money
from the federal government in Bivens actions requires that the federal government have directly
caused the physical damage that is the basis of a lawsuit to a specific individual.480 And
Congress had to pass Section 1983 to make state officials similarly liable for money damages
when they cause an injury. But nowhere in the Constitution is there any notion of government
liability to pay money of the kind Professor Michelman describes. In fact, state welfare payments
as they presently exist might have been originally considered an unconstitutional form of class
legislation, since they single out poor individuals for unique, government-provided benefits.
We recognize that interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to include a broad ban on all
class legislation is to adopt an approach to the Amendment‘s anti-discrimination guarantee that is
inconsistent with the legendary discussion in United States v. Carolene Products Footnote Four.
In that footnote, the Supreme Court indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s antidiscrimination command protects ―discrete and insular minorities,‖481 an argument that was later
elaborated by John Hart Ely.482 The language emphasizing protection only for discrete and
insular minorities necessarily implies a narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment under
which the Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command would not apply to women or other
majority victims of class legislation. But the Supreme Court has rejected Ely‘s approach in
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recent years483 and the Court has decided many recent Fourteenth Amendment cases without
even citing the Carolene Products test.484
Moreover, the holding in Carolene Products is consistent with the notion that the
Fourteenth Amendment bans class legislation generally. In Carolene Products, Congress
prohibited shipments of a certain kind of imitation milk which it found could be ―injurious to the
public health, and its sale constitutes a fraud on the public.‖485 The law thus singled out sellers of
imitation milk for a special burden, but it did so under a public purpose justification – public
health concerns and protecting the public from fraud. Those are sufficient justifications for
upholding the law; the Supreme Court was right in the Carolene Products case itself.
C.

Carolene Products Footnote Four and Religion

More dramatically, United States v. Carolene Products Footnote Four explicitly declared
that the Fourteenth Amendment bans discrimination on the basis of religion. In the third
paragraph of Footnote Four, the Court said that a law would be ―subjected to more exacting
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment‖ if it was ―directed
at particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities.‖486 The Court thus explicitly
understood the Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command as protecting individuals
from laws that discriminate on the basis of religion, just as it protects individuals from laws that
discriminate on the basis of national origin and race. And the Supreme Court made this
observation about the ban on laws that discriminate on the basis of religion, even though the
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Court had just finished saying in the first paragraph of Footnote Four that laws will be given less
deference if they burden rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, which of course itself contains
two Religion Clauses. If the Court had thought that religion was only protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment as a consequence of its incorporation of the First Amendment, the Court
would not have mentioned religion as a forbidden basis for discrimination after its initial
reference to the Bill of Rights and the Religion Clauses in the first paragraph of Footnote Four.
By listing religion in the third paragraph of Footnote Four, alongside national origin and race, the
Supreme Court showed that religion was not merely protected by the First Amendment but was
also protected by the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment. Strikingly, the
Supreme Court listed discrimination on the basis of religion before both discrimination on the
basis of national origin and discrimination on the basis of race, perhaps recognizing that first and
foremost the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment bans discrimination on
the basis of religion. The Supreme Court also failed to mention gender discrimination at all as
being forbidden in Footnote Four, even though women had been guaranteed the right to vote for
eighteen years before the Carolene Products case was decided. This too shows the unique
constitutional weight that the Court attached to the protection of religious liberty under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Footnote Four also shows that the Fourteenth Amendment banned laws targeting all
religion generally, and not just laws targeting specific religious groups. On its face, Footnote
Four does not appear to stand for this proposition because the Supreme Court refers in Footnote
Four to ―particular religious . . . minorities‖487 which could be read to imply that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not protect either religion generally or majority religions. But to support itself
in Footnote Four, the Supreme Court approvingly cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters, a case
487
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involving a law, which burdened all religious groups generally. In Society of Sisters, the State of
Oregon had passed a law requiring all children between ages eight and sixteen to attend public
school.488 The law did not provide exemptions for parents who wanted to send their children to
private religious schools and thus created a substantial burden on all religious families and
schools.489 The Supreme Court held that the law ―unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.‖490
The Court therefore invalidated a law burdening all religious families and schools – whether
minority or majority religions – without any discussion about the unique burdens on one
particular religion. And the Carolene Products Court saw this Oregon law as the primary
example of forbidden discrimination on the basis of religion under the Fourteenth
Amendment.491 The court cited no other cases.
Even Footnote Four‘s famous language that ―discrete and insular minorities‖ deserve
special protection492 implicitly includes most religions, especially in the United States where
there is no one majority faith. The words ―discrete and insular‖ suggest that a targeted group
must be distinct and narrowly defined for Footnote Four to apply. Religion as a whole in the
United States does not fit this definition, but fervently religious groups, such as the Amish,
Orthodox Jews, religious Muslims, or particular religious Christian groups, certainly could be
included. And the words ―discrete and insular‖ also could apply to groups that have historically
suffered prejudice or stigma. The Supreme Court has used this approach to ban gender
discrimination even though women constitute a majority of the U.S. population.493 Even
488
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mainstream religious groups like Episcopalians, Catholics, Quakers, and Unitarians are
minorities in the United States and would be protected under Footnote Four. If so, the many
religious groups that have suffered persecution in this country all deserve Fourteenth
Amendment protection. Even today, there is still much anti-religious bias and stigma attached to
those who are religious and who profess their belief in a higher being.494
This observation leads us to discuss the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in City of
Boerne v. Flores, the case which struck down as unconstitutional the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) in so far as it applied to the states. Justice Kennedy‘s majority opinion
in City of Boerne v. Flores explicitly questioned the extent to which discrimination on the basis
of religion is still pervasive in this country.495 The Court noted that, in contrast to the Voting
Rights Act context, Congress had produced no findings in passing RFRA of the existence of
generally applicable laws motivated by religious bigotry that needed redressing in the forty years
leading up to the passage of RFRA.496 Because of the lack of findings of religious
discrimination, the Supreme Court questioned whether Congress had the power to create a
prophylactic measure to protect religion under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.497 The
Supreme Court essentially implied that reinstating the Sherbert-Yoder free exercise of religion
balancing test498 was pointless because religious discrimination was not a real problem anymore.
The first problem with the Court‘s opinion in City of Boerne is that discrimination on the
basis of religion is unfortunately alive and well in modern times. The Anti-Defamation League,
494
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for example, reported 1,211 documented anti-Semitic incidents in the United States alone just in
the year 2009.499 And the U.S. State Department reports that discrimination on the basis of
religion and religious intolerance continue to be major worldwide concerns, including in many
western democratic countries.500 It is quite reasonable to worry that anti-religious animus in
society could seep into the legislative process and lead to the passage of neutral, generally
applicable laws that have a discriminatory impact on religion. In fact, the Supreme Court had to
strike down just such a discriminatory law in Church of the Lukumi Babalu when the City of
Hialeah passed a facially neutral law targeting the animal sacrifice practices of members of the
Santeria religion. While on the Third Circuit, then-Judge Samuel Alito wrote an opinion striking
down a police department‘s policy of granting secular exemptions to its no-beard policy but
refusing to grant exemptions for religious reasons.501 And in 2011, a local California ballot
initiative seeking to ban circumcision had sponsors with anti-Semitic affiliations.502 Similarly, a
city might seek to save money, not by explicitly banning religious individuals from public
schools, but by making public schools so secular and so hostile to religion that religious parents
would feel unable to let their children attend public schools. Concern exists over laws that
discriminate on the basis of race and gender, and it is quite unclear why it should not also exist
with respect to laws that discriminate on the basis of religion.
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And second, the Supreme Court‘s observation in City of Boerne that Congress did not
present findings in that case of specific, neutral, generally applicable laws that had a
discriminatory impact on religion should not have led to the Court‘s conclusion that RFRA was
pointless. Quite possibly, few discriminatory laws were passed because judicial protections, such
as the Sherbert-Yoder free exercise balancing test, and other laws, such as RFRA or its many
state-level equivalents, had successfully deterred legislatures from discriminating on the basis of
religion. Who knows what kind of havoc legislatures could potentially wreak in the absence of
those deterrents? Even assuming that a lack of findings means that there is no actual problem of
religious discrimination, why should the legislature be precluded from preemptively guarding
against potential discrimination on the basis of religion? Just as many people proactively take
care of their health, it seems sensible to proactively prevent discrimination on the basis of
religion before it actually happens. And finally, the Supreme Court‘s evaluation of
discrimination on the basis of religion fails to take into account the plethora of Blaine
Amendments in a huge majority of state constitutions which explicitly ban government funds
from going to any religious organizations503 – a degree of facial discrimination unheard of today
with regards to race. So the Court‘s conclusion that RFRA cannot be justified is simply incorrect.
The upshot of our discussion of Carolene Products is that using the Fourteenth
Amendment to ban discrimination on the basis of religion does not contradict the modern Equal
Protection Clause case law. Footnote Four explicitly said that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects all of us from discrimination on the basis of religion, just as it protects all of us from
discrimination on the basis of national origin and race.504 And ―discrete and insular minorities‖
certainly include religious minorities, even assuming that discreteness and insularity are
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important to anti-discrimination law – a conclusion which we tend to doubt. The Supreme Court
recognized in Carolene Products that religion gets Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination
protection, even though religion also gets strict scrutiny as a result of its inclusion in the Religion
Clauses of the Bill of Rights.505 Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have enshrined religion in
the Fourteenth Amendment with almost ritualistic statements that ―[t]he Equal Protection Clause
prohibits selective enforcement based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification.‖506 In Kiryas Joel, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said, ―the Religion
Clauses-the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Religious Test Clause, . . . and
the Equal Protection Clause as applied to religion-all speak with one voice on this point: Absent
the most unusual circumstances, one's religion ought not affect one's legal rights or duties or
benefits.‖507
These statements show that many contemporary courts and Supreme Court justices are
not at all restrained in invoking the Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command to
answer questions involving religious liberty. The Supreme Court has never said that the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command does not apply to discrimination on the
basis of religion or that the First Amendment Religion Clauses must be used to answer all
constitutional questions as to the scope of religious liberty. So, the Supreme Court or even lower
federal and state courts could simply start using the Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination
command today in cases where there has been discrimination on the basis of religion.
505
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IV.

The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses after the Fourteenth Amendment
We now consider the impact that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s general anti-

discrimination command had or should have had on the interpretation of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, which are incorporated through Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process to apply against the states.508 Because both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause were really bans on certain specific forms of discrimination on the basis of
religion, it is vital that we ask whether and how the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s
general ban on discrimination on the basis of religion affects the Supreme Court‘s present-day
Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause jurisprudence. To answer this question, we think
it is helpful to focus on the definition of class legislation and on the evils that the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment sought to eradicate by constitutionalizing a ban on class legislation. It is
also vital that we remember that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade discrimination on the basis
of religion at the same time that it forbade other forms of discrimination as well.
We believe that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s general ban on discrimination on the basis
of religion expanded the scope of Free Exercise Clause protections but that it did not enlarge the
reach of the Establishment Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that laws burdening
religion or discriminating against religion must promote the general good of the whole people.
This means that we should sometimes provide religious exemptions from facially neutral laws
that effectively discriminate on the basis of religion because religious individuals and secular
individuals are not similarly situated. But the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class legislation
on the basis of religion does not open the courtroom door to citizen suits in which a mere whiff
of establishment was perceived, even though actual damages were never incurred and no litigant
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has standing. Nor does it imply that we should scrub the public square free of all religious
expression and symbols. To do that would be to actually discriminate on the basis of religion,
which is precisely what the Fourteenth Amendment forbids. The Fourteenth Amendment was
written to foster equality and liberty, not to repress it. Reexamination of the Supreme Court‘s
Religion Clause case law is therefore warranted.
A.

Free Exercise Clause
1. Originalism and the Free Exercise Clause

The Free Exercise Clause was originally meant to provide limited protection for the free
exercise of religion. First, the Clause restrains Congress from passing certain kinds of laws,509
but it does not restrict actions taken by private citizens.510 In this sense, the Free Exercise Clause
is quite different from the Thirteenth Amendment which guards against private actions.
Second, the Free Exercise Clause specifically restrains congressional law making but not
federal judicial or executive law making. And the Free Exercise Clause says nothing about
religious freedom and law enforcement discretion. The Free Exercise Clause thus contrasts with
the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids the states from making or enforcing laws that abridge
or shorten or lessen the rights or privileges or immunities of citizens on the basis of religion.
Third, the Free Exercise Clause only prevents Congress from making laws ―prohibiting‖
or targeting the free exercise of religion, but the Clause does not on its face block laws that
merely abridge or burden or infringe on religious liberties.511 Samuel Johnson‘s 1786 Dictionary
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and Noah Webster‘s 1828 Dictionary both defined ―prohibit‖ as ―to forbid; to interdict by
authority.‖512 In 1856, prohibit appeared to have the same meaning.513 The Free Exercise Clause
thus contrasts with the Free Speech Clause which bars Congress from even ―abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.‖514 Laws that limit access to government
welfare benefits and to charity may ―abridge‖ the free exercise of religion, but it is hard to say
that they ―prohibit it‖. The original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause thus is hard to square
with Sherbert v. Verner,515 although that case is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment‘s
anti-discrimination command.
Finally, there is considerable debate over what kinds of religious activity the Free
Exercise Clause protects. In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court said that the Free
Exercise Clause only protected rights of conscience,516 which probably also included a right to
take action by worshiping in ceremonies of worship.517 The Clause does after all on its face
protect the free ―exercise‖ of religion and not merely ―freedom of conscience‖ or ―belief.‖ It
notes that the word ―infringing‖ was initially proposed but was replaced with ―prohibiting.‖ Id. at 1486. McConnell
also cites a report of the Department of Justice that the original meaning of the Clause only prevents Congress from
passing laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion. Id. Yet, somewhat curiously, McConnell ultimately
concludes that the Free Exercise Clause bars even laws abridging or infringing on religion, not just those prohibiting
it. See Id. at 1487-1488.
512
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strains credulity not to read the Free Exercise Clause as at least protecting a right to take action
in ceremonies of worship and to decline to serve in the military. But Professor Michael
McConnell has argued much more boldly that the Free Exercise Clause protects not only the
taking of action in ceremonies of worship but also all other religiously motivated conduct as
well.518 McConnell‘s view is based on the fact that initial drafts of the Free Exercise Clause
protected only ―rights of conscience,‖ while the final draft more broadly protected the ―free
exercise of religion.‖ Dictionary definitions at the time of the Framing defined the word
―exercise‖ as involving the ―labour of the body‖ or other physical activities, whereas the word
―conscience‖ was restricted to apply only to ―private thoughts‖ or ―knowledge.‖519
2.

Role of the Anti-discrimination Command of the Fourteenth Amendment
on Free Exercise questions

After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, analysis of the incorporated Free
Exercise Clause should have changed to take into account the Amendment‘s ban on all forms of
discrimination on the basis of religion. We agree with Bernadette Meyler that the courts should
have taken an equal protection approach to free exercise claims, but we disagree with her as to
the doctrinal test that should be used.520 Instead of inquiring whether a congressional action
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prohibited the free exercise of religion, we think the Supreme Court should instead have asked
whether a state law abridging religious freedom was a forbidden form of class legislation that
discriminated on the basis of religion. As with any other form of forbidden class legislation, the
Court must consider two questions: 1) does the law or government action discriminate on the
basis of religion, and 2) is there a public purpose served by the law such that the law is a general
law enacted for the good of the whole people? To be clear, granting a specific religious group a
unique privilege or immunity simply because the government wants to help that religion –
perhaps in an attempt to rectify past discrimination or out of sympathy for its current
unpopularity – is not a law that should be seen as having a legitimate public purpose. Similarly,
dishing out unique burdens simply because a particular religion does not comport with
majoritarian norms is also unacceptable. A law serves a public purpose and is not class
legislation when it is designed to benefit society as a whole and not just a special interest group.
Additionally, since the free exercise of religion is undoubtedly a fundamental right – enshrined
in the text of the Bill of Rights and guarded in three clauses in the Constitution and in the Bill of
Rights – a court should subject any law that abridges religious liberty to strict scrutiny.521 This is
doubly the case since most religions in the United States are arguably discrete and insular
minorities that qualify yet again for protection via strict scrutiny under Carolene Products
Footnote Four. Accordingly, a court should evaluate laws that abridge religious liberty by asking
whether the government interest underlying the law is being pursued using the least restrictive
means and whether the law in question benefits the general public as a whole.
The easiest application of the ban on class legislation that discriminates on the basis of
religion is to laws that are facially neutral but that are clearly intended to discriminate against
religion. For instance, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu, the Supreme Court unanimously struck
521
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down a city ordinance banning animal sacrifice.522 The legislative history showed that the city
council passed the law in question in response to the practice of adherents of the Santeria religion
who performed animal sacrifice in their ritual ceremonies of worship.523 This law was rightly
held to be a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. It also violates the anti-discrimination
command of the Fourteenth Amendment because: 1) it directly discriminates against religion,
and 2) it lacks a public purpose because it fails to serve the general good of the whole people.
The ban on animal sacrifice should have been subjected to strict scrutiny, which it could not
possibly have survived.
Constitutional analysis gets harder when courts are asked to assess a facially neutral and
generally applicable law that lacks any specific anti-religious intent but which uniquely burdens
religion. Whether the Free Exercise Clause mandates religious exemptions from facially neutral
laws is a question that has triggered considerable scholarly debate.524 The Supreme Court has
taken two divergent approaches. A brief summary of the Court‘s case law in this area is
necessary.
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Until 1990, the Supreme Court generally balanced the government interest in adopting a
facially neutral law that burdened religion against the severity of the burden imposed on the
religious individuals who were forced to choose between complying with the law and sacrificing
their religious beliefs.525 In Sherbert v. Verner, as was mentioned above, the Supreme Court held
that the denial of unemployment benefits to Seventh Day Adventist who would not work on
Sabbath violated the Free Exercise Clause, even though the law in question was religion-neutral,
facially neutral, and applied to all citizens generally.526 The Court explained that depriving a
religious individual of unemployment benefits if he or she was fired for refusing to work on the
Sabbath placed him or her in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between his or her
religion and the government welfare benefits in question.527 In holding that such governmental
pressure violated the Free Exercise Clause, the Sherbert Court laid down a two-step test for
evaluating Free Exercise Clause claims. First, does the government action in question
substantially burden an individual‘s ability to exercise his or her religious belief? 528 And second,
does the government have a compelling state interest that overrides the individual‘s religious
liberty claim? 529 The Supreme Court implied that these two questions were interrelated and that
they required balancing the importance of the government interest in question against the degree
to which the free exercise of religion was impaired.530 The answer to this question depended in
part on whether the government pursued its compelling objective in the least restrictive way.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court used the Sherbert balancing test to hold that
Amish parents could not be compelled to send their children to school past the eighth grade.531
525
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The court explained that the government‘s interest in forcing Amish children to attend ninth and
tenth grades was not sufficiently compelling relative to the substantial burden the law imposed
on Amish parents‘ religious beliefs.532 Sherbert and Yoder thus seemed to herald the dawn of a
new age in which the Free Exercise Clause would be read broadly as protecting the access of
religious people to welfare benefits and to their own ideas about the education of children.
In its 1990 decision in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court abruptly changed course 180 degrees. The Court in Smith
rejected the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test and held that facially neutral criminal laws banning
the use of peyote in religious ceremonies did not need to be accompanied by a religious
exemption under the Free Exercise Clause.533 The Court declared that facially neutral laws that
prohibit action in a religious ceremony do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, as long as they
do not target a specific religious group, even though specific religious groups or religious people
in general might face a significant burden on their religious beliefs or practices.534
In 1993, in the wake of the Smith decision, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), which purported to reinstate the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test.535
RFRA said that the ―Government shall not substantially burden a person‘s exercise of their
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.‖536 If a government action
does burden religious exercise, it must satisfy strict scrutiny. Namely, the government action
must 1) further a compelling government interest, and 2) accomplish its goal with the least
restrictive means.537 RFRA applied to both the states and the federal government. Congress
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justified RFRA on the grounds that it was overturning Smith and enforcing the Free Exercise
Clause as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment under its Section 5 power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment.538
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as it applied to the
states.539 The Court explained that Congress could only enforce the Free Exercise Clause if there
was ―congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end.‖540 The Supreme Court said that Congress could not legislatively
―overturn‖ a Supreme Court decision like the one in Smith and that it could not invent a new
substantive right restricting state governments while pretending to ―enforce‖ the Fourteenth
Amendment.541 The Supreme Court did not, however, strike down RFRA‘s application to the
federal government,542 and in a later case the Court unanimously held that RFRA was valid as to
the federal government.543 Thus the Obama Administration‘s recent decision to force all
organizations – whether religious or not – to provide contraceptive coverage to their
employees544 will have to survive strict scrutiny under RFRA.
We think that Justice Scalia‘s approach in Smith is open to two criticisms. First, on the
facts of Smith, a group of Native Americans was barred from ingesting peyote in a religious
ceremony of worship because of state anti-narcotics laws. The constitutionality of this law seems
dubious because the Native Americans literally wanted to engage in the exercise of religious
worship, which is precisely the primary type of ―exercise‖ that the Free Exercise Clause protects.
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Allowing the government to simply declare a mode of worship illegal appears to gut the Free
Exercise Clause of any meaning. And the Native American worship did not harm any third
parties as might a human sacrifice in a Neo-Aztec ceremony of worship or the burning of a
widow on her husband‘s funeral pyre as in the ancient Asian Indian practice called suttee. Justice
Scalia thus seems wrongly to say in Smith that the Free Exercise Clause actually protects only
freedom of conscience and not the ―exercise‖ of any religious liberties.
Second, Justice Scalia‘s opinion in Smith seems to imply that so long as a law is facially
neutral and is motivated by no discriminatory intent it will survive Free Exercise Clause scrutiny.
This seems to us to be plainly wrong. A law can be facially neutral but still be discriminatory if it
is written in a way that targets a suspect class or that treats unlike things as if they are like things.
The laws in the South in the 1880‘s that allowed anyone to vote whose grandfathers had been
eligible to vote were facially neutral, but they were also plainly designed to discriminate on the
basis of race. Similarly, laws today that require that all healthcare providers fund access to
contraceptives and abortion discriminate on the basis of religion even if they are written in a way
that is facially neutral. These are all facts that everyone in society just knows, and they arise
from the fact that since religious people and secular people are different in some respects a law
that treats them as if they were exactly the same is in fact discriminatory. This phenomenon was
mentioned as long ago as by Aristotle in The Politics:
―[T]he political good is justice, and justice is the common benefit. Now everyone holds
that what is just is some form of equality …. For justice is something to someone, and
they say it should be something equal to those who are equal. But equality in what and
inequality in what, should not be overlooked. For this involves a problem and political
philosophy.‖545
The basic point is that a law that requires that everyone take Sunday as their legal day of rest
may be facially neutral and nondiscriminatory, and it may not even by motivated by a
545
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discriminatory intent. But such a law does in fact discriminate on the basis of religion to the
detriment of Jews and Muslims.
We think that Justice Scalia was quite properly concerned in Smith by his correct dislike
for disparate impact analysis in Title VII race discrimination cases where the Supreme Court
held that whenever an employment practice had a racially disparate impact the practice was
unlawful unless the defendant could prove it was justified by business necessity.546 Early in his
tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia joined an important opinion in Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio547 which sought to limit disparate impact analysis and which Congress then tried to
overturn by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In his separate concurrence in Ricci v.
DeStefano,548 Justice Scalia even asked whether Title VII disparate impact analysis might itself
violate constitutional equal protection doctrine, which has been held since Washington v.
Davis549 to require proof of discriminatory intent as well as disparate impact. Disparate impacts
often emerge for totally benign reasons, and we think it is a huge mistake in race discrimination
or religion discrimination cases to shift the burden of proof only because of a disparate impact.
The real question in any Fourteenth Amendment discrimination case is whether the
government has denied to any class of people the same legal rights as were held by white men
under federal and state law in 1868. Members of every race, sex, and religion have the same
legal rights, today, as were enjoyed by white men in 1868. A law is discriminatory under the
Fourteenth Amendment without regard to proof of discriminatory intent or of disparate impact if
it gives a class of people fewer legal rights than were enjoyed by white men in 1868. Citizens of
every race, sex, and religion have, in the words of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ―the same
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right[s]‖ as were enjoyed in the 1860‘s by white citizens.550 Class legislation is unconstitutional
unless it is in the form of a general law enacted for the good of the whole people, not a
subsection of society.551
We think that disparate impact analysis in cases where discrimination on the basis of
religion is alleged must take account of the fact that it is often well known how a facially neutral
law will impact religion prior to its enactment. Because the discriminatory impact certain laws
will have on a known religion is so obvious and inescapable, discriminatory intent can be more
easily inferred in cases involving discrimination on the basis of religion than in cases involving
discrimination on the basis of race. Justice Field discussed this issue while riding circuit in 1879
in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, a case in which the court struck down an ordinance that permitted
prison guards to shave the heads of prisoners, even Chinese prisoners who wore a queue for
religious reasons.552 In that case, the government was well aware that shaving the queues of
Chinese individuals would violate their religious beliefs.553 Despite the possible benefits of the
ordinance, Justice Field was disturbed by the way in which ―the ordinance acts with special
severity upon Chinese prisoners, inflicting upon them suffering altogether disproportionate to
what would be endured by other prisoners if enforced against them.‖554 For that reason, the court
struck down the ordinance as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class legislation
discriminating on the basis of religion.555
If Justice Field had used the test of Employment Division v. Smith in Ho Ah Kow v.
Nunan, the prison ordinance requiring the shaving of queues should have survived because it was
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a neutral, generally applicable law regarding hair length in prison. But Justice Field recognized
that the disparate impact on Chinese religious practices was well known and severe and for that
reason the law in question did constitute impermissible class legislation. Justice Field further
discussed how a facially neutral law could be considered ―legislation with a hostile intent‖
merely because of the ―exceptional severity‖ such legislation inflicted on a particular class, such
as believers in a minority religion.556 Justice Field described, for example, how a law requiring
all prisoners to eat pork would violate the Fourteenth Amendment because of such a law‘s
obvious disparate impact on observant Jews.557 Justice Field also said that laws ―enacted with the
avowed purpose of imposing special burdens and restrictions upon Catholics‖ would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, even if they were facially neutral.558
Justice Field‘s point is that the existence of certain religious practices is often well known
before legislation is adopted, and for that reason severe disparate impacts on religion, unlike
severe disparate impacts on the basis of race, can be easily predicted. We therefore think that the
Fourteenth Amendment prevents lawmakers from simply ignoring obvious and inevitable
disparate impacts that facially neutral laws will have on religion unless those laws are needed to
avoid harm to some third party – for example, a widow being burned on the funeral pyre of her
husband. But under Smith, the Supreme Court seemed to say that lawmakers could force Chinese
prisoners to shave their heads, Jews to eat pork, and Catholics to pay for contraception and
abortions, as long as the laws in question are facially neutral and generally applicable. We think
that result is wrong and violates the Fourteenth Amendment for the reasons Justice Field gave in
1879.
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In Carolene Products Footnote Four, the U.S. Supreme Court said that the Fourteenth
Amendment banned laws that disparately impact religion. As discussed earlier, Footnote Four
cited one case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment
banned discrimination on the basis of religion.559 In Society of Sisters, the Oregon law at issue
was not one that facially discriminated against one religion or all religions. It was a facially
neutral, generally applicable law that merely had a disparate impact on religion because it
banned all private schools. The law in question applied to all school children, and the Court in
Society of Sisters cited no examples of anti-religious animus or of discriminatory intent in the
legislative history of the Oregon law. Yet the Carolene Products Court still cited the Oregon law
struck down in Society of Sisters as the primary example of a law ―directed at‖ religion in
violation of the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment.560 Why would the
Supreme Court cite a disparate impact case in discussing discrimination on the basis of religion
when it cited a case of facial discrimination for race?561 The Court did not explain itself, but we
can speculate that perhaps the justices recognized that disparate impacts on religion were more
common than facial discrimination on the basis of religion? Or perhaps the Supreme Court just
took judicial cognizance of the fact that everyone knew that Catholic parochial schools were the
real targets of the Oregon law no matter what the law said on its face. Or perhaps the Supreme
Court recognized that facial discrimination against religion was already banned by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as it would be incorporated against the states, whereas
the Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command outlawed disparate impacts on
religion as well as laws that discriminated on their face. Whatever the reason, Carolene Products
Footnote Four reflects the U.S. Supreme Court‘s acknowledgment in a seminal opinion that the
559
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Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command broadly bans all discrimination on the
basis of religion, just as it bans all discrimination on the basis of national origin or race.
We think that, instead of using the Smith rule, the Supreme Court should say that the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command as applied in the context of religion
mandates a variation of the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test. First, the Fourteenth Amendment‘s
ban on discrimination on the basis of religion means that a law discriminating on the basis of
religion can only be upheld if it promotes the general good of the whole people. The SherbertYoder test merely required that a law burdening religion pursue an important government
interest. Second, we also think that the Fourteenth Amendment demands an evaluation of the
degree of harm to religious citizens that is inflicted by the law in question as well as by the need
to protect a vulnerable third party from actual physical harm. Courts should take into account the
magnitude of the harm inflicted on religion, as the Supreme Court did in its equal protection
decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma, and as Justice Field did in Ho Ah Kow.562 And courts should
assess whether reasonable accommodations are possible, if not required, as is done in cases
arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act563 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.564 In contrast, the Sherbert-Yoder test simply required the government to pursue its interest
using the least restrictive means. Thus, the Sherbert-Yoder test would have wrongly allowed a
law to stand that discriminated on the basis of religion if that law served an important
government interest, even if it did not promote the general good of the whole people. And the
Sherbert-Yoder test would also wrongly permit a law to stand that inflicts substantial, irreparable
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harm on a religious group, so long as the law in question does so using the least restrictive
means.
Perhaps for these reasons the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test turned out to provide a pretty
skimpy protection for freedom of religion even in the days between 1963 and 1990 when the test
was widely used. Professor Adam Winkler points out that under the Sherbert-Yoder balancing
test and under RFRA, seventy-two percent of all the laws that have been challenged have been
upheld, even though the courts reviewing those laws were supposed to be applying strict
scrutiny.565 In contrast, in other areas of constitutional law where strict scrutiny is used, only
thirty percent of the cases that get strict scrutiny resulted in the courts upholding the law being
challenged.566 For this reason, some referred to the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Smith as a
―mercy killing‖ because the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test had proved to be such an ineffective
protection for the free exercise of religion.567
The laws that were struck down as unconstitutional in both Sherbert and Yoder may very
well have been consistent with the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause itself. Denying
welfare benefits or access to private charity schools may very well ―abridge‖ the Free Exercise
of Religion, but they do not ―prohibit‖ it. The verb ―prohibit‖ implies a government action that is
backed up with criminal sanctions. It is completely implausible to say that a denial of welfare
benefits is a ―prohibition‖ on the free exercise of religion. A criminal truancy statute in the
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context of Yoder might well rise to the level of being a ―prohibition,‖ but the denial of welfare
benefits in Sherbert and in Thomas v. Review Board do not.568
The government‘s actions in Sherbert, in Yoder, and in Thomas v. Review Board all,
however, do violate the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment. The laws in
all three of these cases clearly discriminated on the basis of religion. The law in Sherbert denied
a Seventh Day Adventist Sabbath observer unemployment benefits when she was fired because,
under her religion, the Sabbath was celebrated on Saturdays, and she refused to work on that day.
But for her religion, the plaintiff would not have been fired and would not have needed
unemployment benefits. The law in Yoder, like the law in Society of Sisters, placed a substantial
and irreparable harm on the parents of school children – in this case on the Amish. The
Wisconsin legislature was probably genuinely concerned with the level of education that school
children were receiving, but the Amish had a different approach to education based on their own
religious values, which they ought to have been free to pursue. The Wisconsin law in Yoder was,
in effect, a form of discrimination on the basis of religion, which was barred by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The law in Thomas v. Review Board denied unemployment benefits to a Jehovah‘s
Witness who refused to work for an employer who made military equipment. Here too, the law
in question operated as a form of discrimination on the basis of religion
The basic problem in all of these cases is that the religious individuals who brought them
were not similarly situated to secular individuals. The Seventh Day Adventist in Sherbert
celebrated the Sabbath on Saturdays and not on Sundays. The Amish parents and child in Yoder
thought that education mandated after eighth grade was bad for the soul. And, the Jehovah‘s
Witness in Thomas v. Review Board thought that it would violate his religion for him to work for
an employer who made military equipment. In all three cases, religious citizens were treated as if
568
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they were identical to secular citizens when in reality they were not alike. Fourteenth
Amendment principles are violated, not only when we treat two similar people differently, but
also when we treat two people who are in reality different in the same way. Sherbert, Yoder, and
Thomas are thus not examples of Griggs v. Duke Power disparate impact analysis run amok.
They are instead a reminder that we may sometimes need to treat different people differently if
we want to secure them a truly equal citizenship under the law.
For this reason, the foundational religious liberty case of all time, Pierce v. Society of
Sisters was correct because it involved an instance of discrimination on the basis of religion. In
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the facially neutral law in question applied much more harshly to
religious families who wanted, as a matter of their faith, to send their children to private religious
schools than it did to secular families. Even though there might be a public purpose served by
requiring all children to attend public schools, the law would fail strict scrutiny equal protection
analysis because it was partially aimed at closing down private religious schools, and it was not a
general law enacted for the good of the whole people.569 Religious education is a critical part of a
religious child‘s upbringing, and forcing a child to attend a secular public school in which the
child is taught in a secular way is clearly an irreparable harm that could be easily avoided with a
religious exemption. The fact that religious education is not a critical part of a secular child‘s
upbringing does not mean that religious education can just be outlawed across the board.
Religious children and secular children simply have different educational preferences. Treating
both groups the same way when they are in fact different violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, we think, as we implied above, that the decision in Smith was inconsistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment. The law in Smith penalizing ingestion of peyote in a Native
569
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American religious ceremony should have been struck down since it directly burdened the
exercise of religion in a ceremony of worship and posed no harm to other individuals. The harm
to the Native Americans involved in this case was certainly substantial and irreparable with
potentially far-reaching consequences. Although the drug laws do address a huge societal
problem – one which likely can only be addressed by government – allowing carve outs for a
few religious rituals would not undermine the efficacy of those laws.570 A narrow exemption for
a legitimate religious practice should have been feasible. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court
appeared to partially pare back Smith, by creating a significant, yet ambiguous exception to
Smith‘s general rule.571 In future cases, the Supreme Court should invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s ban on discrimination on the basis of religion as Justice Scalia would have done in
his dissent in Locke v. Davey. This would allow the Court to avoid the Smith rule entirely
without directly overruling a landmark precedent that it has relied upon for over twenty years.
B.

Establishment Clause
1. Originalism and the Establishment Clause

As an original matter, the Establishment Clause created only the most minimal limits on
government.572 Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Establishment Clause only applied to the
federal government and not to the states. At the federal level, the Clause substantively guaranteed
disestablishment. But beyond that, the Clause served simply as a structural tool of federalism,
permitting the states to choose whether to have religious establishments or not and barring the
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See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39-41 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that allowing an exemption to
federal drug laws for medicinal users of marijuana would undermine a national scheme to fight drug abuse).
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Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 821 (2012)
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See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, BELIEVERS AS EQUAL CITIZENS, IN OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS
OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 90, 100 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000)
[hereinafter ―BELIEVERS AS EQUAL CITIZENS ―] (describing how the Establishment Clause set up a ―pluralist state‖
as opposed to a ―secular state‖)
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federal government from having any say over this matter.573 Whether the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the Establishment Clause to apply against the states has been the subject of debate
among originalists with some arguing against incorporation574 and some arguing in favor of it.575
The evidence seems to us to more likely favor the incorporation argument. By 1868, twenty
seven out of thirty seven state constitutions had some form of an establishment clause.576 This
suggests that freedom from an established state church is a right that was deeply rooted in
American history and tradition in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
The Establishment Clause prohibits laws that ―substantively institute, authorize, or
otherwise establish religion,‖ as Professor Douglass Laycock has written.577 The Clause does not
set up a wall of separation between church and state.578 As Professor Michael Paulsen has
argued, the Establishment Clause should be interpreted using an equal protection approach.579 In
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See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32-41 (1998); Kurt T. Lash, The
Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1085,
1089-99 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2109 (2003); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 Wash. U. L.Q. 371, 406-07; Paulsen, Supra note 16, at 317; William C. Porth
& Robert P. George, Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment Clause, 90 W. Va. L.
Rev. 109, 136-39 (1987); Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1113, 1132-35 (1988); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the
Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 1191, 1201 (1990). Even Lawrence Tribe concedes that the primary
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CONG. 420, at 758 (Gales & Seaton eds.1789).
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1786, Samuel Johnson defined the word ―establishment‖ as mainly having financial
connotations, as in a ―settlement, fixed rate‖ or an ―allowance, income, salary.‖580 Samuel
Johnson also defined ―establishment‖ as being a ―foundation, fundamental principle‖ or a
―confirmation of something.‖ 581 Samuel Johnson defined the verb form ―to establish,‖ as
meaning ―to settle firmly, fix unalterably,‖ ―to make firm, to ratify,‖ ―to fix or settle in an
opinion,‖ ―to found, to build firmly, fix immoveably.‖582 Johnson‘s definitions thus would seem
to support Laycock‘s assertion that an establishment was a substantial undertaking. Samuel
Johnson also defines the verb ―establish‖ as ―to settle in any privilege or possession.‖ 583 This
definition suggests that the Framers may have included the Establishment Clause in the First
Amendment to prevent Congress from forming a national monopoly religion by granting a
special privilege to one religion but not to others. Read this way, the Establishment Clause
represents a ban on a certain form of particularly obnoxious class legislation.
Professor McConnell argues that six categories of laws fall within the original Eighteenth
Century understanding of what constitutes an establishment of religion. These six categories
include laws that: ―(1) control … doctrine, governance, and personnel of the church; (2) [make]
compulsory church attendance; (3) [give a religion] financial support; (4) prohibit… worship in
dissenting churches; (5) [govern the] use of church institutions for public functions; and (6)
restrict… political participation to members of the established church.‖584 McConnell‘s bright
line categories effectively ask whether a particular law actively establishes religion.585
580

See SAMUEL JOHNSON‘S 1786, supra note 512.
Id.
582
Id.
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Id.
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McConnell, supra note 525, at 2131.
585
The modern Supreme Court‘s tests for evaluating Establishment Clause cases are generally inconsistent with the
Clause‘s original meaning. For instance, the court in Lemon v. Kurtzman established a three part test to evaluate
facially neutral laws: 1) ―the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;‖ 2) the statute‘s ―principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;‖ and, 3) ―the statute must not foster an excessive
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McConnell avoids such nebulous concepts as whether a law ―advances religion,‖ whether it has a
―secular legislative purpose,‖ whether it ―endorses religion,‖ whether it leads to ―entanglement,‖
or whether it respects the ―separation of church and state‖
The Establishment Clause on its face seems only to bar actions taken by Congress, and
not actions taken by the executive or the judicial branches of government.586 This point flows
from the constitutional text which states that ―Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.‖587 But actions taken by the President alone or by other executive
branch or judicial officials do not violate the clause. The point is that making an establishment of
religion is a major undertaking that can only be accomplished with the participation of multiple
branches of government, as is required for Congress to make a law. Accordingly, the President‘s
declaration of a day of prayer and Thanksgiving, his appointment of military chaplains, or the
placement of religious symbols in the Oval Office or on the walls of the Supreme Court building
plainly do not violate the text of the Establishment Clause. The text also seems to permit placing

government entanglement with religion.‖ 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). These factors really have nothing to do with
establishing a religion as was understood at the time of the founding. In Agostino v. Felton, the Supreme Court
appeared to modify the Lemon test. There, the Court said that in evaluating aid to religion, courts should ask whether
the government had a permissible non-sectarian purpose and whether the law had a non-religious primary effect. 521
U.S. 203, 234 (1997) To determine whether an effect was permissible or non-permissible, a court should evaluate
three factors: (1) whether the aid supported religious ―indoctrination;‖ (2) whether recipients of the aid were defined
by a reference to religion; and (3) whether the aid program caused an excessive entanglement with religion. 521 U.S.
203, 234 (1997). Again, these factors are almost entirely irrelevant as an original matter. Unsurprisingly, using these
factors has led to decisions that diminish religious liberty, instead of promoting it. For instance, in Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., the Court struck down a law requiring employers to allow their employees to take off work
on the Sabbath. 472 U.S. 703 (1985) The court explained that the law had the primary effect of advancing religion
because it increased costs for employers and co-workers to accommodate the employee‘s religious practice. Id. The
repression of religious liberty in Thornton cannot be underemphasized. See also Board of Education of Kiryas Joel
Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (striking down a law creating a separate school district for a
group of Chassidic Jews who were unable to benefit from the secular public school system).
586
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religious symbols anywhere on government buildings or in parks, even in courtrooms, as well as
using the phrase ―In God We Trust‖ as our national motto.588
2.

Establishment Clause Questions after the Fourteenth Amendment

Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence Sager argue that Establishment Clause cases should
be viewed from what they consider to be an equality perspective.589 They believe that the
Establishment Clause‘s equality principle requires a hermetically strict separation of church and
state. Essentially, they think that almost any partiality that the government might show towards
religion violates an equality principle. They thus conclude that religious exemptions, displays of
religious symbols, and vouchers for school children are all unconstitutional.
A wooden, textual reading of the Fourteenth Amendment analysis could in theory lead to
a strict wall of separation between church and state, particularly if one starts from the assumption
that religion plays and should play no role in people‘s lives. If the Fourteenth Amendment bans
class legislation, one could thus argue that the government should not be able to provide religion
with special benefits not offered to the general population. A religious display during the holiday
season could thus be construed a special privilege, allowing a particular religion to advertise
itself or convey a message. And religious exemptions in general could be argued to be classic
588

The clause‘s emphasis on congressional actions also answers complaints that the participation of clergy members
and churches in politics is an establishment of religion. The language solely restricts Congress from passing a law
and in no way burdens religious individuals or organizations from involving themselves in politics. See Hamburger,
supra note 575, at 52. This is sensible because the purpose of the clause was to protect individual religious freedom.
See Hamburger, supra note 18, at 101. Barring religious individuals or organizations from politics also should
violate the No Religious Test Clause.
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See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is
Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 441 (1994) (The "equal regard" principle requires "that government treat
the deep, religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the same regard as that enjoyed by the
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religion.‖); see also Gellman & Looper-Friedman, supra note 18 (arguing that religious displays violate the Equal
Protection Clause because they make non-believers feel marginalized).
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examples of special class laws that carve out a unique benefit for a single class of individuals and
hold the rest of the population to a different standard. It is for this reason in City of Boerne v.
Flores that Justice Stevens concluded that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was an
unconstitutional establishment of religion over irreligion.590
The proper response to Justice Stevens and Professors Sager and Eisgruber requires that
we recall that a critical feature of lawsuits challenging partial or special laws during the
Antebellum Jacksonian period was that plaintiffs could only bring law suits when they had
suffered actual economic damages from a law.591 Litigation challenging special or partial class
based laws was not initiated by average citizens under a theory that those laws caused emotional
distress. Instead the plaintiffs who challenged class legislation during the Jacksonian era were
always attempting to recover a tangible economic loss that had resulted from the law they were
challenging.592 For this reason, there really was no difference between special laws, which
convey a unique privilege, and special laws, which impose a unique burden, because both types
of laws are economically burdensome. Thus, a standing requirement that a litigant have suffered
actual and concrete legal injury was essentially built into all the pre-1868 class legislation cases.
No one could have challenged as class legislation a law that caused them to suffer emotional
distress unless they had also suffered real and actual economic damages.
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City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring)
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See Saunders, supra note 19, at 299, n.243 (noting that ―none of the antebellum cases contain any suggestion that
discriminatory intent, standing alone - that is, without discriminatory effect - would raise constitutional concerns‖).
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See, e.g., Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15, 27-28 (Iowa 1849) (a half-breed Indian challenged a law singling out
halfbreed Indians for special disadvantage as land owners and attempting to recover property); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me.
326 (1825) (adversely affected party challenging a law granting certain person a special right to appeal financial
obligations between adverse parties); Budd v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 483 (1842) (criminal defendant challenged a
special criminal law applicable only to employees of a certain bank); Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 59
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creditor challenged a law granting a debtor a special right to release from debtor‘s jail without paying back his debt);
Saunders, supra note 19, at 252, n.28.
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There is no reason whatsoever to think that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class
legislation overrode this standing requirement for challenges to class-based laws, and there is no
historical evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment created a cause of action for unharmed
citizens. In an Establishment Clause context, to the extent that a law creates a unique privilege or
burden and causes actual economic damage, it constitutes class legislation, just as it would in
any other context. But absent actual economic damages, a law is simply not class legislation in
the sense in which that term would have been understood in 1868. Therefore the Supreme
Court‘s recent move toward tightening up the standing requirements in Establishment Clause
cases is completely consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class legislation.593
Sager and Eisgruber‘s belief that some abstract notion of equality requires courts to strike
down almost any relationship between government and religion is wrong for multiple reasons.
As we just explained, their argument has no basis in the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class
legislation, which contained a standing requirement and never recognized the causes of action
that Sager and Eisgruber endorse. Religious displays, President Obama‘s annual Easter prayer
breakfast, and the Supreme Court‘s recent Christmas Party simply do not constitute class
legislation because no one is legally injured by any of those government actions. Second, Sager
and Eisgruber‘s argument is irreconcilable with the original meaning of the Establishment Clause
which required an actual establishment of religion, as Professors Laycock and McConnell have
explained. Mere whiffs of religion are not to be mistaken for an establishment like the one that
existed in England from 1607 to 1791.594 The idea that a religious display constitutes an
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See Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, (2011) (restricting the application of Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), which served as an exception to standing requirements in Establishment Clause cases);
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establishment of religion because some peoples‘ consciences are offended by it is frankly
laughable. Many people‘s consciences are offended by the teaching of Darwin in public and
private schools. That does not mean that they have suffered a legal injury entitling them to sue.
And third, using the Fourteenth Amendment or First Amendment as a sword, rather than
a shield, to lash out at religion is bizarre given that those amendments were designed in part to
guard and promote religious liberty.595 It would be repressive and not freedom-enhancing for a
court to strike down religious exemptions designed to protect religious adherents damaged by a
generally applicable law. For that reason, it would be repressive and not freedom-enhancing to
refuse to grant vouchers to religious children who want to attend private religious schools or to
refuse to provide vouchers for religious schools, even though vouchers are provided for private
secular schools. Such refusals do not represent equality. They represent discrimination. And
banning religious displays that people want and enjoy when those displays do not economically
damage anyone is a restriction on religious freedom, not a promotion of it. Sager and Eisgruber‘s
―equal regard‖ principle is simply not consistent with either the original meaning of either the
Fourteenth or the First Amendment, and it violates basic principles of liberty and equality. In
reality Sager and Eisgruber are promoting a secular state that is more in line with the traditions
of France than it is in line with those of the United States.596
3.

Voucher programs do not violate the Establishment Clause

Government programs that provide tuition vouchers for students attending the private
school of their choice, including private religious schools, do not violate the Establishment
Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. In Zelman v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that such
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vouchers do not violate the Establishment Clause.597 Voucher programs for the use of private
schools do not constitute class legislation because they are general welfare benefits available to
all residents, and they do not single out a class of people for unique benefits or burdens. Because
students can use their education vouchers equally at both religious and at secular schools,
voucher programs are really no different from general welfare payments which recipients can
spend either on secular or religious goods and services. Suits challenging voucher programs
should probably even be dismissed for lack of standing,598 as the Supreme Court held in Arizona
Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn.599
School vouchers do not offend any of Professor McConnell‘s six categories of laws
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.600 Perhaps one could argue that vouchers provide
financial support for religious institutions. But the kinds of financial support that are barred by
the Establishment Clause are those instances where the government directly funds religion by
paying the salary of clergy or providing for the upkeep of churches or synagogues. In contrast,
vouchers for education give every student and parent the right to choose whether to use
government money at a private school, be it secular or religious, instead of having to attend a
secular public school. It would truly be a distortion of the Constitution to use the Establishment
Clause, which guaranteed religious liberty, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which guaranteed
individual liberty, to strike down a program that actually enhances individual educational choice.
The history of the Blaine Amendment also indicates that vouchers do not violate the
Establishment Clause. In 1875, James G. Blaine, who was at that point a Congressman from
Maine, proposed an amendment to the federal Constitution banning state governments from
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funding religious schools and institutions.601 Although the Senate did not ratify the Blaine
Amendment, thirty nine states and the District of Columbia eventually passed similar provisions
over a period of time that stretched from 1848 to 1959. The fact that Congress and the States felt
the need to pass the Blaine Amendment in 1875 to stop government money from going to
religious schools and institutions itself shows that members of Congress in 1875 did not think
that the Establishment Clause alone barred government funding of religious schools and
institutions. If the Establishment Clause had already banned public funds from reaching religious
institutions, then the Blaine Amendment would have been unnecessary. There is little historical
evidence that members of Congress objected to the Blaine Amendment on the grounds that the
Establishment Clause already did what the Blaine Amendment was supposed to do.602 Rather,
the history supports the Supreme Court‘s holding in Zelman.
One counterargument is that in 1875 many members of Congress may not have believed
that the Bill of Rights and therefore the Establishment Clause applied to the states. Accordingly,
they may have simply wanted to restrict the states in the same way that the federal government
was restricted. This explanation seems sensible in the wake of the Slaughter-House Cases, in
which the Supreme Court implicitly ruled that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.603 It
is also supported by statements made by members of Congress during the Blaine Amendment
debate in 1875 and 1876.604 But it is contradicted by the fact that Congress felt the need to add a
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Blaine-style provision to the D.C. Code, banning government funds to religious organizations in
the District of Columbia and restricting U.S. Government expenditures in general.605 That
provision would have been unnecessary if the Establishment Clause already barred public funds
from reaching religious schools and organizations. And the discussion about incorporation was
limited during the congressional debate, and there is little evidence that more than a handful of
congressional members were concerned with the issue of incorporation.606 Rather, the focus of
the debate was on the substantive merits of the Blaine Amendment.607
V.

The Blaine Amendments
Blaine Amendments play a significant role in the story of religion and the Fourteenth

Amendment. We think that the various Blaine Amendments in thirty-seven states and in the
District of Columbia violate the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class legislation because they
facially discriminate against religion, and they are not general laws that promote the good of the
whole people. These Amendments, which were passed at the end of the Nineteenth and the
beginning of the Twentieth Centuries, were motivated by anti-Catholic bigotry and to a lesser
extent by hatred of other minority religions. That ugly history has been to some extent forgotten
in the modern secular era, where Blaine Amendments are currently viewed as being general antireligion clauses, and not as being clauses that target Catholics or another specific group. Blaine
Amendments are a reminder of how insidious a neutral, generally applicable law that purports to
only burden religion in general can be. Blaine Amendments have also received some cover in the
modern era from the Court‘s Free Exercise Clause case law because they do not on their face
target a specific religion, such as Catholicism, and instead discriminate against all religions
equally. We think that under a Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination analysis, Blaine
605
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Amendments should surely be struck down. Laws that barred government funds from going to
organizations or schools run by racial minorities – say, historically black colleges -- would surely
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. We find it impossible to see why blocking government funds
from going to religious schools and organizations should be any different. Blaine Amendments
discriminate on the basis of religion in distributing government money, and they should thus be
subjected to strict scrutiny and struck down.
The passage of the various Blaine Amendments in the Nineteenth Century, both before
and after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, does make one wonder whether the
original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s anti-discrimination command really did
ban discrimination on the basis of religion. This question may be of interest to those who are
original intent theorists, but it is irrelevant to those who believe in the original public meaning of
the constitutional text. The objective original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as it
was adopted in 1868 banned all forms of class legislation including class legislation targeted at
religion. The fact that some framers or other politicians subjectively believed or expected that
religion would not be included in this ban is quite simply irrelevant to determining the objective
public meaning of the constitutional text. Thus the Nineteenth Century practice of discriminating
on the basis of religion, just like the Nineteenth Century practice of discriminating on the basis
of race, became unconstitutional on the day the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Practice is
an imperfect guide in discerning the original public meaning of constitutional texts.
A. The History of the Blaine Amendments
As we mentioned above, there are currently thirty-seven states with so-called ―Blaine
Amendments‖ in their state constitutions that prohibit government funds from reaching religious
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organizations, such as schools.608 The District of Columbia has a comparable provision in the
D.C. Code.609 These Blaine Amendments come in varying forms, and state courts have used
them to strike down many different kinds of government funding schemes.610 A typical provision
reads, ―no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, donated, or used,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system
of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.‖611 The bigoted and shameful history of
Blaine Amendments has been well-documented612 and is worth briefly recounting.
Conflict over funding religion began with the advent of the public schools in the 1830s
and 1840s. Public schools during this time characteristically taught the Bible from a Protestant
perspective and imbued Protestant values in children. At the same time, large numbers of
Catholics, and to a lesser extent Jews, began immigrating to the United States.613 The public
education of children in an increasingly pluralistic religious environment led to conflicts among
religious factions with deeply held religious values. The Protestant majority set up a public
school curriculum designed to convey Protestant values, and many dissenting Catholics and Jews
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understandably resisted.614 But Protestant educators went a step farther and used public schools
as a forum for denigrating Catholics and excluding non-majoritarian religious views.615 In an
attempt to level the playing field, Catholics began requesting private school funding in such
major cities as New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore.616
Protestants responded to these requests for government funding of parochial schools with
a strong legislative backlash designed to prevent Catholics from ever controlling public schools
or from ever receiving any public funds. In 1842, the New York State legislature passed a law
that banned government money from ever going to any schools where ―any religious sectarian
doctrine or tenet shall be taught, inculcated, or practiced.‖617 In 1848, Wisconsin became the first
state to amend its State constitution to impose a similar prohibition on government money ever
going to a religious school.618 By 1875, another thirteen states had followed Wisconsin‘s lead by
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founded on the pretense that religion has no legitimate place in public education... [i]n reality it was a particular kind
of religion that its proponents sought to isolate from public support‖).
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See Diane Ravitch, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: NEW YORK CITY, 1805-1973, 3-76 (1974); Joseph P. Viteritti,
Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 Yale L.
& Pol'y Rev. 113, 192 (1996).
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See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 615, at 301; Joseph Viteritti cites the law as New York law as 1844 N.Y. LAWS
ch. 320, § 12. See Viteritti, supra note 616, at 146 n.176.
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WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (added 1848) (―nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of
religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.‖)
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adopting similar Blaine Amendments to their State constitutions.619 Although on their face these
prohibitions appeared to neutrally prohibit all government funding of religious schools,
protestant religious practice in the public schools was so common during this time period that it
was clear that these states were not endorsing secularism in any way.620 Several State
constitutions adopted during this period expressly used the word ―sectarian,‖ which, in the
Nineteenth Century, was taken to be a code word for ―Catholic.‖621
At the national level, politicians jumped on the anti-Catholic bandwagon. The ―KnowNothings,‖ later known as the American Party, were dedicated to ―remov[ing] all foreigners,
aliens, or Roman Catholics from office‖ and opposed appointing Catholics to positions of
power.622 The Know-Nothings and the American Party had enormous success in local and
national elections.623
Opposition to funding private religious schools was based primarily on a fear and hatred
of Catholics and immigrants. Protestant fear of Catholics was partly motivated by the belief that
Catholic doctrines were contrary to American principles of freedom, individuality, and perhaps
democracy. For instance, the Catholic Church‘s traditionally authoritarian structure, close
connection between church and state, and tight regulation of individual rights and conduct was
perceived as somewhat un-American.624 Opposition to funding religious schools was also

619

MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 40 (1850); IND. CONST. art I, § 6 (added 1851); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (added 1851);
MASS. CONST. art. XVIII (added 1855); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2. (1857); OR. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1857); KAN.
CONST. art. VI, § 8 (1859); KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (1868); ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3
(1870); ALA. CONST. art. XII, § 8 (1875); PA. CONST. art. III, § 18 (1874); MO. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (1875); NEB.
CONST. art. VIII, § 11 (1875).
620
See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 615, at 299.
621
See Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 388, at 38.
622
See Michael F. Holt, The Politics of Impatience: The Origins of Know Nothingism, 60 J. Am. Hist. 309, 311 (1973); see also Katz, supra
note 613, at 118, n.15 (describing how the American Party used oaths to test Catholics‘ loyalty and put Catholics in precarious situations).
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Katz, supra note 613, at 112.
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See, e.g., Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 615, at 302-03 (describing the church‘s opposition to secular education and
freedom of conscience and noting that ―Rome hampered attempts by American Catholics to abandon the Church's
legacy by issuing reactionary pronouncements ideally suited to confirm the rankest prejudice‖); STEPHEN MACEDO,
DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 61 (2000) (noting that America's
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motivated by a nativist skepticism of all immigrants, particularly Irish Catholics.625 Yet this
seemingly secular nativism ultimately blended into religious prejudice.626 Anti-Catholic
newspapers circulated,627 there were numerous incidents of mob violence against Catholics, and
Catholic churches were burned down.628 Public schools were a means of assimilating Catholics,
Jews, and other immigrants into the Protestant mold.629
In the 1860s and 1870s there was also a wave of radical secularism that was committed to
―the absolute separation of church and state.‖630 The goal of these secular humanists was to
terminate ―all public appropriations for sectarian educational and charitable institutions‖ and that
―no privilege or advantage shall be conceded to Christianity or any other special religion‖ at both
the federal and state level.631 Secularists also demanded that ―our entire political system shall be
founded and administered on a purely secular basis.‖632 For these secularists, the Blaine
Amendment was insufficient because it did not effectively wipe out religion from the public
sphere. Secularists ―viewed all Christians with the same fear and horror [that] Protestants

―core principles of individual freedom and democratic equality‖ seemed to conflict with the Catholic Church's
―authoritarian institutional structure, its long-standing association with feudal or monarchical governments, its
insistence on close ties between church and state, its endorsement of censorship, and its rejection of individual rights
to freedom of conscience and worship‖); Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of Orphans and Vouchers: Nevada's
"Little Blaine Amendment" and the Future of Religious Participation in Public Programs, 2 NEV. L.J. 551, 555
(2002) (noting that ―[t]he Vatican Decree of Papal Infallibility of 1870 added to the anti-Catholic sentiment during
this time‖); Hamburger, supra note 18, at 229-34 (discussing the church‘s condemnation of separation of church and
state and reaction by American Protestants).
625
See Hamburger, supra note 18, at 202; see also Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State
Relations, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 121, 130 (2001) (discussing the ―long history‖ of American anti-Catholicism).
626

See Hamburger, supra note 18, at 202; see also Berg, supra note 625, at 130 (discussing the ―long history‖ of
American anti-Catholicism).
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Viteritti, supra note 615, at 667.
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reserved for Catholics.‖633 Most shockingly, they even believed that ―government benefits
distributed on purely secular grounds could not be given to religious organizations.‖634
In 1875, the Blaine Amendment gained fervent momentum at the national level. President
Ulysses S. Grant delivered an influential speech in which he said that Congress should
―Encourage free schools, and resolve that not one dollar, appropriated for their support, shall be
appropriated to the support of any sectarian schools.‖635 Lest anyone think that Grant was
endorsing secularism, Grant added that children should receive a ―good common school
education, unmixed with sectarian, pagan, or atheistical dogmas.‖636 Grant‘s speech was a clear
attack on Catholics in an effort to align himself with Protestants as he sought a third term for
President.637 On December 7, 1875, speaking before Congress, Grant called for ―a constitutional
amendment ... prohibiting the granting of any school funds, or school taxes, or any part thereof ...
for the benefit or in aid, directly or indirectly, of any religious sect or denomination.‖638 James
Blaine followed Grant‘s lead, and Blaine proposed his amendment to the federal Constitution on
December 14, 1875.639 Blaine‘s proposal was met with overwhelming support because it was
seen ―as a means of curbing the Catholic influence on school boards.‖640 The national Blaine
Amendment failed to clear the Senate, but states continued to amend their state constitutions
with their own Blaine Amendments well into the Twentieth Century.
B. The Supreme Court and the Blaine Amendments
633

Id. at 302.
Id. at 304-05 n.43
635
Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 388, at 47.
636
Id.
637
Viteritti, supra note 615, at 670.
638
Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 388, at 51.
639
(―No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
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therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any
money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.‖); Blaine Amendment
Reconsidered, supra note 388, at 49-50 (citing The Index, Dec. 2, 1875, at 570)
640
Id. at 53 (citing Zion's Herald, Dec. 16, 1875, at 4; Dec. 23, 1875 at 4).
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The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the constitutionality of the thirty-seven
Blaine Amendments in various State constitutions.641 The closest the court came to passing on
this question was in Locke v. Davey642 where the Court considered the State of Washington‘s
policy of not giving scholarship money to individuals seeking a religious education, even though
it provided scholarships to individuals seeking a secular education. The plaintiff in Davey had his
scholarship revoked once he took up religious study at a religious school but would have been
able to maintain his scholarship if he had studied religion from a secular perspective.643 Chief
Justice Rehnquist‘s majority opinion held that the states have ―room for play in the joints‖ of the
Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses that allows the states in some contexts to facially
discriminate against religion.644 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that barring funding for
religious education served the state‘s ―antiestablishment interests,‖ even though the court in
Zelman had declared that this kind of funding was completely permissible under the
Establishment Clause.645 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the state did not impose
―sanctions on any type of religious service or rite‖ or deny ―to ministers the right to participate in
the political affairs of the community‖ or force ―students to choose between their religious
beliefs and receiving a government benefit.‖646 These actions would certainly have violated the
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Various articles have argued that Blaine Amendments are unconstitutional. See, e.g., Mark Edward DeForrest, An
Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 551, 617-625 (2003) (arguing that Blaine Amendments violate freedom of speech); Heytens, supra note 610,
at 140-52 (arguing that Blaine Amendments violate equal protection); Duncan, supra note 5 (arguing that Blaine
Amendments violate the Free Exercise Clause); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers,
Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 917, 962 n.204, 967-971
(2003) (indicating that some Blaine Amendments could violate free speech principles); Rebecca G. Rees, ―If We
Recant, Would We Qualify?‖: Exclusion of Religious Providers from State Social Service Voucher Programs, 56
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1291, 1313-1328 (1999) (explaining how Blaine amendments improperly restrict free speech).
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See 540 U.S. 712. In Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-829 (2000), the Court noted the ―shameful pedigree‖
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See Davey, 540 U.S., at 716-717.
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Free Exercise Clause under existing Supreme Court precedent. Instead, the state had ―merely
chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.‖647 This was a sufficiently rational basis for
the law, even though choosing not to fund an activity on the basis of race or gender would
obviously violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the facts in Locke v. Davey warranted a
direct application of the ban on facial discrimination on the basis of religion enunciated in the
Church of the Lukumi Babalu case. Justice Scalia cited Brown v. Board of Education648 and
Craig v. Boren and compared facial discrimination in schools on the basis of religion to facial
discrimination in schools on the basis of race and gender, although he did not explicitly invoke
the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment that we argue for in this
article.649 Justice Scalia noted that Employment Division v. Smith only permitted facially neutral
laws that disparately impacted religious practice, not facially discriminatory laws like the ones
upheld in Locke v. Davey. Justice Scalia emphatically argued that the state did not have a
legitimate governmental interest in barring government funding for religious students when
government funding for similar secular studies was allowed.650
It is not clear, however, that the holding in Locke v. Davey should necessarily lead to
upholding Blaine Amendments. Professor Douglas Laycock has argued that the holding in Locke
v. Davey was a narrow one and that it only applies ―to training of clergy, to refusals to fund that
are not based on hostility to religion, and to cases that do not involve forums for speech.‖651
Blaine Amendments are blanket bans on government funding of any religious school or
institution, not just bans on government funding of the clergy. They were also clearly motivated
647
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347 U.S. 483.
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Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
650
Id. at 734.
651
See Laycock, supra note 388, at 184.
648

154

Calabresi and Salander

by a strong anti-Catholic bigotry in the Nineteenth Century.652 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
could, consistent with Locke v. Davey, hold Blaine Amendments unconstitutional.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has similarly limited the
application of Locke v. Davey in an important opinion by then-Judge Michael McConnell.653 In
Colorado Christian Univ. v. Weaver, the Tenth Circuit struck down a state educational funding
scheme that allowed government money to go to religious schools but that barred it from going
to ―pervasively sectarian‖ schools.654 Writing for the majority, Judge McConnell explained that
under Locke v. Davey ―the State‘s latitude to discriminate on the basis of religion is confined to
certain ‗historic and substantial state interest[s].‘‖655 Accordingly, Davey ―does not extend to the
wholesale exclusion of religious institutions and their students from otherwise neutral and
generally available government support.‖656 Only ―minor burdens and milder forms of disfavor
are tolerable in service of historic and substantial state interests‖ while ―major burdens and
categorical exclusions from public benefits‖ are problematic.657 Judge McConnell‘s opinion also
held that discrimination on the basis of religion is subject to ―heightened scrutiny‖ and could
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See generally Hamburger, supra note 18. Some scholars argue that this overt bigotry alone should be sufficient to
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violate the Equal Protection Clause.658 Thus, the Tenth Circuit applied some sort of intermediate
scrutiny for religion in place of the usual rational basis test.
C. Blaine Amendments Constitute Class Legislation
State Blaine Amendments easily violate the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on class
legislation. Blaine Amendments facially discriminate on the basis of religion by explicitly
carving out a special disadvantage for religious individuals as compared to secular individuals.
Blaine Amendments fit precisely into the definition of class legislation ―which is partial in its
operation, intended to affect particular individuals alone, or to deprive them of the benefit of the
general laws.‖659 The plaintiff in Davey lost his scholarship once he took up religious study at a
religious school, but he would have been able to maintain it if he had studied religion from a
secular perspective.660 This is a blatant instance of the government discriminating on the basis of
religion. Other applications of Blaine Amendments could include: 1) allowing vouchers for
students attending secular schools, but not for students attending religious schools; 2) allowing
the funding of secular charities, but not of religious ones; or 3) denying any other government
benefits or welfare payments to religious groups while upholding them for secular individuals.
Blaine Amendments therefore constitute blatant discrimination on the basis of religion, and they
are impermissible in the absence of a very compelling public purpose.
Blaine Amendments lack a legitimate public purpose because the types of funding that
they outlaw are generally constitutional when the money goes to a secular school or institution.
The Supreme Court has held that many forms of government funding of religious organizations

658
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do not violate the Constitution.661 These holdings are consistent with the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause which only banned actual establishments of religion.662 So, it seems quite
difficult to claim that the Blaine Amendments serve an ―antiestablishment‖ purpose663 when the
Supreme Court has itself said that many of these kinds of funding programs do not actually
violate the Establishment Clause. States could certainly have provisions in their state
constitutions that parallel the federal Establishment Clause without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s ban on discrimination on the basis of religion. For example, states could ban direct
funding of the clergy consistently with the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth
Amendment. States could even augment the protections of the federal Establishment Clause in
some contexts, as the states commonly do with other constitutional provisions. But states cannot
augment a provision of the federal Constitution in a way that violates the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s ban on discrimination on the basis of religion. We do not allow states to
strengthen free speech protections in a way that discriminates based on race because doing so
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, we should not allow states to strengthen
federal Establishment Clause protections in a way that discriminates on the basis of religion.
The simple desire not to fund religion, as a matter of conscience, is not a legitimate
public purpose that can save the Blaine Amendments if the identical activity does get funded
when done by a secular school or institution. The argument that taxpayers, as a matter of
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See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652 (holding that a government voucher program that benefited students attending
religious schools did not violate the Establishment Clause); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1,
13-14 (1993) (holding that public employees may be placed in religious schools); Witters v. Washington Dept. of
Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986) (holding that public funds could support a blind person at a religious
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conscience, should not be forced to indirectly support religion by having their tax dollars go to
religious organizations664 is not itself a public welfare rationale. The conscientious objection
rationale may explain the ulterior motivations of supporters of Blaine Amendments, but it does
not provide a constitutional defense for those amendments. To justify class legislation, a law
must convey a general benefit that promotes the good of the whole people. Examples of class
laws that promote the general good of the whole people include most of our police power laws
which are designed to protect the public‘s health, safety, and economic autonomy. Simply
banning a specific class of disfavored people who are religious from receiving government
money does not promote a public purpose. Undoubtedly, there are white supremacists who – as a
matter of conscience – object to government funds being spent for the benefit of AfricanAmericans. But, in our constitutional system, this is not an acceptable public purpose that could
justify class legislation on the grounds that it was meant to benefit the general good of the whole
people. Indeed, members of religious groups could argue quite plausibly that they
conscientiously object to having their tax dollars used to fund a secular public school system. In
Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law banning sodomy because it
lacked a ―legitimate state interest,‖ despite the fact that the law reflected local morals and
conscience.665 The Court stated, ―Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.‖666 If the Court can conclude that laws targeting gays and lesbians lack a public
purpose, even though homosexuality is no where mentioned in the Constitution, unlike religion,
then the Supreme Court should surely be able to say that laws discriminating on the basis of

664

See, e.g., Americans United for Separation of Church and State, http://www.au.org/issues/religious-schoolvouchers/ (last visited April 12, 2011).
665
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
666
Id. at 558.

158

Calabresi and Salander

religion are not general laws enacted for the good of the whole people. Such laws must instead
be subjected to strict scrutiny.
Locke v. Davey‘s license to discriminate on the basis of religion in the context of
educational funding could easily be transferred to many other sorts of government programs.
Educational funding is merely one type of general welfare program designed to benefit the
public. Educational funding is thus no different in principle from Medicare, Social Security, or
even the provision of local fire protection services.667 Under the logic of Davey, the legislature
could ban Medicare recipients from going to religious hospitals or prevent Social Security
recipients from making donations to religious institutions. Or perhaps local communities, in
keeping with the local residents‘ ―freedom of conscience,‖ could establish fire departments that
protect secular schools and organizations, but not religious ones. The fact is that Davey is no
more defensible than are any of these other forms of government discrimination on the basis of
religion. What this shows is that Davey must be wrong.
How can the Supreme Court change course? The answer is that in Locke v. Davey, the
Supreme Court was exclusively focused on the Free Exercise of religion question, and it failed to
ask whether the state law in that case violated the equal protection doctrine by discriminating on
the basis of religion. The majority in Davey concluded that revoking Davey‘s scholarship did not
constitute a ―prohibition‖ of religion within the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. The parties
and amici in Locke v. Davey were also primarily focused on the Free Exercise Clause question.
Some of the briefs mentioned the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
they did so only in passing.668 Neither the majority, the dissent, or any of the briefs gave any
serious consideration to the Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination question. So the
667

In Zelman, the Court effectively described Ohio‘s voucher program as a general welfare program, referencing the
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Fourteenth Amendment discrimination issue was not truly before the Court in Davey, even
though it should have been. The parties never recognized that Washington State‘s law was an
impermissible form of class legislation which violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and so the
Court did not truly pass on that issue. In the future, the Supreme Court could and should simply
take up the Fourteenth Amendment discrimination question.
D. The Counterargument of the Blaine Amendments
One possible counterargument to our thesis is that the sordid history of state Blaine
Amendments shows that the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment was such that
the Amendment was not thought to protect religious freedom at all. Since nine states had Blaine
Amendments in 1868, and another twenty-four states added Blaine Amendments to their state
constitutions by the end of the Nineteenth Century, it could be argued both that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not incorporate the religion clauses of the First Amendment and that it did not
ban discrimination on the basis of religion. This point is further underscored by the overt antiCatholic and, at times, anti-religious bigotry that accompanied these Blaine amendments.
This counterargument regarding religion actually mirrors a similar counterargument that
could be made regarding discrimination on the basis of race and gender. In the years immediately
following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, racial segregation was widespread in
the United States especially from 1877 to 1954. During the period between 1868 and 1920 and
then again from 1937 to 1971, discrimination on the basis of gender was also widespread
notwithstanding the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. The Supreme Court‘s
awful decisions in Plessy v. Ferguson,669Bradwell v. Illinois,670 and Goesaert v. Cleary671 further
justified and entrenched these discriminatory practices. The history of virulent discrimination
669
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against African-Americans and women following the ratification of the Fourteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments has led some to believe that a deviation from the original meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment is necessary to protect against racial or sex discrimination.672
But these arguments are mistaken.673 The original expected applications of the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment, much like their subjective intent, are simply not relevant to
ascertaining the objective public meaning of the text of the constitutional provision that they
wrote. A fitting analogy is someone who contracts to sell his house and at the closing refuses to
hand over the keys to his garage, noting that the contract does not specify that the garage, which
he did not intend to sell, was included in the sale of the house. The seller‘s expectations and
subjective intent would be simply irrelevant in establishing the objective meaning of the contract
which would instead be defined by local laws and customs. The Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment deliberately and knowingly used broad, unqualified language that went far beyond a
simple ban on race discrimination. The original objective public meaning of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to ban all forms of class legislation and all systems of caste. When
the framers wanted to excise certain groups, such as aliens, from the broad protection of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, they crafted a text that explicitly applied only to citizens. The
fact that the text mentions neither race, nor gender, nor religion, means that a general ban on all
forms of class legislation was enacted. The fact that some or even many framers or other
politicians failed to understand what the Amendment had done and thought that discrimination
on account of race or religion was still permissible is irrelevant to the objective original public

672

See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979
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meaning of the text.674 Instead, discrimination on the basis of race and religion became
unconstitutional on the very day that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. To say otherwise
is no better than the guy who wants to hold onto his garage.
VI.

The Public School System
We think that our argument that Blaine Amendments violate the Fourteenth Amendment

leads to a further and perhaps startling conclusion. We think that the current American public
school system violates the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on all forms of class legislation for two
basic reasons. First, we think that states discriminate on the basis of religion when they
administer secular public schools that are unpalatable to religious individuals and that are funded
with taxpayer dollars. As already discussed, discrimination on the basis of religion is a form of
class legislation that is banned by the Fourteenth Amendment. And many religious children
constitute a caste because their religious status is inherited from their parents and is effectively
immutable until they grow up. Indeed, some religions, including Judaism and Islam, do not even
acknowledge conversions of their members to other faiths as being valid. Second, we also think
that public school systems violate the Fourteenth Amendment because they are state-operated
monopolies. These state-run public school monopolies are no different in principle from the
types of state-granted monopolies that the Jacksonian Democrats fought against in the
Nineteenth Century and that the Fourteenth Amendment banned. To rectify these breaches of the
Fourteenth Amendment, we think that states are constitutionally obligated to give tuition
vouchers to all students that they can use, if they wish, at the private school of their choice.
A. Discrimination on the Basis of Religion
674

See Harrison, supra note 30, at 388 (discussing how the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were concerned
that the Amendment could have broader implications than they expected or intended because they recognized that
the objective meaning of the text, not the subjective intent, was controlling); see also Calabresi & Matthews, supra
note 30 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment banned antimiscegenation laws, despite the Framers‘ intent).
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Public schools discriminate on the basis of religion. Even though the education laws do
not explicitly ban religious individuals from attending public schools, religious students are
effectively excluded by the character of the public school curriculum, moral teachings in public
schools, and general atmosphere at public schools.675 Public education is generally advertised as
being secular, neutral, and open to all students. Yet neutrality in education is probably
impossible because conveying values to children is an inherent aspect of education.676
Secularism and popular culture are incompatible with many religious belief systems, and public
schools are simply incapable of teaching the religious values and doctrine that religious families
often need. Indeed public education in America is neither neutral nor welcoming to all students,
as public schools regularly promote political and social agendas at odds with religious views. 677
In modern society, it is impossible to create a ―neutral‖ educational environment.
Religious and secular educators advance polar opposite approaches on such controversial topics
as sex education,678 homosexuality,679 abortion,680 and standards of dress and decency. For
instance, California recently enacted the California Fair Education Act which mandates that
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educators, textbooks, and instructional materials positively promote "lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
Americans" as role models.

681

Needless to say, this produced a strong backlash from religious groups opposed to

these lifestyles. Balancing religion

and science has also never been simple. The debate over

creationism versus evolution is long-lived and impassioned.682 Which books should be read, or
not read,683 as well as how to teach history are also regularly debated.684 And clashes between
religious and secular factions frequently end up being litigated in court.685
The facts of Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District686 are instructive of the
religion versus secularism controversy in public schools.687 There, a kindergartener had drawn a
picture of Jesus as part of a class assignment. The school district censored the picture in
furtherance of its antiestablishment interests. The Second Circuit sided with the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits, holding that schools may not censor students in this curricular context. But the
First and the Tenth Circuits permit this form of censorship.688 One would not expect a neutral
public school program, palatable to all, to produce a heated circuit split.
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The overall environment of public schools is also incompatible with many religions‘
beliefs. Many religions forbid pre-marital sex and foul language and are simply repulsed by a
popular culture that endorses these behaviors. Many religious groups are also skeptical of
modern materialism which seems to equate happiness with physical possessions. And they are
concerned about the way women are objectified in the media and popular culture, and how
young girls and boys are consequently impacted. For these reasons, many religious parents are
careful about which kinds of movies, television shows, or websites they allow their children to
view. And, quite predictably, many religious parents do not want their children in a militantly
secular school where their beliefs are trivialized or are described as being bigoted.
Many religions also require that a specific religious curriculum be taught to students of
their faith. For instance, Orthodox Jewish schools typically spend a large portion of the day
teaching religious subjects that include the study of scripture, Jewish law, and Jewish ethics.689
Many Christian and Muslim schools have similar programs, depending on the needs of their
respective student bodies.
Today public schools are almost all militantly secular institutions. This is in part the fault
of the Supreme Court which has outlawed prayer and Bible study in public schools. Under the
Supreme Court‘s Establishment Clause case law, Bible readings and prayer in public schools are
unconstitutional, even if some students are absent or can be excused from these activities.690
Problems also arise if a school proscribes religious exercises,691 teaches creationism,692

1993) (allowing a public school committee to refuse to reappoint a biology teacher who discussed abortion based on
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distributes the Bible in school,693 or otherwise sponsors a religious message.694 Other potential
land mines include voluntary prayer, moments of silence, student sponsored events, sporting
events, and graduation ceremonies.695
Public schools are also largely secular because most public school administrators believe
that teaching a rigidly secular dogma is best both for public school students and for society. This
is perhaps in part a result of the increased pluralism in American society which has created a
need to find a middle ground common to everyone.696 Public schools have been forced by the
courts to adopt a ―no endorsement‖ policy in a futile attempt not to alienate anyone.697 But in
practice, many religious students are in fact alienated and marginalized.
Modern secular humanism is a core, almost religious, belief system of modern liberalism.
Secular humanists distrust – and sometimes even dislike – religion.698 Modern secular humanism
teaches values and opinions that are often wholly inconsistent with religious teachings.699
Though so-called modern ―liberals‖ pretend to favor concepts such as ―neutrality,‖ ―tolerance,‖
and ―independent thinking,‖ liberal educators in practice often have little or no tolerance for
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religious views that are incompatible with the tenants of modern liberalism.700 Excluding
religious views from the classroom is in fact important to effectively convey liberal secular
humanist ideology to public school students.701 The result is that ―common schools‖ are unable
to incorporate different viewpoints and bring true religious diversity into the classroom.702
The use of facial neutrality as a façade for the exclusion and intolerance of those who
hold a religious belief is not a new practice for the public school system. From the moment
public schools were founded by Horace Mann in the Nineteenth Century, they were infused with
majoritarian intolerance of minority religions. Mann advertised his ―common schools‖ as
inclusive and open to everyone without a bias for any particular religious denomination. 703 The
curriculum was designed to be a ―pan-Protestant compromise, a vague and inclusive
Protestantism.‖704 In justifying the practice of reading the Bible without commentary, Mann said
that, ―Our system earnestly inculcates all Christian morals; it founds its morals on the basis of
religion; it welcomes the religion of the Bible; and in receiving the Bible, it allows it to do what
it is allowed to do in no other system, to speak for itself.‖705 Yet Mann‘s schools were not at all
bastions of religious inclusiveness. Instead their curricula were based solely on Protestant
teachings and were wholly intolerant of any other form of Christianity or of any other religion. 706
While reading the Bible without commentary might seem to be neutral on its face, such a
700
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practice was in truth designed to shut out non-Protestant teachings and was deeply offensive to
Catholics.707 Mann said that ―sectarian books and sectarian instruction, if their encroachment
were not resisted, would prove the overthrow of the schools.‖708 The word ―sectarian‖ here was
code for Catholic. Mann‘s schools reflected a national trend in public education: states operated
public schools that were allegedly ―nonsectarian‖ but that were in fact incredibly intolerant of
non-Protestant denominations.709 Other countries have had similar historical experiences where
majoritarian groups integrate allegedly neural values into systems of public education that turn
out to be nothing more than a façade for the oppression of religious minorities.710 If history is
any indicator, there is nothing neutral about neutrality in the context of public education.
Public education has long been advertised as being a government benefit that is available
to the whole population, but it is in reality a form of class legislation because it is simply
unacceptable to religious individuals unless they have no other choice. A widely recognized
phenomenon in anti-discrimination law is to understand that a racially hostile environment or a
sexist or harassing environment is a form of race and gender discrimination. Public schools could
not and should not be able to teach racist or sexist literature, and public school teachers cannot
and should not be able to make racist or sexist comments in class. The same principle applies to
discrimination on the basis of religion in schools. It is not enough for the government to avoid
discrimination in hiring teachers or admitting students. The government must also not create a
hostile learning environment for devoutly religious students. Teaching Orthodox Jews or
fundamentalist Christians or devout Muslims that non-marital sex is acceptable creates a
707
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forbidden form of a religiously hostile environment. Banning prayer and Bible study in classes
does the same thing. For this reason alone, it is obvious that the modern day secular public
schools are engaged in a systemic form of discrimination on the basis of religion.
This point can be further illustrated with an analogy. Suppose a state decided to buy
clothing for its residents. But instead of buying different clothing for men and women, the state
just bought men‘s clothing and offered it to everyone on equal terms. Undoubtedly the program
would be unconstitutional because men‘s clothing is fundamentally unfit for women. Similarly,
our militantly secular public schools are fundamentally unfit for religious students. They offer a
learning environment that is hostile to religion and therefore discriminates on account of religion.
Consider another hypothetical. Suppose that the government decided to shut down the
entire public school system and instead gave all students tuition vouchers, which they could use
to attend the private school of their choice. Suppose further that the government stipulated that
those education vouchers could only be used at secular schools, and not at religious ones. Such a
selective funding program would clearly constitute facial discrimination on the basis of
religion.711 Our current public school system is simply the publically operated version of that
secular voucher program. Instead of funding only secular private schools, the government funds
only secular public schools. Why should a program that funds only secular public schools be
considered any less discriminatory than a program that funds only secular private schools?
The discriminatory impact of the secular public school system is compounded by the
enormous financial burden that the current system places on religious families. Religious
families that are poor simply may not be able to afford private school tuition for their children.712
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Consequently, they are forced to send their children to secular public schools against their
religious beliefs. Once there, students are exposed to a learning environment that is enormously
hostile to their religious beliefs. Racial minorities are especially likely to be disparately impacted
by this predicament.713 And this problem is exacerbated by mandatory education laws which
obligate all children between certain ages to attend a school. Even Wisconsin v. Yoder only
exempted religious school attendance beyond the eighth grade. Poor religious parents who could
not afford a private school for their first grader would undoubtedly be forced to send him or her
to a secular public school with an environment that is hostile to their religion. For a religious
family, sending a child to a secular public school could easily constitute a substantial and
irreparable harm for the reasons described above. From a religious family‘s perspective, the
degree of harm could be comparable to the harm caused by discriminatory sterilization laws in
Skinner v. Oklahoma. Religious children may grow up to be atheists, much to their parents‘
profound dismay. Even religious families that can afford private schools suffer substantial
damage from the public school system because private school tuition is often expensive.
The financial burden is compounded by the gross inequity of forcing religious families to
pay for secular public schools as taxpayers in addition to paying private school tuition.714 Public
schools are paid for by taxpayers at the local, state, and federal levels, yet private schools are
funded solely by parental fees and private donations. Religious families are therefore forced to
subsidize the education of secular students – while religious families get nothing in return. This
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form of wealth redistribution based purely on religious distinctions is reminiscent of the religious
taxes placed on members of disfavored minority religions, such as Jews and Catholics, in
Europe.715 Governments at all levels in the United States have effectively decided that secular
education is the winner, religious education is the loser, and that religious families must therefore
open their pocketbooks. If the ACLU has conscientious objector taxpayer standing to object to
Christmas and Hanukkah displays, then surely religious parents have conscientious objector
status to sue over being taxed to pay for militantly secular public schools with a learning
environment that is illegally hostile to religion.
To make matters worse, the government‘s policy of discriminating on the basis of
religion incentivizes religious individuals to actually become secular. This is true because
government programs fund only secular education,716 and this encourages religious individuals to
attend militantly secular public schools in violation of their core religious beliefs. The obvious
consequence is that those students will be less well educated in their own religious traditions,
less committed to their religions, and more likely to embrace militant secularism and
materialism. Governments in the United States have not outlawed religious schools, which might
violate the Free Exercise Clause, but they have gone around the Free Exercise Clause by creating
a very substantial financial incentive for children to abandon the religious traditions of their
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families.717 And the proof is in the pudding: since the Supreme Court began striking down
religious instruction and prayer in schools in the early 1960s,718 religious affiliation has dropped
from over 90% of the American public to approximately 77%.719 Over the same time period, the
percentage of individuals who have no religious identification has increased from around 2% to
approximately 16%.720 When schools lack religious instruction or maintain a learning
environment that is hostile to religion or even openly denigrate religion, children will simply
lack the connection and the education they need to lead a virtuous and religious life. Therefore
despite the Supreme Court‘s affirmation in Pierce v. Society of Sisters that families have a
constitutional right to educate their children according to their own religious beliefs, the public
school system in the United States transforms that right into a mere fantasy for families who are
unable to overcome the financial burdens of paying for a private religious education. The end
result is a government-mandated subsidy of secularism.
The words of the Supreme Court underscore the paramount significance of private
religious education. In Society of Sisters, the Court struck down a state law that would have
forced children to attend public school because the law ―unreasonably interferes with the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children.‖721 The court said,
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
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right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.722
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court added, ―the values of parental direction of the
religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a
high place in our society.‖723 And in Abbington School District v. Schempp, Justice William J.
Brennan wrote, ―The choice between public secular and private or sectarian education is one-very much like the choice of whether or not to worship-- which our Constitution leaves to the
individual parent. It is no proper function of the state or local government to influence or restrict
that election.‖724 But our current public school system with no education vouchers for religious
students violates these core principles by strongly favoring a secular education and by
economically penalizing a religious education.
Discrimination on the basis of religion in this context cannot be defended on the ground
that funding public schools is a general law that promotes the good of the whole people and that
therefore serves a compelling government interest. As already explained, the public schools are
unacceptable to religious individuals because they are permeated with a learning environment
that is openly hostile to religion. For a law to be a general law, it must benefit almost everyone or
at least be available for almost everyone. Roads and parks can be created by the use of powers of
eminent domain because they are available for everyone. Many occupational licensure laws and
requirements that one have a driver‘s license to drive are for the same reason general laws that
benefit the whole people. But the funding of public schools with an environment that is hostile to
religion coupled with a refusal to give religious students an education voucher is not a general
law that promotes the good of all the people nor is it justified by any compelling governmental
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interest. If the government wants to fund education, then public funds must be made available to
all individuals in a way that does not require the religiously devout to learn in an environment
permeated by hostility to religion. If a government policy had a disparately negative impact on a
racial minority or on one gender, it would certainly be intolerable. Policies that have such an
impact on religion should not be viewed any differently. We would never tolerate a public school
that approvingly taught a racist book like Little Black Sambo, by Helen Bennerman, or a sexist
magazine that contained pornographic material denigrating women. We should be equally
intolerant of a system of public education that forces devoutly religious children to learn in an
environment that is saturated with contempt for religion.
Even if the secular public school system served a compelling public interest and was a
general law enacted for the good of the whole people, the discriminatory impact of the current
public school system on religion fails the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test. That test requires the
government to pursue its goal in a manner that has the least restrictive impact on religion. What
is the government‘s goal? If the goal is to educate children broadly, then the least restrictive
means requires that the government fund education for all children and not only for secular
children. Paying for only secular public schools but not for religious ones is not the least
restrictive means by which the government can pursue its objective. And if the government‘s
true goal is to narrowly provide only secular education, but not religious education, then that
goal is impermissible because it discriminates on the basis of religion. There is simply no good
reason for the government to decide that education devoid of religion is objectively better than
education involving religion. As a policy matter, asserting that secular education is superior to
religious education is utterly baseless because religious schools have existed for several
millennia and have successfully educated students over that whole period of time. Most of our
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major private universities, including Yale and Harvard, originated as religious schools. And
secular public schools in this country have had, shall we say, somewhat mixed results. But more
critically, deciding that education devoid of religion is objectively better than education
involving religion is an illegitimate goal because it constitutes discrimination on the basis of
religion. The government certainly could not maintain an education policy designed to educate
whites but not blacks or men but not women. Why should an education policy designed to
benefit only secular children and not religious children be any different?
Some argue that private schools should not be funded by the government because only
wealthy families send their children to private schools. This argument is problematic for several
reasons. First, private schools are populated by children from low and middle income families.725
The words of Maimonides, the great twelfth century Codifier of Jewish Law, exhibit the
extremity to which fervently religious people will go to pursue religious study:
Every Israelite is under an obligation to study Torah, whether he is poor or rich, in
sound health or ailing, in the vigor of youth or very old and feeble. Even a man so
poor that he is maintained by charity or goes begging from door to door, as also a
man with a wife and children to support . . . [as scripture says,] ‗But you shall
meditate therein day and night.‘726
Needless to say, individuals with Maimonedes‘ perspective will not be dissuaded from attending
private religious schools, even if doing so comes at great financial hardship. Second, the
argument is premised on the notion that wealthy families should be entitled to fewer government
benefits than non-wealthy families. That logic is itself a classic example of class legislation,
violating Locke‘s maxim that there should be ―one rule for rich and poor.‖727 And third, many
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wealthy families send their children to public schools without paying extra fees or tuition.728 So,
the notion that educational benefits are distributed based on wealth is utterly without merit. The
real dividing line between the public and the private schools is religion. Those families who can
tolerate secular education – whether rich or poor – can enjoy tuition-free education. And those
families whose religious beliefs require that their children attend religious schools or who object
to a public school learning environment that is hostile to religion must pay through the nose for
their private school education. That is discrimination on the basis of religion – plain and simple.
Just to be crystal clear about our argument, the problem with American public schools is
one of discrimination on the basis of religion, not one of the denial of fundamental rights. The
government has no obligation to fund religious education as a substantive right, just as it has no
obligation to fund abortions, church construction, or most other substantive constitutional rights
that private individuals enjoy. If the government would choose not to fund any education at all
that would be constitutionally permissible. But what the government cannot do is fund education
discriminatorily. If the government chooses to fund education, as it has, it must do so evenhandedly without distributing benefits by discriminating on the basis of religion.729
B. Education Monopoly
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The public school system is a monopoly, no different from the Nineteenth Century
government-granted monopolies which the Fourteenth Amendment outlawed along with all other
class legislation. As already discussed, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had a
Jacksonian concern with the evils of government-granted monopolies or government grants of
special ―privileges‖ or ―immunities‖ conferred on only a few crony capitalists. The Privileges or
Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause were originally understood as banning
monopoly and class legislation by securing equally to all citizens all of the privileges or
immunities of both federal and of state citizenship. Professor Calabresi has set out the originalist
argument that state government grants of monopoly violate the Fourteenth Amendment in
extensive detail in another article, and we will therefore not repeat those arguments here.730 It
suffices here to say that government grants of monopoly are only permissible under the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment if they are contained in general laws that benefit the
whole people. Occupational licensure laws for brain surgeons and airplane pilots undoubtedly
satisfy this test, but the present day militantly secular public school monopoly does not.
The President of the American Federation of Teachers, Albert Shanker, once remarked
about American education that, ―public education operates like a planned economy .... [O]ur
school system ...more resembles the communist economy than our own market economy.‖731
Indeed it does. In 2009-2010, approximately ninety percent of all K-12 students attended public
schools.732 In the context of the private economic sector, that statistic would by itself easily
trigger an antitrust lawsuit.733 But here we just call it a public service that is secured by a
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government grant of special privilege. Years ago, some states tried to gobble up that final ten
percent by banishing private education, but the Supreme Court slammed on the breaks in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters.734 Currently the fifty states retain their dominant market position by simply
relying on their financial power. The states refuse to fund private education at all, or they choose
to fund only some private schools that meet certain very specific criteria. The unsavory effects of
the government conferred public school monopoly are the same as the unsavory effects that
appear with most government grants of monopoly power. There are: 1) fewer consumer choices,
2) higher costs to consumers, 3) lower quality services, and 4) a discriminatory benefit that only
accrues to the monopolist in this case public school administrators and teachers.735
It is important to stress that the public school monopoly is government-granted, just as
were all monopolies prior to the adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Law in 1890.736 When the
Jacksonians railed against the evils of monopolies, their principal objection was to government
grants of special privileges to a single citizen or class of citizens. The government has granted
itself control over the public schools, just as it granted control of the railroads to particular
private companies which were given the power to take private land by eminent domain.
But the public school monopoly is especially pernicious because the revenue for the
public schools comes from all taxpayers. Consumers are forced to pay for a monopoly system of
public education, whether they want to or not, so the public schools do not even have to go out
and convince consumers to purchase their services. In contrast, no legislature has ever in any
other context forced consumers to actually purchase products from a government-granted
monopoly. When English Kings and Queens granted a monopoly on the right to produce playing
734
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cards to a royal favorite, they never required that the public buy those playing cards and thus pay
the monopoly rent. Governments in the United States have sometimes favored specific
companies, such as railroad companies, and they have also created unfair marketplaces where
consumer choice is limited,737 but they have never in any other context actually forced
consumers to pay for the monopolist‘s services whether they used those services or not.
The fact that the consumers of education are forced to pay for the government‘s
educational services is especially problematic in light of this country‘s religious diversity. As
already explained, a public school that creates an environment that is openly hostile to religion is
simply not an option for many religious families.738 Families for whom religion is an integral
part of their lives are therefore forced to pay for militantly secular public schools to which they
would never send their own children – not in their wildest dreams. Public funding of militantly
secular schools is equivalent to forcing a consumer to a buy a product for himself which he
abhors, telling him that the product is actually good for him, and then refusing to give him back
his money when he demands it. Even the most overbearing government and private monopolies
cannot actually force consumers to buy a product that they do not want. Most monopolies
survive and flourish by taking advantage of consumers who already want to purchase their
product. But generating revenue from people who actually detest the product being offered
requires a level of coerciveness that is unique to the public school system. Forced support for
militantly secular public education is not at all similar to state laws that require that we all
purchase car insurance. Such laws are general laws that promote the good of the whole people
and that are justified by a compelling governmental interest. Nor are the laws establishing the
public school monopoly at all similar to government funding of roads and parks which are open
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and available to the entire public. They are instead comparable to President Obama‘s individual
mandate which compels individuals to purchase health insurance, even though those individuals
might have wanted to stay out of the health insurance market altogether. In the education context
as with the healthcare mandate, the states force individuals to pay tuition to public schools, even
though those individuals might never want to attend a public school.
To make matters worse, families that manage to send their children to private schools are
forced to pay two tuitions – one for public school and one for private school. Even the most
onerous monopolies would never be able to force consumers to purchase their products even
though those consumers had already gone out and purchased a competing product. The
combination of the economic inefficiency and injustice of this result is truly staggering.
As with any monopoly, the public school system decreases consumer choice by
eliminating competition. A monopoly‘s dominant market position allows it to muscle
competitors out of the marketplace. Here, competing services (i.e., private schools) are
dramatically disadvantaged because public education is offered free of tuition. This is a powerful
and unique feature of the public school monopoly. Few, if any, typical monopolies have the
luxury of offering their products for free and generating income from the government based on
the number of people who sign up for their free products. Private schools obviously cannot
seriously compete with free tuition, as parents face enormous economic pressure to send their
children to public schools. For poor families, there is simply no alternative. For wealthier
families, the economic burden is coupled with the knowledge that their tax dollars already pay
for public schools. Consequently, private school enrollment is effectively capped, as supply and
demand are artificially low for private schools and artificially high for public schools.
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And like most monopolies, the people who are coerced into consuming the public
schools‘ services get stuck with a service that has many undesirable elements. In a competitive
market, consumers can choose from different products, selecting the one that matches their tastes
and preferences. But a monopoly eliminates that choice, giving consumers only one product that
they may or may not like. There is strong evidence that public education is quite undesirable
even for families whose children attend the public schools. A 2011 Gallup poll showed that only
34% of Americans have ―a great deal‖ or ―quite a lot‖ of confidence in their public schools.739
Only 8% of Americans are ―completely satisfied‖ with K-12 education today, and only 37% are
even ―somewhat satisfied.‖740 These numbers show that consumers of education are not getting
the kinds of services that they want. Unsurprisingly, several polls have shown that a strong
majority of public school parents would prefer to send their children to private schools if they
could afford to do so.741 Part of the explanation for these poll numbers could be that public
schools are entirely secular, while approximately 80% of all Americans identify themselves as
religious.742 In 2009-2010, only 8% of all K-12 students attended private religious schools,743
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indicating that consumers of education, 80% of whom are religious, may not be receiving the
kind of education that they want. Alternatively, they could just be upset about the low quality of
secular academics or poor school administration.744 Either way, people are unhappy with the
service that they are consuming.
The experiences of other countries are instructive. When the government does not
monopolize the market for education, families often choose to send their children to private
schools in substantially higher numbers than they do when the government operates a public
school monopoly as in the United States. For instance, in the Netherlands, the government pays
for the full cost of education for all students at both public and the private schools.745
Consequently, 70% of school children in the Netherlands attend private schools, with the vast
majority attending private religious schools.746 In Australia, where the government funds
approximately 50-75% of private school costs,747 approximately one-third of all Australian
students attend private schools.748 In Israel, where the government funds between 60% and 100%
of private school expenses, 40% of Israeli students attend private schools.749 But in the United
States, where the government barely funds private schools at all, only 10% of students attend
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private schools.750 These statistics show that when families have a meaningful choice, they often
choose to send their children to private schools.
Because public schools are insulated from competition, they, like most monopolies, can
afford to operate inefficiently and deliver sub-optimal services. The basic reason is that
competition forces market players to provide the highest quality services possible at the lowest
possible cost.751 But a monopoly can afford to slack off and provide lower quality services at a
higher expense and just stick the cost back on the consumer. This problem is especially
pronounced with public school education because consumers do not choose to pay tuition but are
instead forced to cough up taxes to the government. Theoretically, consumers of other
monopolized services could still choose whether to buy those services or not. Unsurprisingly, the
evils of monopolies are readily apparent to anyone who looks at our public schools. They are
wasteful, bloated, bureaucratic monstrosities that fail to effectively educate children. 752
For poor children, the injurious effects of government‘s monopoly are especially
pronounced. Generally speaking, public schools in poor, urban neighborhoods provide the lowest
quality education.753 These schools are fraught with crime, dilapidated facilities, and often subpar teachers and administrators.754 They consistently produce high drop-out rates, low scores on
standardized tests, and few graduates going on to college.755 As Justice Thomas put it, ―[t]he
failure to provide education to poor urban children perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty,
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dependence, criminality, and alienation that continues for the remainder of their lives.‖756 To
make matters worse, poor students cannot opt out of this system because they cannot afford to
attend private schools and are instead trapped in the jaws of the government‘s educational
monopoly. Their lot in life is truly a sad manifestation of the Court‘s statement in Brown v.
Board of Education: "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education."757 For these reasons, the vast majority of low
income parents support private school vouchers.758 Even some liberal political theorists
hesitantly support vouchers to help poor children.759
This economic monopoly also allows the government to exert ideological control over
students. As Professor McConnell has pointed out, government control of ideology often has a
strong majoritarian bias which in turn tends to smother minority groups and dissenting
opinions.760 In the nineteenth century, Protestants used the public schools to attack Catholics, and
now secularists and liberals use the public schools to attack religion and conservatism.761 For this
reason, the strongest advocates of vouchers are members of religious minorities, especially
Catholics, Evangelicals, and Jews, as well as political conservatives.762
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The government‘s monopoly of education also disturbs a critical balance of power
between the government and parents. Nearly ninety years ago, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the
Supreme Court recognized that parents, not the state, have the right ―to direct the upbringing and
education of children‖ because ―[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State.‖763 The Supreme
Court has time and again reaffirmed that parents have a right to educate their children in the way
in which they see fit.764 By monopolizing education through the creation of the public schools,
the government has created a very uneven playing field that tilts the balance of power firmly
towards government schools, substantially decreasing the likelihood that parents will be able to
exercise their Society of Sisters rights.
So, why does the education monopoly persist? There are several reasons why it is
retained. First, fear and hatred of Catholics has existed since the Nineteenth Century, and
Catholic parochial schools have historically comprised the majority of private schools.765 AntiCatholic bigotry was most vividly exemplified in the Nineteenth Century school funding wars
and in the history of the Blaine Amendments,766 and it continued fervently into the Twentieth
Century and persists even today. Refusing to fund private schools is an effective way to express
anti-Catholic sentiment. Second, some people, especially elites, simply do not like religion of
any kind, and they do not want their tax dollars used to support religion in general. 767 They do
not mind, however, using tax dollars obtained from religious people to teach secularism, Darwin,
and the joys of extra-marital sex. This view is fueled by growing secularism and by
misconceptions about the supposed need to maintain a ―wall of separation between church and
763
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state.‖768 Third, many individuals and organizations, namely teachers unions, school boards,
administrators, and all other school personnel, benefit from a massive government-run school
system, and they do not want to lose their jobs or give up their monopoly rents.769 The
beneficiaries of a government grant of monopoly often wield substantial political influence and
are able to sway elected officials to preserve their monopoly at all costs.770 Fourth, some
wealthier communities are concerned that local tax revenues would be diverted away from
schools in their communities.771 Some of these individuals also fear that poor, minority students
from the inner city could start attending schools in their communities. Indeed the Ohio voucher
plan from Zelman allowed inner city children to enroll in suburban public schools, if those
schools would permit them to enroll, but no suburban public schools allowed them to attend.772
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The fact that the government is the beneficiary of the monopoly does not alleviate the
Fourteenth Amendment violation. President Jackson vetoed the re-charter of the Second National
Bank, which was partially owned by the federal government, on the ground that it gave
monopoly banking privileges to a single federally chartered corporation. And the public schools
fit the basic model of a special monopoly because they single out a class of people for a special
benefit and consequently burden all other classes of people.773 Jackson himself decried laws that
sought ―to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent
more powerful.‖774 But public schools do just that, perpetuating themselves through their
statutory power over taxpayers and exerting their ideological control over religious dissenters.
C. The Solution: Endorse Pluralism
To rectify the way in which the public schools breach the Fourteenth Amendment both by
discriminating on the basis of religion and by establishing a monopoly which does not promote
the general good of the whole people, the Supreme Court should order state governments to
make education vouchers available to any student who wants a private education either secular or
religious. If families choose to send their children to private schools, whether secular or
religious, the government should fund that education, just as it funds public school educations
today. The Supreme Court would not have to change its case law banning direct funding of
religious education by the public schools, and it could instead simply require the states to
implement voucher programs with the vouchers being redeemable at secular or religious schools
based on the parents‘ choice. The Supreme Court should not shy away from the fact that
judicially mandated vouchers would cause a significant, perhaps revolutionary, change in
American public school education. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court radically
773
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changed American public schools forever and for the better, by tearing down an educational
system that discriminated based on race. The Supreme Court should be similarly enthusiastic
about striking down our present-day public school system that discriminates on the basis of
religion and that functions as a government-granted monopoly.
Forcing the states to implement education voucher programs is not a revolutionary idea.
Embedded in the philosophy of government vouchers to pay for school education is the principle
of pluralism which is a foundational democratic value that permeates our whole constitutional
system. For example, constitutional federalism recognizes that the fifty states might have varying
values, tastes, and concerns; the electoral process recognizes that different people might vote for
different leaders; and the First Amendment acknowledges that individuals might have different
opinions and religious affiliations. Similarly, government funding of private school education
recognizes that families might have different approaches to education. Frederick Douglass once
said that, ―education . . . means emancipation. It means light and liberty. It means the uplifting of
the soul of man into the glorious light of truth, the light by which men can only be made free.‖775
How can there be only one kind of educational ―light and liberty?‖ The notion that the best way
to achieve Douglass‘ ―light and liberty‖ is through a government-run secular school system with
an environment hostile to religion is absolutely preposterous. There are many ways to educate
children, and many different kinds of plausible schools. Instead of pursuing the impossible task
of defining a set of common, neutral values to thrust upon all children,776 the government should
instead embrace pluralism and recognize that different people have different values. Favoring
public secular education over private religious education is the pinnacle of intolerance and
contradicts democratic principles.
775
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Many other democratic countries have rejected the American ―one size fits all‖ model
and have instead endorsed a pluralistic model that requires the government to fund private
religious education. Some of those countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Germany, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, and New Zealand, 777
England, and France,778 amongst others.779 Many of these countries are religiously diverse780
and choose to fund religion as a means of embracing and celebrating their diversity. The
American system with its hostility to religious education stands out as a complete anomaly.
Comparing and contrasting the American experience with the Dutch experience
highlights just how disgraceful the American system of public school education is. In the
nineteenth century, both the Netherlands and the United States recognized that education was
fundamentally important.781 And during that time, both countries faced enormous turmoil over
how to fund education.782 In the United States, the conflict featured Protestants against Catholics;
in the Netherlands, secular liberals faced off against Catholics and other Christians. American
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Protestants and Dutch secularists each controlled their respective public school systems and
sought to teach children an allegedly consensus set of values that would unify society. In both
countries public education turned out to be quite oppressive for religious minorities who did not
subscribe to the majoritarian ideology. And so in both countries, religious minorities, mainly
Catholics, objected to the educational systems and fought to obtain public funds for their private
schools. But the outcomes were vastly different. Dutch Catholics joined forces with Orthodox
Reformed groups and successfully obtained school funding from the Dutch government, while
American Catholics got steamrolled by the Protestant majority and by today‘s secular elite.
The two countries‘ disparate philosophies are striking. The Netherlands adopted the
political philosophy of Abraham Kuyper, a Calvinist, who believed that tolerance and diversity –
whether secular or religious – were crucial elements of a successful society.783 Kuyper rejected
the notion of a single set of universal values or that one value system was necessarily better than
another. Instead Kuyper favored pluralism and tolerance. So widely accepted was Kuyper that he
served as Prime Minister of the Netherlands from 1901-1905. In 1917, the Dutch Constitution
was amended to guarantee funding equality for public and private schools without regard to
religious affiliation.784 Kuyper‘s pluralism was officially constitutionalized and has continued to
play a central role in Dutch society since that time. In contrast, nineteenth century Americans
endorsed religious intolerance and passed Blaine Amendments.785 Through the mid-twentieth
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century, Protestant themes and anti-Catholic bigotry pervaded American public schools. Starting
in the 1960s, the Supreme Court struck back at Protestants and began eradicating all religion
from public schools. Contemporary public school ideology has mutated into a mishmash of
secularism, liberalism, and environmentalism.786 Religious families are left to fend for
themselves. At a time when the Dutch were endorsing pluralism, Americans were endorsing
intolerance.
The fruits of these disparate philosophies are evident in contemporary education. Today
Dutch children can attend the school of their choice, and the Dutch government pays the full cost
whether the school is religious or secular, public or private. Consequently, 70% of Dutch
children attend private schools, with the vast majority attending private religious schools. 787 But
in the United States, only 8% of children attend private religious schools, even though
approximately 80% of Americans identify themselves as religious.788 In the context of education,
the Dutch embraced Fourteenth Amendment principles, but Americans did not.
A voucher system would dramatically change American schools for the better.789
Vouchers would break up government‘s education monopoly by giving students, particularly
poor students, the ability to attend private schools.790 Students would thus enjoy all the benefits
of a free market, including more ideological and religious choices and greater quality
786

See Robert H. Nelson, Rethinking Church and State: The Case of Environmental Religion, 29 Pace Envtl. L. Rev.
121 (2011) (arguing that environmentalism is a religion).
787
See Helen F. Ladd, Edward B. Fiske, Nienke Ruijs, Parental Choice in the Netherlands: Growing Concerns
about Segregation, 6, prepared for the National Conference on School Choice, Vanderbilt.
University, (September 2009), available at http://www.ncspe.org/publications_files/OP%20182.pdf.
788

See American Religious Identification Survey, Trinity College, available at
http://commons.trincoll.edu/aris/files/2011/08/ARIS_Report_2008.pdf, 5 (2008); see also Pew Forum on Religious
Life, available at http://religions.pewforum.org/reports (finding that approximately eighty-three percent of
Americans identified themselves as religious).
789
See generally Friedman & Friedman, supra note supra note 735.
790
See Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The Triumph of Pluralism, and Its Effects on Liberty, Equality, and
Choice, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1105, 1172-73 (2003) (discussing how vouchers would benefit the poor).

191

Calabresi and Salander

education.791 Public schools themselves might even benefit from the increased competition
which could motivate them to operate more efficiently and improve the quality of education
delivered.792 The result would be greater pluralism, more diversity, enhanced religious freedom,
and higher quality education.
Conclusion
After the Civil War, Americans amended the Constitution to guarantee equality for all
people by eradicating systems of caste and class legislation. They did this because they had
learned from their own mistakes – slavery, government-granted monopolies, and the like. They
observed caste systems around the world from the Indian Caste system to European feudalism,
and they recognized that it was fundamentally immoral to single out specific groups for special
burdens or benefits that did not apply to the rest of society. Although limited bans on class
legislation had been around since the founding, after the Civil War the sentiment was that society
had changed to the point where a ban on class legislation had to be constitutionalized. From then
on, legislation would have to provide a general welfare benefit, and the laws would have to be
equally enforced. No longer could the government pick out winners and losers. The goal was a
society of equals. Religion was certainly included in this protection. At this point in history, the
United States stood out on the world stage as the standard-bearer for societal equality.
Unfortunately, the Fourteenth Amendment‘s goal of creating a society without systems of
class, caste, or government conferred monopolies did not come to fruition quickly. Racist
legislation and enforcement continued. Segregation persisted. Blaine Amendments were passed.
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Even after the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, gender discrimination lived on
until 1971. In short, American legislatures got away with a lot of racist and sexist legislation, and
the courts until Brown v. Board of Education failed to step in. Our history of Jim Crow and of
sexism does not prove that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment permitted racism
and sexism. They only prove that the American people and their Supreme Court justices were not
adhering faithfully to the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ban on racial and gender systems of class
legislation and of caste. The fact that some people violate a law does not mean that the law
permits the conduct in question. It just means that some people are engaged in lawlessness. Over
time, American courts and legislatures have rectified many of the lawless violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment, eliminating racial and gender discrimination, as well as other improper
forms of class legislation. But as for discrimination on the basis of religion, American courts and
legislatures still have significant work ahead.
In the context of construing the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
government currently has way too much discretion to force religious individuals to comply with
generally applicable laws. Smith and City of Boerne represented significant steps away from the
no class legislation principles of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Sherbert-Yoder
balancing approach should be restored, albeit with a bit more backbone, and the various state
Blaine Amendments should be struck down because they discriminate on the basis of religion.
In the context of education, the situation is truly embarrassing. While the United States
was once at the forefront of the equal rights movement back in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries, the current state of the American public schools has unfortunately moved the United
States to the back of the pack. Countries all over the world have endorsed educational pluralism,
the funding religious education, and private schools of all stripes. But the United States
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persistently maintains an educational monopoly that favors secular education and secularism in
general. The funding scheme grossly discriminates against religious families and ultimately
diminishes the quality of education and educational choices for children. Most astonishingly,
many states still have Blaine Amendments which facially discriminate against religion. The
result is that the equality goals of the Fourteenth Amendment remain unrealized for religious
families who are forced to pay for both public and private schools. And the assurance of Pierce
v. Society of Sisters that everyone has a right to educate their children as they see fit remains an
unfulfilled promise for many families who are coerced into sending their children to militantly
secular public schools. Courts and legislatures should return to the principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment and should endorse religious pluralism by requiring the states to implement voucher
systems for both secular and religious public and private schools.
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